{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Kolvek avers that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because his trial was held outside the time limit outlined by R.C.
{¶ 4} The courts must strictly enforce the statutory speedy trial provisions. State v. Pachay (1980),
{¶ 5} According to R.C.
{¶ 6} Although R.C.
"The time within which an accused must be brought to trial * * * may be extended only by the following:
"(A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him * * *;
"* * *
"(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused's lack of counsel, provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as required by law;
"* * *
"(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
"* * *
"(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion[.]"
{¶ 7} Before we can determine whether Mr. Kolvek was denied his right to a speedy trial, we must first ascertain if the trial court disposed of Mr. Kolvek's motion to suppress within a reasonable time. This determination is necessary, as a motion to suppress tolls the speedy trial clock from the time the defendant files the motion until the trial court disposes of the motion, as long as the trial court's disposition occurs within a reasonable time. State v. Arrizola (1992),
{¶ 8} The determination of whether a trial court disposed of a motion within a reasonable time necessarily involves a thorough examination of the circumstances. State v. Deshich (Jan. 10, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 3054-M. Moreover, a reviewing court must consider the complexity of the facts, the difficulty of the legal issues presented in the case at issue, and the demands placed on the time and schedules of trial court judges. Id.; State v.Wilson (1982),
{¶ 9} In this case, Mr. Kolvek filed his motion to suppress on April 21, 2003, and the trial court disposed of his motion on September 11, 2003. Approximately four and one-half months elapsed between Mr. Kolvek's filing of this motion and the trial court's disposition. During this period of time, the trial court (1) granted Mr. Kolvek's five motions to continue, (2) granted the motion to withdraw of Mr. Kolvek's counsel, and (3) sua sponte "held in abeyance" ruling on Mr. Kolvek's motion to suppress until the completion of his other criminal trials. Based upon a thorough examination of the circumstances of this case, we cannot find that the trial court's delay in disposing of Mr. Kolvek's motion to suppress was unreasonable. See Deshich, supra (concluding that a 16-month delay was reasonable in light of the fact that the trial court encountered various procedural motions and issues during the 16-month period).
{¶ 10} We must now calculate the actual time that had elapsed between Mr. Kolvek's arrest and his plea. The record indicates that Mr. Kolvek was arrested on March 4, 2003, and, accordingly, the statutory speedy trial time began to run on March 5, 2003. See Steiner,
{¶ 11} Thereafter, on April 21, 2003, Mr. Kolvek filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss. As we have concluded that the four and one-half month delay was reasonable, the speedy trial time was tolled until September 11, 2003, when the trial court denied Mr. Kolvek's motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. See R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
Whitmore, P.J. Baird, J. concur.