STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SCOTT WILLIAM KYGER, Defendant-Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court 17CR08793; A165404
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Argued and submitted April 25, 2019, affirmed July 22, 2020
305 Or App 548; 471 P3d 764
Michael C. Wetzel, Judge.
Affirmed.
Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the opening brief and a reply brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services. Scott W. Kyger filed the supplemental brief and a reply brief pro se.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
LAGESEN, P. J.
Affirmed.
This case presents the question whether an attempted aggravated murder charge based on the theory that the defendant had the objective of killing two or more persons in the same criminal episode is legally tenable. Defendant was a backseat passenger in a car when he punched another passenger and then drew a razor blade and attacked two other men in the car. The state charged him with two counts of attempted aggravated murder for the razor-blade attacks, as well as several other offenses for his conduct during the episode. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the case was tried to the court. The state‘s theory on the attempted aggravated murder counts was that, in each instance, defendant had taken a substantial step toward killing the victim under circumstances in which (had defendant succeeded) there would have been more than one homicide victim. After the court found defendant guilty, he moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the state‘s theory was not legally viable. He argued that, in the context of aggravated murder, the number of victims involved in a criminal episode is a circumstance element that cannot, as a matter of law, be attempted. The court denied the motion. We conclude that, under State v. Quintero, 110 Or App 247, 823 P2d 981 (1991), modified on other grounds on recons, 114 Or App 142, 834 P2d 496, rev den, 314 Or 392 (1992), the court correctly denied defendant‘s motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant raises two pro se supplemental assignments of error that we also reject. We therefore affirm.
The question raised by defendant‘s motion in arrest of judgment is one of law. We therefore review for legal error. State v. Stout, 281 Or App 263, 266, 382 P3d 591 (2016), aff‘d, 362 Or 758, 415 P3d 567 (2018).
The victims on the counts of attempted aggravated murder, Z and G, along with a third man, B, were “work colleagues” (as the prosecutor described them below) in a scheme buying and selling mobile phones. G was the boss. B and Z worked for G. Their job was to recruit people willing to take a hit to their credit score in exchange for compensation, typically homeless people, to obtain mobile phones from mobile phone stores. They would instruct the recruits on what phones to obtain, and how to obtain them, and
Defendant and his girlfriend were among the recruits. G, Z, and B picked them up in Clackamas. After failed attempts to purchase phones at Portland-area stores (stores that were starting to catch on to the scheme), the group drove to Salem so that defendant and his girlfriend could attempt to purchase phones from Salem stores. They obtained phones at one store, but they were the wrong phones. Although the store accepted the return of those phones, it grew suspicious and would not give defendant any more phones. Although defendant went to several other stores, none of those stores would sell phones to him.
The group returned to Portland. During the drive, G told defendant and his girlfriend that they would not be paid because they did not get any phones. Angered, defendant punched B in the head two or more times, sliced G‘s face and neck so it looked like “hamburger,” and slit Z‘s throat. He then jumped out of the still-moving car and ran from the scene. Defendant was apprehended about two weeks later.
For his razor-blade attacks on G and Z, the state charged defendant with two counts of attempted aggravated murder. As to those counts, the indictment alleged:
“The defendant, on or about April 25, 2016, in Clackamas County, Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally attempt to cause the death of [Z], another human being, defendant having unlawfully and intentionally attempted to cause the death of [G], an additional human being, in the course of the same criminal episode.
“* * * * *
“The defendant, on or about April 25, 2016, in Clackamas County, Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally attempt to cause the death of [G], another human being, defendant having unlawfully and intentionally attempted to cause the death of [Z], an additional human being, in the course of the same criminal episode.”
Defendant waived his right to a jury, and the case was tried to the court. The court found defendant guilty of those two charges, and a number of others.
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court‘s denial of his motion in arrest of judgment. He argues, much as he did below, that a person cannot attempt a circumstance element of a crime. Thus, defendant reasons, a person who takes a substantial step toward killing two or more people in a single criminal episode, but succeeds at killing none of them, has committed only attempted murder with respect to each potential victim. Defendant urges us to conclude either that Quintero does not control or, alternatively, that we should overrule it, in view of the Supreme Court‘s subsequent decision in State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, ___ US ___, 137 S Ct 665 (2017), and our subsequent decision in State v. Snyder, 288 Or App 58, 405 P3d 175 (2017), which, in defendant‘s view, undercut Quintero‘s conclusion. The state responds that Quintero is dispositive and that neither Turnidge nor Snyder demonstrate that it should be overruled. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the state.
Under
Under our en banc decision in Quintero, the answer to that question is yes. In that case, two of the defendants were charged with, and convicted of, attempted aggravated murder under the theory that they each had attempted to kill more than one person in the same criminal episode. 110 Or App at 256-57. Although the defendants had attempted to kill more than one person, they did not succeed in killing anyone. Id. at 257. Much like defendant here, the defendants argued that the charges should be dismissed, or that acquittal was required, because, in their view, absent a murder victim, “it is a physical, legal and logical impossibility to have the crime of Attempted Aggravated Murder.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on the definition of the crime of attempt in
“An attempt, by definition, does not require that all elements of the offense be completed. The state presented evidence to show that defendants had intentionally engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the murder of more than one person. That crime is attempted aggravated murder.”
Id. Thus, as the trial court correctly recognized, Quintero foreclosed it from granting defendant‘s motion in arrest of judgment.
Defendant argues that two cases—the Supreme Court‘s decision in Turnidge and our own decision in Snyder—undercut Quintero, requiring us to overrule it and hold, to the contrary, that an attempt to kill more than one
First, our decision in Quintero tracks the text of
Second, our decision in Quintero is consistent with the legislature‘s purpose in criminalizing the inchoate crime of attempt. See generally Or Laws 1971, ch 743, §§ 54-56; Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report, §§ 54-56, 51-55 (July 1970). Those provisions were intended to get at the danger presented by people who have conscious criminal objectives and act in furtherance of those objectives, even when those criminal objectives are not achieved:
“The law of attempt is now recognized as being more properly directed at the dangerousness of the actor—the threat of the actor‘s personality to society at large.
“* * * * *
“The Model Penal Code comment on situations of this kind is well expressed as follows:
“‘In all of these cases (1) criminal purpose has been clearly demonstrated, (2) the actor has gone as far as he could in implementing that purpose, and (3) as a result, the actor‘s “dangerousness” is plainly manifested.‘”
Commentary at § 55 at 52-53. Holding a person responsible for attempted aggravated murder when the person has the criminal purpose of killing more than one person in the same criminal episode, and takes substantial steps toward that criminal objective, is consistent with that legislative intent to target the dangerousness of an actor who has the purpose of killing more than one person—an intent that would be frustrated were we to conclude that a person with the conscious objective of killing more than one person in the same criminal episode could be liable only for attempted murder if the person does not, in the end, kill anyone.
Third, neither Turnidge nor Snyder addressed the issue presented here and in Quintero: whether intentionally engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward killing two or more people in the same criminal episode amounts to the crime of attempted aggravated murder where, as here, that intentional conduct does not ultimately cause the death of any person. Turnidge addressed the completed offense of aggravated murder under
Snyder, on the other hand, did address the inchoate offense of attempt, but with respect to driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and not with respect to aggravated murder. 288 Or App at 60. In Snyder, the defendant was charged with DUII. Id. He requested that the jury be instructed on attempt, under the theory that the evidence would allow for the jury to find that he “was at most attempting to be sufficiently intoxicated” to commit DUII, but was not yet intoxicated enough to have committed DUII. Id. at 61. We rejected that argument, reasoning that, under the case law, “[a] DUII defendant‘s level of intoxication * * * is a question of status that exists regardless of conduct or purpose.” Id. at 62. Consequently, “a nonintoxicated driver who has recently consumed alcohol is not attempting, in any legal sense of the word, to commit DUII simply because he might become intoxicated while still driving.” Id. (emphasis in original). That is, “simply driving after having consumed alcohol” is not behavior that is “proscribed by law,” regardless of whether the person may have intended to consume enough alcohol to result in legal intoxication. Id.
We recognize that some aspects of our analysis in Snyder support defendant‘s view as to how the attempt statute should work with the underlying offense of aggravated murder based on the killing of more than one victim. In defendant‘s view, the presence of an additional victim for purposes of aggravated murder is analogous to the status of being intoxicated for purposes of DUII, in that both are attendant circumstances that do not require proof of a mental state for proof of the completed crime. He argues that Snyder stands for the proposition that a person cannot “attempt” an attendant circumstance of that nature because it is a binary status that either exists or does not. Therefore, in defendant‘s view, a person who does not succeed in killing at least one person had not attempted, for purposes of the law, to commit the crime of attempted aggravated murder. Although that comparison between this case and Snyder is not without some force, it ultimately does not persuade us
For one, as explained above, that reading is consistent with the text of the attempt statute and with the legislative intentions in defining the inchoate crime of attempt. The court in Snyder did not address Quintero or purport to be displacing its holding. Further, the analysis in Snyder was specific to the “status” of being intoxicated under DUII statutes, and there is no reason to believe that the court was creating a rule to apply more broadly to a context like attempted aggravated murder, or that the Snyder court viewed the status of being intoxicated under the DUII statutes as equivalent to the circumstance of a criminal episode involving more than one murder victim that defines the offense of aggravated murder under
In sum, under Quintero, the trial court correctly denied defendant‘s motion in arrest of judgment. In addition to the assignment of error that defendant raises in his brief submitted through counsel, defendant has raised two pro se supplemental assignments of error. Having considered them, we reject them without further written discussion.
Affirmed.