{¶ 2} Mr. Kodman moved the trial court to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the оfficer had illegally stopped him and illegally arrested him. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and he pleaded no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol and to refusing to submit to a chemical test. He has argued on appeal that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress. This Court affirms his convictions because the officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop him and probable cause to arrest him.
The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop . . ., and then the decision whether these historiсal facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion. . . .
Ornelas v. United States,
The first part of the analysis involves only a determinаtion of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact. . .
Id.
{¶ 4} The trial court found that the officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Kodman and thаt Mr. Kodman acknowledged that he had had four beers. Mr. Kodman does not appear to challenge the trial court's finding of those historical faсts. Rather, he appears to argue that those historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable policе officer, did not establish a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Kodman had or was violating the law. Having smelled alcohol on Mr. Kodman and having learned that he was driving after consuming four beers, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Kodman was driving while under the influence of alcohol. Accоrdingly, he acted legally in instructing Mr. Kodman to *4 pull his automobile into a parking space and in administering field sobriety tests to Mr. Kodman.
To determine whether an officer had probablе cause to arrest an individual for [driving while under the influence of alcohol], the court must examine whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
State v. Medcalf,
{¶ 6} After Mr. Kodman pulled his car into the parking space, the officer had him get out. The officer saw that Mr. Kodman's eyes were glossy and bloodshot. He administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Mr. Kodman, which resulted in five out of six possible "сlues" that Mr. Kodman was under the influence of alcohol. He also had Mr. Kodman perform the walk and turn test. Mr. Kodman failed to touch his heel to toe, as the officer had instructed him, was unable to stay on the painted line the officer had asked him to walk, and was *5 unable to turn in the manner the officer had instructed him. The officer instructed Mr. Kodman to do the one-leg-stand test, but Mr. Kodman said that, because of his hearing problem, he had a problem with equilibrium, and the оfficer did not force him to attempt that test. The officer then arrested Mr. Kodman.
{¶ 7} Again, Mr. Kodman does not appear to challenge the officer's testimony about his glossy and bloodshot eyes or his performance on the field sobriety tests. Rather, he has pointed out that the officer acknowledged that he had followed the officer's directions, his demeanor was polite and respectful, his speech was good, he was not stumbling, staggering, or falling down, and the officer had not seen him driving erratically or violating any traffic laws. While Mr. Kodman's failure to exhibit some symptoms that sometimes accompany intoxication was part of the totality of the circumstances, the absence of those symptoms did not negate the presence оf other symptoms. His admission of having had four beers, his glossy and bloodshot eyes, and his performance on the field sobriety tests provided the officer prоbable cause to believe that Mr. Kodman was driving while under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, the officer legally arrested him.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds thаt there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal Cоurt, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which timе the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to appellant.
*7MOORE, P. J. REECE, J., Concur.
(Reece, J., retired, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to, § 6(C), Article IV, Constitution.) *1