*1 Dakota, Plaintiff North STATE Appellee, KUMMER,
Terry Lee Defendant Appellant. No. 910138.
Crim. North
Supreme Dakota. Court 20, 1992.
Feb.
MESCHKE, Justice. Terry appeals Kummer from a con- Lee possession of a controlled sub- viction for intent to deliver. The convic- stance with sting” opera- out of a “reverse tion arose Fargo by officers of the tion conducted divi- Department and the narcotics Inves- of the State Bureau Criminal sion that the un- tigations. Because we believe disputed facts of this case show that induce the used unlawful means to police crime, establishing entrapment as a matter law, reverse. we During law enforce- the summer learned from two confidential ment officers Kummer had been involved informants that drug trafficking. The informants had arrested for viola- themselves been tions, they agreed cooperate and exchange officers for favorable attorney’s state’s recommendation to the prosecutions. Special Agent on their office and Daniel Baumann of the Crime Bureau police depart- Donn Weaver of the Officer planned narcotics division a reverse ment’s arranging for an informant to make sting, drugs targeted to a individual. a sale of 17, 1990, infor- September one of the On mants, the direction of Baumann and at Weaver, taped telephone call from made a department to Kummer in Ana- moose, asked him when he would be and advantage Fargo to take area “good on cocaine. Kummer ex- deal” interest, quality only if the pressed an but past. than it had been was better he should con- The informant asked when again. replied that Kummer Kummer tact he contact the informant the follow- would return ing Wednesday. Kummer did not phone call. planned and Baumann Weaver to offer to Kummer and amount of cocaine $1,200 Sep- per ounce. On price set the at 21,1990, the informant made anoth- tember de- taped telephone er call to, Kummer in Anamoose and dis- partment quantity of co- price and the cussed the Atty., (argued), State’s Far- John T. Goff might purchase. Kum- that Kummer caine appellee. go, plaintiff for and purchase three ounces. mer decided to 28, 1990, the informant (argued) Nelson Law On /September Nelson Brian W. táped telephone calls appellant. made two more Office, Fargo, for defendant date, time, place this electronic surveillance was conducted plan Kummer a court order. and Kummer ar- without The informant sale. evening Septem- meet ranged to procedures obtaining Fargo. Bau- Motel ber warrant-like, parte ex order wire *3 rooms Motel 75. then rented two at mann are in tapping eavesdropping or set forth Chapter A NDCC 29-29.2. court order au 30,1990, September Weaver obtained On thorizing electronic surveillance is not re of from the evidence three ounces cocaine Chapter all quired under circumstances. The co- police department. the room at 29-29.2 an originated from earlier caine had apply interception, does not to the disclo- time. had closed some case that been sure, wire, electronic, or use of a or oral one- cocaine into three Weaver divided the person intercepting, communication if the portion portions and heat-sealed each ounce disclosing, wire, electronic, using or the bags. gave cocaine plastic Weaver the or oral communication: Baumann. person acting 1. Was a color of under that Baumann and the two day, Later wire, electronic, intercept law to the rooms to one of rented informants went party to oral communication and was a placed “body Motel 75. Baumann at par- the communication or one of the the informants and on one of transmitter” given ties to the communication had per- the front desk them to tell instructed prior interception; consent to such ... arrival, Kummer, upon have his sonnel 29-29.2-05(1). argues NDCC Kummer coming to the room. When call before exception the consent to the court that called, gave Baumann the three Kummer requirement legalize not the order does packages of cocaine to the informant who in this surveillance case because electronic transaction, arranged turned on the had prove State failed to consent. We dis- the placed had body transmitter that the been agree. informant, to the the other and went interpreted consent We have not the up had set motel room where officers other statute, of our statute. Our NDCC clause receiving equipment. surveillance the 29-29.2-05(1), parallels language of 18 the informants the officers heard When 2511(2)(c), the federal eaves- U.S.C. § $3,600 given counting the Kummer had dropping The federal courts have statute. them, they hallway and went into wait- interpreting a framework established Upon for Kummer to leave room. ed provides guidance federal that statute room, stopped leaving the the officers Clapp- Co. v. to us. See Land search, Office Kummer, pat-down conducted Co., (N.D. 401, 442 N.W.2d 403 Thomssen packages of cocaine. the three retrieved 1989). precedents. look to the federal money Kum- The officers also retrieved given informants. prosecution prov mer had has the burden of The voluntary consent ing party’s charged of Kummer was with violation and uncoerced. United States v. Kolod 19-03.1-23, a class 19-03.1-07 and NDCC 590, (5th Cir.1983). F.2d The ziej, 706 593 of controlled felony, possession A informant, however, testimony of is not The confi- with intent to deliver. substance prove con required informant out state and moved dential informants Fishman, interception. to the C. sented also did testify trial. Kummer did not at 13(b) Wiretapping Eavesdropping § rejecting Kummer’s testify. jury, The (1978 Supp.1991), & and cases collected defense, guilty returned a ver- prosecution Generally, therein. appealed. Kummer dict. an informant’s proving meet the burden of showing infor simply consent SURVEILLANCE I. ELECTRONIC transaction after proceeded with the mant An- knowing that it monitored. would be argues that the trial court Kummer not., Interception Telecommunication failing suppress the evidence erred Excep- Party As or With Consent By body transmitter because from use 440 conducting elec cooperation informant’s Proscription Such Federal tion ...To infor 429, do not make the surveillance A.L.R.Fed. tronic
Interceptions,
Jones,
involuntary.
839 F.2d
States
v.
mant’s consent
United
(1984);
States
United
Cir.1973);
Cir.1988).
(4th
(5th
Kolodziej.
F.2d
Dowdy, 479
v.
Silva,
explained
United
449 F.2d
for this
v.
rationale
States
Bonanno,
658-659
Cir.1971).
the consent is
(1st
Only
when
States
Cir.1973):
conduct,
(2d
improper police
product of
promises
have no
that the extent
which
the outset
such as coercion
We observe
fact,
an inform-
the consent
to show that
proof required
realistic basis
monitoring
Jones;
or record-
involuntary.
to the
United States
er consented
deemed
*4
normally quite
(7th
telephone
319,
call
ing
Horton,
of a
F.2d
322-23
Cir.
601
v.
needed to show con-
that
1979);
different from
There is
Kolodziej, 706 F.2d
595.
search,
by the
physical
whether
to a
sent
consent here
no reason to believe
person in a
byor
some
himself
defendant
coerced.
was
Cf.,
give an effective one.
position
case,
the
dispute
no
that
In this
there is
Viale, 312 F.2d
v.
e.g.,
States
United
body transmitter
the
informant who wore
denied,
Cir.),
373 U.S.
595,
(2
cert.
601
in return
cooperating
authorities
(1963);
1291,
903,
L.Ed.2d 199
10
83 S.Ct.
to the
recommendation
for a favorable
891,
Como,
F.2d
v.
340
United States
testimony
the
that
prosecutor. There was
Cir.1965);
(2
ex rel.
United States
893
nature
fully aware of the
informants were
519,
McMann,
417
Lundergan v.
Motel 75. The infor-
transaction at
Cir.1969).
(2
generally
521-522
during
body
transmitter
mant wore
Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
v.
Schneckloth
undisputed that he
and it is
transaction
(1973).
2041,
218,
441 test, objective the focus is on the Kummer has der the case. occupants this expec- enforcement officials and a reasonable he had shown that during the three to five the effect it would have on the privacy tation Flamm, room as an law-abiding the hotel citizen. v. 338 spent he State minutes See, example, People 826, (N.D.1983); Mees, v. v. guest. N.W.2d State invited 973, Rada, (N.D.1978). 532 N.Y.S.2d Predispo- 141 Misc.2d 272 N.W.2d trial (1988). that conclude of the accused to commit the crime is sition suppress evi- properly Hoffman, refused irrelevant. State v. (N.D.1980). Thus, this electronic surveil- from in order to dence obtained fashion an defense under lance. 12.1-05-11, NDCC must estab- accused MEANS II. UNLAWFUL elements: law enforcement lish two agents en induced the commission of the crime argues that he was Kummer and that method of inducement was of law because trapped as a matter crime,” likely normally law-abiding per- to cause to create and commit police “had to commit the offense. is, to obtain the sons unlawful means use (N.D.1984). Weisz, In 356 N.W.2d persuade him in order to drugs for sale to *5 case, agree. this the method of inducement was him to commit a crime. unlawful. a law Entrapment occurs “when This is the first time that this court has commission agent induces the entrapment faced the assertion of an de- offense, or other using persuasion of an where law enforcement officers fur- fense law-abiding likely to cause
means
nished the
controlled substance
Conduct
to commit the offense.
persons
brought
prosecution
and convic-
about
affording
person
opportunity
an
merely
possession
the accused for
tion of
not constitute
an offense does
to commit
juris-
from other
intent to deliver. Courts
12.1-05-11(2). Any
entrapment.” NDCC
this
have taken a dim view of
dictions
cooperating with a law enforcement
police conduct.
agent” for
agency is a “law enforcement
entrapment
defense.
purposes of
decisions have declared
Numerous
Erban,
12.1-05-11(3);
429
v.
State
NDCC
that,
shows
uncontroverted evidence
when
408,
(N.D.1988). Entrapment
413
N.W.2d
agent provided the illicit
one
accused
defense that the
is an affirmative
pos
illegally
then
drugs that the accused
preponderance of the evi
prove by a
must
dispensed to a second
sessed or
449
Nassif,
v.
City
dence.
Bismarck
of
entrapment is estab
agent, the defense of
789,
Ordinarily,
(N.D.1989).
796
N.W.2d
matter of law. See United
lished as a
entrapment
question
exists is a
whether
fact
(3rd
1083,
West,
1085
511 F.2d
v.
States
Rehling, 426
jury.
for the
State v.
Cir.1975);
Mosley, 496
v.
United States
But,
dispute
6,
(N.D.1988).
if no
7
N.W.2d
Cir.1974);
1012,
(5th
1015
F.2d
the inferences to be
over the facts or
exists
(5th
161,
F.2d
163
Oquendo, 490
v.
States
facts,
deter
drawn
Bueno,
Cir.1974);
447
v.
United States
mat
entrapment
as a
mine the existence
(5th Cir.1971);
903,
Evans v.
906
Willman,
v.
City
of law.
Mandan
ter
1976);
(Alaska
830,
State,
P.2d
844-845
550
92,
(N.D.1989).
use
93
439
436,
P.2d
Ariz.
501
McKinney, 108
v.
State
entrapment.
of unlawful
State, 141
378,
(1972);
v.
Coleman
383
42,
(1977);
193,
43-44
Ga.App.
233 S.E.2d
entrapment
statute em
Our
“
914, 917
Overmann, 220 N.W.2d
v.
“objective” test
‘to determine State
ploys the
State,
1974);
566 So.2d
(Iowa
v.
unsa
Tanner
sufficiently
police conduct
whether
”
State,
(Miss.1990);
v.
1246,
Froggatt
1249
entrapment defense.’
justify an
vory to
1011,
(1970);
267,
1013
694,
(N.D.
467
86 Nev.
P.2d
264 N.W.2d
697
Pfister,
v.
State
9,
160,
13
Talbot,
364 A.2d
N.J.
Papers
v.
1978)
Working
(quoting from The
338,
State,
(1976);
106 N.M.
Baca
on Reform
National Commission
(1987);
Lynn v.
320).
(1970),
P.2d
1045-1046
p.
Un-
Laws
Federal Criminal
State,
(Miss.1986).
State,
P.2d
Barnes v.
Evans,
Moreover,
not a law
States,
425 U.S.
96 S.Ct.
either seller is an
know that
does not
dant
(1976)[majority
that
L.Ed.2d 113
concludes
assume, as a matter
agent. To
undercover
outrageous police conduct
bar convic-
law,
defendant who
that a
law];
tion as a matter of
Evans v.
abiding
purchase from
will
law
(Alaska 1976). It
public believed policy, law, treated as under our was entitled to be and, per- traditional opinions in more their law-abiding person” “normally because entrap- such as haps, more tenable forms entrapment defense. NDCC he raised the ment. 12.1-05-11(2). § what heretofore But rather than confuse believe, however, ordinarily I exposition of a judicial has been a clear dirty trap and must use tricks can on the law of en- legislative statute clear drugs. in illicit I “predisposed” traffickers attempting tug and stretch trapment by law, matter of agree police, as a that it fits concept so permitted to use confiscated should not be case, I we should our believe view “normally to induce a law-abid- substances directly and declare that the issue confront to commit a crime. ing person” policy public we will as a matter by intolerable sustain a conviction obtained Folk, In part of law enforcement conduct on the (N.D.1979), we said: notwithstanding agents, ease can be a meritorious “No doubt neater and more candid statute. That is a defense proposition that a made for the supported It is position for this court.2 away attention juror’s which diverts West, 511 States v. the decision United police is onto the the defendant and from There, (1975). although crimi- professional designed to benefit *9 entrap- “if the reaching the same result beginner who nal, a detriment to a but is analyzed as aspect of this ease worldly wiles of a gullible to the solely predisposition depending conniving, confidence-type, undercov- engage in illicit defendant] [the agent.” er traffic,” analyzed the issue the court first legislature time for the I that it is believe Meschke language cited Justice in the second look at to take a opinion and concluded that majority jury question, v. Kluck 340 embarrassing presents a [State ex This stance also avoids 2. (1983) "mat into a is transformed ] en N.W.2d 446 planation defense of of how the affirmative of law.” trapment, have heretofore held ter which we redesign it to benefit statute and give police au-
law-abiding persons” and profes- engage “predisposed”
thority to of “no holds a battle
sional criminal
barred.” LATRAILLE, Appellant,
Wanda WORKERS
NORTH DAKOTA BUREAU,
COMPENSATION
Appellee.
Civ. No. 910219. of North Dakota.
Supreme Court
Feb. 1992.
