*1 168 answered had that year. he owned Appellant
many shotguns he ticket -showing solicitor “one” and the produced pawn two. owned at least in determin latitude has considerable trial judge The State evidence. admissibility impeachment ing E. 298 Williams, S. (2d) S. C. v. 252, 126 E. 28 Brock, v. S. C. State (1974); rather than at two shotguns owned least The fact appellant raised by credibility point his one directly went trial court did circumstances, hold we him. Under these -to con examination in (cid:127)allowing.the -discretion abuse its not objection. tinue over appellant’s merit are without exceptions Appellant’s remaining 23. Rule dismissed under
Affirmed. Gregory Littlejohn, Harwell,
Lewis, C. J., JJ-, concur. LaBARGE, STATE, George Appellant. v. Respondent, Ronald 278) (268 E.S. *2 L. and Thomas A. Harrelson McKinney, Hugh
Thomas Givens, Hill, appellant. A. Rock for Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Gen. Attys.
Atty. Gen. Columbia, and Sol. P. G. Sally Young, Brim Gibbes York, respondent. L. Ferguson, William 21, 1980. July
Littlejohn, Justice: was convicted George
Ronald of murder and robbery armed was sentenced life Julian Johnson *3 years, For the twenty-five imprisonment respectively. this the facts mur- surrounding appeal purposes Johnson’s reverse, be will not detailed. We are not important der trial which entitle La- occurred during that errors finding new trial. to a Barge trial, unsuccessful motion a
Following separate codefendant, a was ordered trial with a LaBarge along Terry It the was the theory Lee State that Jackson. Jackson the shot that was LaBarge fired fatal to assist. present the State was a presented by Among confession in the crimes. by implicated LaBarge given Jackson the mandate of United States v. Bruton, with In accordance Ed. Ct. 20 L. U. (1968), confession of one defendant the out-of-court cannot that be codefendant, statement was redacted in against used all references to to exclude direct It LaBarge. can an attempt the method of that was in- forecfully redacting argued name “Mister X” appeared, “LaBarge” Where effective. other In the “Mister X” testimony light substituted. After to LaBarge. presentation directly pointed case, State’s his from not changed to plea guilty Jackson At that moved that state- guilty. LaBarge point, Jackson’s’ ment be from evidence since was no withdrawn longer relevant in the trial of the defendant. The only remaining trial this No reference to the state- request. refused ment was made his initial judge during charge However, of his at the conclusion jury. supplemental stated: charge,
“One other I want to tell thing before you conclude my remarks, whenever though, you consider written state- any case, ment in this in mind that that statement can keep be used the defendant against it.” making
We believe that the trial erred to re failing move out-of-court statement from the rec it, ord and to admonish jury disregard erred in the statement to the room go as an ex letting jury hibit. Once trial, and was no pled guilty longer Jackson the statement not to^ relevant issue. Under remaining any Bruton, supra, United States v. the statement could not have been used against event. This LaBarge error was later the trial compounded judge allowed the jury, above, to consider the charge quoted statement. Jackson was no so the longer defendant, judge’s charge effect the statement to the attention bringing jurors’ while them could not use it telling they against LaBarge. These errors us to a new grant trial. require
Since several exceptions raise issues which arise may *4 case, in the again retrial of this we will address those matters for the of court and counsel. guidance asserts that the trial erred in
LaBarge denying his motion to all of State’s witnesses. sequester do not We agree.
“Whether witnesses are or not is a for sequestered matter Hall, the discretion of the trial State v. 268 S. C. judge.” 524, S. Ed. (1977). On discretion. no judge’s
We find abuse at- case, his motion and renew may retrial LaBarge of to of the judge. the desirability sequestration to show tempt to the trial refused in that is next asserted Error into Thomas of witness Gertrude allow the criminal record admitted her Thomas, par- victim’s daughter, evidence. Thomas’s criminal guilty. in the crimes pled ticipation drunkenness, of breach of of public record consisted charges license, conduct, driving without disorderly posses- peace, of asserts sion unlawful weapon, trespassing. LaBarge that, witness, chief Thomas’s credibility as the State’s her crimes evinced an attitude and since highly important could be used they impeachment of social irresponsibility We purposes. disagree. Carolina,
In a crime South a conviction of involving moral may used to credi turpitude impeach of a witness. The traditional definition moral of bility is: turpitude vileness,
“. . in the baseness,, . an act or depravity man, to his social duties man owes fellow private to or contrary accepted customary society general, Horton, . .” State v. between man and man. . right duty E. (2d) C. While crimes all involve some of social degree irresponsi- all crimes do not moral bility, involve The crimes turpitude. which are Thomas’s record do not evidenced fall within definition moral There was no error. turpitude. above óf examination, the course direct
During LaBarge asked, in it “Are involved guilty being you way?” objected State crimes] [the the objection. form and the sustained of the question been allowed answer the think should have We effect, if he was, another way since asking question, the crimes. had committed *5 cross-examination, asked in “That’s as
true as the rest of your testimony?” objection, Upon the State withdrew the question, Notwithstanding withdrawal, the stated that the question proper on cross-examination and allowed State to repeat We believe the better question. would have been procedure for the have allowed withdrawal of the question.
In the course of his jury one aid charge relating stated: ing abetting, committed, “. . . act unlawful is the act of one is if act of all. And all are to be presumed present guilty, this be in a common in a com- pursuance purpose cause, mon with them each at a station at one operating same instance to arrive at a common . . .” goal. he when . . We think erred he “. all are said, presumed to be As this has court noted: present previously guilty.” law,
“All evidence, presumptions are independent innocence, in favor of and every is to be person presumed innocent until he is to be proved State v. Hyder, guilty.” 242 S. C. 131 S. E. of innocence presumption should not be diluted by
other remarks in a we While believe the charge. above- inadvertent, statement was quoted should carefully avoided future trials.
Other errors are not alleged to occur on likely the retrial and, of this case are not accordingly, discussed.
Reversed and remanded. Gregory C. J., and
Lewis, JJ., concur. Harwell, Ness, J., dissents. : (dissenting)
Ness, Justice I the failure to withdraw agree statement from consideration was error. do jury’s not view it under error. The or possibility here as reversible
the circumstancse test to be is not the applied of prejudice probability is as in this case overwhelming. of guilt *6 the exhibit was hold that the failure to withdraw of that the evidence the sense guilt in harmless error not have been could preju- that LaBarge so overwhelming con- appellant initially mind. Moreover in the jury’s diced in event its the statement of sented to the redaction discretionary. admission was confession a de- a codefendant’s implicating “Whether so as redacted to delete effectively portions can fendant its in the introduction permit defendant implicating S. v. court to determine.” U. trial is for the trial joint dis- Mitchell, 1239 C. N. (D. Y.), 372 F. Supp. appeal missed, 485 F. 1290 Cir. v. Gagliardi, (2d) (2nd Stans 1973). Thomas was
Here, the witness testimony the Gertrude the State’s against appellant. evidence primary principal her her father’s confessed to voluntarily participation She She included murder that of as well as LaBarge. Jackson She in the him at scene. and placed appellant planning into the house rob testified went appellant Jackson in the car. she outside her father while remained With the confession exception placing ap- the front door of the house at commission pellant during crime, the confession was to Gert- cumulative merely rude Thomas’ and was harmless error. testimony Chapman v. L. California, 18, 824, U. S. 87 17 Ed. 386 S. Ct. (2d) 705 (1969). Robinson, 140, v. 238
As this stated in State S. C. Court 151, 671, : Ed. 677 (2d) (1961) rational conclusion warranted
“[T]he is conviction guilty, judgement is that accused
175 not be aside should set because of unsubstantial errors not the result.” affecting
In test, the harmless error applying we must consider the character and quality evidence as it re improper to the lates other evidence the same bearing issue, ap praising possible impact upon jury of inadmissi Florida, 427, ble evidence. Schneble v. 405 U. S. 92 S. Ct. 1056, 31 L. Atchison, Ed. 340 State v. (2d) (1972); 268 E. 588, S. C. S. (2d)
The U. S. Court Supreme interpreting Chapman v. California, rule U. Harrington 89 S. Ct. L. Ed. affirmed the (1969) California Court of held: Appeals is not reasonably that a probable result more
“[I]t favor- *7 able to defendant would have been reached had the [Bruton] rule been followed.”
The Court that Harrington held evidence illegal had been “cumulative” and that State’s case against been “so Harrington This overwhelming.” opinion sug- that now gests Chapman embraces an overwhelming test for error is determining harmless.
I have no difficulty beyond a reasonable concluding that doubt error did not influence alleged the verdict. affirm.