State v. KowalState v. Kowal
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The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to
On February 28,1992, at approximately 11:30 p.m., two Derby police officers, Salvatore Forsceno and Scott Todd, observed a motor vehicle, operated by the defendant cross the double center line of Main Street in Derby and make an abrupt right turn across two lanes of traffic onto the southbound entrance ramp of Route 8. The officers, who were several car lengths behind the defendant, followed him onto the entrance ramp and across a bridge, where the defendant took the next exit off Route 8 into Shelton. The defendant drove erratically while on the ramp and bridge. The officers were unable to position their vehicle behind the defendant’s vehicle and initiate a motor vehicle stop until they reached the exit ramp in Shelton. Upon subsequent investigation following the motor vehicle stop, the officers determined that the defendant had operated his motor vehicle in Derby under the influence of alcohol and arrested him for that offense.
In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because (1) the officers’ “reasonable suspicion” that a violation of
*672The defendant asks that we differentiate between an infraction and an offense. He argues that although operating under the influence is unquestionably an offense pursuant to
We have recently stated that the fact that a police officer may not have observed a violation before making an investigative stop is irrelevant because “a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from conduct that alone is not criminal.” State v. Harrison, 30 Conn. App. 108, 113, 618 A.2d 1381, cert. granted, 225 Conn. 921, 625 A.2d 824 (1993). “[T]he weaving of a vehicle in its own lane provides reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigative stop to determine if the driver is, in fact, intoxicated or impaired, [and] thereby violating
In this case, the conduct amply supports the trial court’s determination that the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that justified their making an investigative stop. The defendant drove his motor vehicle across the double center line of Main Street in Derby. He then made an abrupt right turn across two lanes of traffic onto the southbound entrance ramp of Route 8. His erratic driving continued on the ramp and bridge, also within the town limits of Derby. The fact that the conduct observed by the arresting officers within their jurisdiction may have constituted only an infraction is irrelevant. The statute does not require *673that the officers establish probable cause to arrest the defendant before they leave their jurisdiction.4
The defendant does not claim that police officers may not conduct investigatory stops5 outside of their own precincts. See State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). Rather, he claims that pursuant to § 54-If (c) they may do so only when in “immediate pursuit” of an offender.
“We have previously determined that the arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the defendant for the defendant’s actions while in the officer’s jurisdiction. The mere fact that the actual stop and arrest occurred [in another town] will not undercut the validity of the arrest. The language of § 54-If (c) is clear. The requirement of subsection (a), therefore, is that the offense, or the actions that lead to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense has or is about to be committed, occur in the officer’s jurisdiction.” State v. Harrison, supra, 116. As in Harrison, the arresting officers here conducted the investigatory stop that led to the defendant’s arrest on the basis of the defendant’s actions while he was in the officers’ jurisdiction.
In interpreting the term “immediate pursuit” as found in
The trial court properly found that the investigatory stop satisfied the constitutional requirement of reasonable and articulable suspicion, and that the defendant’s arrest was accomplished pursuant to probable cause. The court therefore properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“(c) Members of any local police department . . . when in immediate pursuit of one who may be arrested under the provisions of this section, are authorized to pursue the offender outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest. ...”
There is no question that probable cause was necessary to justify the arrest here; however, the issue of probable cause for the arrest itself is not an issue on appeal.
A brief investigatory stop, commonly referred to as a Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); is permitted, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.