STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick Richard KUJAWA
No. 2005 KA 0470
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit
February 22, 2006
929 So. 2d 99
Mary E. Roper, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Patrick Richard Kujawa.
Before: CARTER, C.J., DOWNING and GAIDRY, JJ.
The defendant, Patrick Richard Kujawa, was charged by bill of information on January 13, 2000 with possession of pornography involving juveniles on December 30, 1999. On January 21, 2000, the state filed an amended bill of information with the identical charge of possession of pornography involving juveniles, a violation of
On December 13, 2000, the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered а plea of guilty to fifteen counts of possession of pornography involving juveniles. Judge Anne L. Simon sentenced the defendant to four years on each of the fifteen counts, each sentence to be served consecutively.1 Judge Simon suspended the sentences and imposed ten years probation.
On January 27, 2004, agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a division
In May 2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Amend Sentence and a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, contending that the total sixty-year sentence (for the state convictions) was illegal because the maximum sentence allowable under the law was ten years. He also asserted his sentences could not properly have been suspended because the statute required the sentences to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Judge Keith J. Comeaux4 found that the court was without authority to suspend the sentences and granted the defendant‘s motion to amend the sentences and have a new sentencing hearing on the matter.
On September 17, 2004, a resentencing hearing was held. On the same date, the defendant filed another motion to quash, arguing that the court should quash all but one count as charged, on the grounds that subjecting him to more than one ten-year sentence constituted double jeopardy.5 After Judge Comeaux heard testimony and argument, he denied the defendant‘s motion to quash and sentenced the defendant to ten years at hard labor for each of the fifteen counts of child pornography. He ordered those fifteen sentences to run concurrently, but for the concurrent sentences to run consecutively to any federal sentence then in effect. The judge also imposed a $10,000.00 fine for each concurrent sentencing count.
The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on September 22, 2004, which was denied by the court. The defendant now appeals, asserting the following seven assignments of error:
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred in denying the defendant‘s motion to quash.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court erred in overruling the defense‘s objection to the introduction of evidence of a subsequent conviction at the resentencing hearing.
Assignment of Error No. 3
The trial court erred in considering evidence of the defendant‘s subsequent conviction in resentencing him.
The trial court erred in failing to consider mitigating factors listed in
Assignment of Error No. 5
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence under the statute.
Assignment of Error No. 6
The trial court erred in denying the defendant‘s motion to rеconsider sentence.
Assignment of Error No. 7
The trial court erred in imposing the maximum fine of $10,000.00.
For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
Due to the defendant‘s guilty plea, there was no trial testimony concerning the facts in this matter. The affidavit to the arrest warrant describes the factual basis for the charges. The defendant, a Catholic priest, was assigned to Holy Cross Catholic Church in Morgan City in St. Mary Parish. On January 4, 2000, Bishop Michael Jarrell of the Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux issued a press release stating that the defendant had been found in possession of pornographic material, some of which involved pictures of minors.
Based on that information, on January 11, 2000 Detective Eric DeLaune and other city police investigators obtained a warrant and searched the defendant‘s living area at the rectory. They seized, among other things, the defendant‘s computer, a second computer hard drive, computer disks, and large jars of Vaseline. Sergeant Travis Crouch and Detective DeLaune examined the materials in a box obtained in the seizure. They found hundreds of pages of printed text and pictures. They removed 220 pages of pictures of nude persons, believed to be juveniles, in various poses and engaged in sexual acts.
On January 10, 2000, the pictures were viewed by Dr. Scott Benton, an assistant professor of pediatrics and Director of Pediatric Forensic Medicine at Louisiana State University Medical School. Dr. Benton found that 62 pages contained pictures of minor children, which, in his opinion, constituted child pornography. The other pages also depicted child pornography, according to Dr. Benton, but less clearly so.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant avers the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash. Specifically, the defendant contends that the 62 counts of possession of pornography involving juveniles should havе been billed as only one count because all the pictures were seized on the same date and in the same location. The multiple charges for a single offense, he argues, constituted double jeopardy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
At issue in this case is the legality of imposing separate sentences on the defendant for convictions of fifteen counts (charged separately in a single bill of information) of violating
The issue before us is technically not one of multiplicity but rather one of determining the correct unit of prosecution. This is not an instance where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). This is a casе, rather, where each successive or separate act has been charged as a separate crime under the same statute. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955), and United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 541 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S. Ct. 1084, 99 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1988), and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991, 108 S. Ct. 1299, 99 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1988).
The issue raised by the defendant with respect to whether he has received multiple punishments for the same offense is resolved by reference to the statutory language of
We find no cases which squarely decide the precise issue here, that is, whether each count chаrged pursuant to
The applicable provisions of
A. Pornography involving juveniles is any of the following:
...
(3) The intentional possession, sale, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute of any photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of seventeen. ...
E. Whoever commits the crime of pornography involving juveniles shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than two years or more than ten years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Under the statute, the contraband7 items are described using the plural form, i.e., photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions.8 The defendant suggests that the intent of the legislature wаs to prohibit a course of conduct, e.g., the possession of pictures,9 be it fifteen or fifty, rather than to authorize the multiple charging of a defendant for each separate and distinct picture possessed. The mere fact that words are in the plural, however, is not dispositive of legislative intent.10
Several Louisiana decisions have found that a single count was the proper charge regardless of the number of prohibited acts performed by the defendant. In State v. Freeman, 411 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1982), two defendants were each convicted on three counts of hunting deer at night and three counts of hunting or taking deer in closed season. The statute at issue prohibited the hunting of “deer” at certain proscribed times. The defendants argued that finding them both guilty of six violations of the statute, when in fact only two existed, subjected them to triple punishment for each of the two violations. The Supreme Court found that the word “deer” without being preceded by an article of “a,” “an” or “the,” was not limited to the singulаr, but also encompassed the plural form. Id. at 1072. The court found that if the legislative aim had been to make the taking of each individual deer an offense, it would have clearly expressed that intent, and to construe the statutory provisions otherwise would permit prosecutors to create multiple offenses without a legislative grant of authority. Id. See also State v. Hungerford, 278 So. 2d 33 (La. 1973), and State v. Price, 475 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 664 (La. 1986).
A review of the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions reveals that there is no clear consensus on what constitutes the proper unit of prosecution when interpreting statutes prohibiting child pornography or similar offenses.11 The following decisions found that the indictments against the defendants containing multiple counts for a single offense impermissibly charged each act as a separate unit of prosecution.
In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. at 82, 75 S. Ct. at 621, the relevant provision of the Mann Act stated:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce ... any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose....
...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The defendant in Bell, having transported two women on the same trip and in the same vehicle, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the Mann Act, one count for each woman. On appeal, the defendant argued he committed only a single offense and could not be subjected to cumulative punishment under the two counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, finding that two separate offenses were committed because, even though the act of transportation was a single one, the unlawful purpose was necessarily personal as to each of the women.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and stated:
Congress could no doubt make the simultaneous transportation of more than one woman in violation of the Mann Act liable to cumulative punishment for each woman so transported. The question is: did it do so? It has not done so in words in the provisions defining the crime and fixing its punishment.
...
It is not to be denied that argumentative skill, as was shown at the Bar, could persuasively and not unreasonably reach either of the conflicting constructions.
...
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.
...
This in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read. Nor does it assume that offenders against the law carefully read the penal code before they embark on a crime. It merely means that if Congress does not
fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses, when we have no more to go on than the present case furnishes.
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. at 82-84, 75 S. Ct. at 622.
In United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2002), the defendants owned and operated Landslide, Inc., an Internet website that provided a computerized credit card verification service used by various webmasters whose websites contained child pornography. The defendants were charged with 43 counts (one count for each individual image) of committing activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography and aiding and abetting in violation of
In contrast, the following decisions found that each separate count against the defendant was an allowable unit of prosecution.
In United States v. Esch, supra, the defendants were charged with sixteen counts of sexual exploitation of children for photographing their children and themselves engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The co-defendants then sold these photographs. The applicable stаtutory provision,
In Vineyard v. Texas, 958 S.W. 2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc), the defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography for possessing a videotape containing a “film image” depicting a child engaging in sexual conduct, and for possessing a photograph with a “film image” depicting a child engaging in sexual conduct. The applicable law provided, in pertinent part, that a person commits the offense of possession of child pornography if he “possesses material containing a film image” that visually depicts a child engaging in sexual conduct. In reversing the defendant‘s second conviction for violation of the double jeopardy clauses, the aрpellate court found that the legislature did not intend that the simultaneous possession of more than one film image created more than one unit of prosecution. The court relied, in part, on
In State v. Mather, 264 Neb. 182, 646 N.W. 2d 605 (2002), the defendant was convicted of eighteen counts of visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct which had a child as one of its participants in violation of the applicable statute, which provided in pertinent part that it “shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly make, publish, direct, create, provide, or in any manner generate any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct which has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers.” “Visual depiction” was defined by the applicable statute as a “live performance or photographic representation.” The defendant, a photographer, had photographed a nude or partially nude seventeen-year-old female. The defendant argued that his conduct amounted to one count because all eighteen photographs were taken of the same subject the same day as part of one ongoing or continuous act. The court found the plain language of the statute focused on ”any visual depiction.” It further found that the singular form of “photographic representation” in the statute read in conjunction with the term “any” indicated that the legislature intended prosecution for each differing photographic representation. Id., 264 Neb. at 187, 646 N.W. 2d at 610-11. Thus, in making multiple different prohibited depictions, the defendant was held to have committed multiple offenses, even though each differing visual depiction involved the same subject captured in a narrow time-frame.
In State v. Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W. 2d 437 (2002), the defendant pleaded guilty to 28 counts of child pornography. The pornographic images were found on two computer disks labeled “Child Pornography”
In State v. Schaefer, 266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W. 2d 760 (App. 2003), review denied, 266 Wis. 2d 61, 671 N.W. 2d 848 (2003), the defendant pleaded no contest to eighteen counts of possession of child pornography. The pornography was in the form of individual images found on a Zip disk removed from the defendant‘s computer. The defendant argued that the charges are identical in fact because all the pornographic photographs were on a single computer Zip disk, and there was no evidence that he acquired each image with a separate volitional act.14 The court found that Multaler was dispositive of the issue and concluded that it was reasonable to assume that the existence of multiple files on the Zip disk demonstrated that the defendant made a new decision to download a particular image file. Therefore, each image file was held to represent a new volitional departure.15 Id., 266 Wis. 2d at 752, 668 N.W. 2d at 777. The defendant further argued that the use of the word “any” to refer to the prohibited “pictorial reproduction” permitted two reasonable interpretations regarding the allowable unit of prosecution and that the rule of lenity compelled construction of the applicable statute in his favor. Relying again on
In Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A. 2d 575 (Pa. Super. 2004), authorities found approximately 500 images of child pornography on the defendant‘s computer hard drive. The defendant was convicted of 28 counts of sexual abuse of children. The applicable statutory provision stated in pertinent part:
(d) Possession of child pornography.—
(1) Any person who knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other materiаl depicting a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits an offense.
The defendant argued that there was a single possessory offense. The court disagreed, finding that the offenses charged stemmed from 28 different criminal acts. The 28 pornographic pictures found involved different children or, in some cases, the same children photographed multiple times. The court reasoned that each photograph of each child victimized that child and subjected him or her to precisely the type of harm the statute seeks to prevent. Id. at 583. See also Slavek v. Hinkle, 359 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477, 496 (E.D. Va. 2005).
In State v. Howell, 169 N.C. App. 58, 609 S.E. 2d 417 (2005), authorities found on the defendant‘s computer hard drive over 200 pictures depicting minors engaged in sexual acts. The images were received in five Zip files, and then stored on the computer‘s hard drive in five separate directories. The defendant was convicted of 43 counts of third degree sexual exploitation of а minor. The applicable North Carolina statutory provision provided in pertinent part that a “person commits the offense of third degree sexual exploitation of a minor if ... he possesses material that contains a visual representation of a minor engaging in sexual activity.” “Material” was defined as “[p]ictures, drawings, video recordings, films or other visual depictions or representations . ...” The defendant contended that because the definition of “material” specified items in the plural, the photographs found on his computer constituted only a single charge. The court disagreed and found that the listing of plural items in the definition of “material” was merely a matter of style. Id., 169 N.C. App. at 61-2, 609 S.E. 2d at 419. The court also found that the plain language of the statute under which the defendant was convicted stated that possession of material containing “a visual representation” allowed for multiple convictions under the circumstancеs. Id., 169 N.C. App. at 62, 609 S.E. 2d at 421. The defendant also argued that the evidence supported, at most, five counts because there were five downloads of one Zip file each. The defendant contended that each of the five downloaded Zip files was the technological equivalent of a digital magazine. The court disagreed, finding that the evidence tended to show that the 200 individual photographs on the defendant‘s computer, found within the five Zip directories, had been opened on his computer. It concluded that since each of the images had been opened and saved on the hard drive, the defendant “possessed” each of the 43 images. Id., 169 N.C. App. at 64, 609 S.E. 2d at 421.
Based on our review of the jurisprudence, we find the defendant‘s emphasis upon the plural form of the contraband items is misplaced. A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that a statute should be considered as a whole, and its separate provisions considered in their сontext to each other. See
Possession of three or more of the same photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions shall be prima facie evidence of intent to sell or distribute.
It can hardly be considered reasonable in this context to interpret the phrase “the same photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual representations” as referring to identical sets of multiple images, as opposed to the same image, in order for the presumption to apply. This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of thе specific language of paragraph F:
Each photograph, film, videotape, or other reproduction of any sexual conduct involving a child under the age of seventeen shall be contraband and shall be seized and disposed of in accordance with law.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the use of the singular form of the contraband images in
Finally, we conclude that the use of the article “any” to modify the proscribed images evidences a clear legislative intent that each such image constitutes a basis for a unit of prosecution. See State v. Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d at 83, 643 N.W. 2d at 451; State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647-48, 732 A. 2d 425, 433-34 (1999). This interpretation best accords with the unequivocal legislative intent to effectively suppress the particular evil addressed by the statute. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant‘s motion to quash.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 2 AND NO. 3
In these assignments of error, the defendant avers the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of evidence of a subsequent conviction at the resentencing hearing. Specifically, the defendant contends that the trial court should not have considered his subsequent federal conviction because it was not in existence at the time he was originally sentenced on April 30, 2001. The defendant further contends that the trial court at resentencing did not refer to the intent of the original sentencing judge.
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, it is irrelevant that his federal conviction for possession of child pornography had not yet occurred when he was originally sentenced on April 30, 2001. The sources of information from which a sentencing court may draw are extensive, and traditional rules of evidence are not bars to consideration of otherwise relevant information. Prior criminal activity is one of the factors under art. 894.1 to be considered by the trial judge in sentencing a defendant. State v. Washington, 414 So. 2d 313, 315 (La. 1982). At the time of resentencing on September 17, 2004, the defendant‘s federal conviction, a violation of his probation, was рrior criminal activity and therefore was proper for the trial judge to consider.
The judge may make ministerial corrections to a sentence imposed by a predecessor unless he or she entertains a
In sentencing the defendant at the resentencing hearing, it is clear from the record that while the trial court may have considered the intent of the original sentencing judge, there was then a new federal conviction that was not of course present for the original sentencing judge‘s consideration. The trial court noted that while the defendant applied to the court on several occasions for lessening the сonditions of his probation, and while Dr. Maureen Brennan17 had testified that the defendant was making significant progress in his treatment for problems with child pornography, the defendant had subsequently been convicted of the same offense. Furthermore, as argued by the State at the hearing, the defendant had progressed from photographs to videos in the subsequent federal conviction.
We find that the trial court properly considered the intent of the original sentencing judge, noted the defendant‘s subsequent federal conviction for the same illegal conduct, and sentenced the defendant accordingly. These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 4, NO. 5 AND NO. 6
In these assignments of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider sentence. Specifically, the defendant contends that in failing to consider mitigating factors, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum sentence under the statute.
Article I, section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of art. 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria.
Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one‘s sense of justice. State v. Andrews, 94-0842, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So. 2d 448, 454. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. See State v. Holts, 525 So. 2d 1241, 1245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of
In applying
The defendant contends the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factor of being a first offender with no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity. However, at the time of resentencing, the defendant was not a first offender. While on probation, the defendant again pleaded guilty on or about January 27, 2004, to possession of child pornography in federal district court for his criminal actions. In light of the defendant‘s federal conviction of essentially the same offense, the trial court found that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense, and that there was an undue risk that during a suspended or probationary period the defendant would commit another crime. The trial court found the defendant was in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that could best be provided by commitment to an institution.
The sentencing range for possession of pornography involving juveniles is two to ten years imprisonment at hard labor.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7
In his seventh assignment of error, the defendant avers the trial court erred in fining him $10,000.00 for each separate count. Specifically, the defendant contends the trial court fined him only because it was erroneously informed by the state that a fine was mandatory pursuant to the statute.
Under
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
DOWNING, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick Richard KUJAWA
No. 2005 KA 0470
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit
February 22, 2006
929 So. 2d 99
DOWNING, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I respectfully dissent. The majority takes what is, at best, an ambiguous statutе and reaches a result that is contrary to established principles of statutory interpretation.
It is not clear from a plain reading of
In giving a genuine construction consistent with the plain language of
Notes
Clause (2) of the above Art. 596 is necessary to prevent multiple prosecutions for continuous offenses. For example, possession of stolen goods or narcotics may continue over a long period of time and may involve more than one object. Yet, obviously there should be only one prosecution for what is in effect one criminal course of conduct.
Q. You indicated to the Court that in addition to the things you‘ve mentioned that a computer was also seized from Mr. Kujawa?
A. In the first, in the first case, yes, sir.
Q. In the State case.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you‘re the one that seized that computer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that computer analyzed?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Was any, anything of contraband or illegal nature found on that computer?
A. Yes. There were images gleaned from the computer as well. But FBI had that, they chose not to prosecute.
* * * * *
Q. The analysis was done by federal agents?
A. By the FBI. Yes, sir.
Q. On the personal computer seized by, by you.
A. On the, on the state case. Yes sir.
Q. State‘s case. Have you seen any reports from authorities like Dr. Denton that have identified any images that were found on the computer seized in the state‘s case that was analyzed by the federal government that was in fact child pornography?
A. By the state case, on the state case, no sir.
Q. So as you sit here today you can‘t identify with any degree of accuracy whatever, based on any authority, that whatever images were found on the computer seized in the state case from Mr. Kujawa in fact contained child pornography.
A. No, sir
In its brief, the state contends that the words “photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions” are qualified with the words “of a child” rather than “of any child.” As such, the state asserts, it was the legislative intention that each visual reproduction of a different child is a separate crime. We do not find any significance in the use of the word “a” instead of “any” in the statute. The use of the words “a child” rather than ”any child” does not, as asserted by the state, clarify legislative intent with regard to the proper unit of prosеcution. The use of “a child” rather than “any child” is not a source of ambiguity. The central object of the statute does not relate to the terms “a child” or “any child,” but rather to the possession of items containing child pornography. The proper focus, thus, is on the legislative intent in designating prohibited items using the plural form. The unit of prosecution refers to the offense proscribed by the statute, not the class of persons the statute protects.
[I]t will not promote guiding analysis to indulge in what might be called the color-matching of prior decisions concerned with `the unit of prosecution’ in order to determine how near to, or how far from, the problem under this statute the answers are that have been given under other statutes.
We nevertheless review jurisprudence from other states to demonstrate the various analyses employed by those courts to resolve the issue.
In essence, because it appears that the images on the disks were photographs of actual children, the disks served as electronic photo albums. The language of § 948.12 shows that the legislature would deem it appropriate to bring separate charges for separate рhotographs in a traditional photo album. Similarly, the legislature presumably would deem separate charges appropriate for individual images displayed in an electronic photo album.
Mr. Senette [prosecutor]: How about a fine, Your Honor, is any fine going to be imposed in this case?
The Court: Any fine of—do you I [sic] have to impose a fine?
Mr. Senette: Ten thousand dollars per count, Your Honor.
The Court: Shall impose?
Mr. Marquet [defense counsel]: Let‘s read it, Judge.
Mr. Senette: That‘s correct, Your Honor.
The Court: Okay. Now I‘m going to impose a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) [sic] of Mr. Kujawa.
Mr. Senette: For each count, Your Honor?
The Court: Yeah, each count to run concurrently, plus cost. All right.