STATE v. GREGORY GEORGE MARSHALL KNOX.
No. 45854.
Supreme Court of Minnesota
December 23, 1976
250 N.W. 2d 147
We are not unmindful of the extent to which the appointee McMahan has been prejudiced by the improper procedure employed herein, for he has to date served in that capacity for more than 6 weeks without salary or other compensation. It was this consideration, among others, which in part led the county court to undertake what it considered was an acceptable procedural shortcut. To the end that the employee may ascertain his employment status in the most expeditious manner, we direct the cooperation of the parties to fully and immediately present the factual and procedural issues to the district court for a prompt determination on the merits.
Writ shall issue.
Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Richard G. Mark, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Hansen, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William M. Gustafson, County Attorney, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc.
SHERAN, CHIEF JUSTICE.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered against him on November 13, 1974, in the Nicollet County District Court, adjudging him guilty of violation of
We affirm.
Upon defendant‘s arrival at MSH, he was diagnosed as psychotic and delusional. A course of treatment was determined, which included the administration of antipsychotic drugs. This treatment continued through February 1973, when the antipsychotic drugs ceased to be administered. During this period, his delusions became less frequent and finally disappeared.
Defendant was granted a “medical parole” to MSH on January 15, 1973, by the Minnesota Corrections Authority. Prior to that time, his confinement at MSH was based solely upon the order of civil commitment.
On June 11, 1973, it was discovered that defendant and another patient, Merle Campbell, had escaped. Egress from the hospital had apparently been gained by cutting through one of the bars on the window in defendant‘s room, crossing a courtyard, cutting through a wire gate, and climbing over two more fences. No one authorized defendant to leave MSH premises. He was taken into custody on October 13, 1973, in Orlando, Florida on charges of vagrancy and he was returned to MSH on October 30, 1973.
In May 1974, defendant was recommended for discharge from his civil commitment; the discharge became effective on May 30, 1974.
On May 14, 1974, the criminal complaint charging defendant with escape was executed by the medical director of MSH, Dr. Charles Sheppard. It was issued the same day. Defendant‘s case came on for trial on October 29, 1974. He waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court. The court found defendant guilty, and he appealed.
(1) Does
(2) Was sufficient competent evidence introduced at trial to support the trial court‘s findings?
(3) Was defendant denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him?
(4) Was defendant denied his right to a speedy trial?
1. Applicability and Validity of
Defendant was convicted of violating
“Subdivision 1. ‘Escape’ includes departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
“Subd. 2. Whoever does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:
“(1) Escapes while held in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime;
* * * * *
“Subd. 3. This section does not apply to a person who is free on bail or who is on parole or probation, or subject to a stayed sentence or stayed execution of sentence, unless he has been taken into actual custody upon revocation of the parole, probation, or stay of the sentence or execution of sentence.”
On appeal, defendant asserts that (a) his conduct does not fall within the proscription of the statute in fact; or (b) the parole exception of
(a) Applicability in Fact.
Central to defendant‘s claim that his conduct was not proscribed by
“When any person confined in the state prison or the state reformatory is alleged to be insane, the warden or other person in charge shall forthwith notify the commissioner of public welfare, who shall cause the prisoner to be examined by the probate court of the county where he is confined, as in the case of other insane persons. In case he is found to be insane, he shall be transferred by the order of the court to the Minnesota Security Hospital or to a state hospital for the insane in the discretion of the court, there to be kept and maintained as in the case of other insane persons. If, in the judgment of the superintendent, his sanity is restored before the period of his commitment to the penal institution has expired, he shall be removed by the commissioner, upon the certificate of the superintendent, to the institution whence he came, and there complete the period of his sentence.”
Other pertinent sections of c. 253 provide:
253.23 “When any criminal shall be transferred to the Minnesota Security Hospital the original warrant of his commit-
253.24 “A prisoner who is removed or returned under sections 253.20 to 253.27 shall be held in the place to which he is so removed or returned in accordance with the terms of his original sentence unless sooner discharged and the period for which he is removed shall be counted as a part of the term of the confinement.”
253.13 “When a state prison or reformatory convict who has been committed to a state hospital escapes therefrom or dies therein, the superintendent shall immediately notify the chief executive officer of such prison or reformatory of such fact.”
Read together, these provisions appear to rebut defendant‘s contention, and seem to indicate a legislative intent to treat prisoners who are transferred to MSH as being under the continuing custody of the state prison. The concept that a person who has been both civilly committed and sentenced to a term of imprisonment might be in the custody of both the Department of Public Welfare and the commissioner of corrections has been expressly embraced by this court in the recent case of Lausche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W. 2d 366 (1974), certiorari denied, 420 U.S. 993, 95 S. Ct. 1430, 43 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1975). While that case dealt with a civil commitment which occurred prior to the criminal conviction and incarceration, this fact would not seem to distinguish the conclusion that—
“* * * the appellant is under commitment to both the commissioner of public welfare and the commissioner of corrections. The commissioner of public welfare has the express statutory authority to transfer patients to a ‘suitable’ institution without disturbing a commitment.
Minn. St. 246.14 . * * * Since both proceedings are in accordance with due process of law, one com-
mitment does not disturb the other.” 302 Minn. 65, 71, 225 N.W. 2d 365, 369.
“The words ‘in legal custody on a charge or conviction of a crime’ includes everything from arrest, to confinement in a jail pending trial, to confinement in an institution following conviction.” 40 M. S. A. 430 (1964).
There is no indication that “institution” refers only to the state prison. It more logically seems to refer to any institution in which the commissioner of corrections has authority to place a prisoner.
It seems clear that
In reaching this conclusion we find further support in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Reed, 364 Mass. 545, 306 N.E. 2d 816 (1974). In considering a case factually similar to the one at bar, a majority of the Massachusetts court stated:
“* * * [I]t is our view that, in interpreting escape statutes, there is justification for adopting a construction which permits the punishment of all escaping prisoners. * * * It would seem illogical to construe a legislative intent that although the pris-
oner was to get credit in the execution of his sentence for the term spent in [a] hospital, however, if he escaped from the hospital he was not considered to be in custody for the purpose of being punished.” 364 Mass. 545, 547-548, 306 N.E. 2d 816, 818.
While in the instant case we do not have the benefit of such a clearly drawn statutory delineation of the status of a state prison inmate transferred to a state security hospital, we have concluded that a prisoner so transferred still remains “in lawful custody.” In order to effectuate the over-all purpose of deterring and punishing all escaping prisoners, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended
(b) Applicability of Parole Exception.
Given application of the statute in fact to the conduct of defendant, does he nonetheless fall within the exception of subd. 3 of the statute?
It is conceded that defendant was on “medical parole” to MSH at the time of his escape. There is little in the record which reflects the exact nature of this type of transfer. We are, however, convinced from what evidence there is in the record that a “medical parole” is not a parole as that term is used in the statute, but rather is merely a temporary transfer for medical treatment, more analogous to a furlough than anything else. The use of the term “parole” is a misnomer. An inmate on “medical parole” does not fall within the parole exception of
(c) Constitutionality.
Defendant asserts that, if it is determined that
In Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W. 2d 318 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803, 94 S. Ct. 130, 38 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1973), we stated broadly the standards to be applied in considering a claimed denial of equal protection. Summarized, those standards require that a legislative classification apply uniformly to all persons similarly situated, and that the distinctions which separate those who are included in a classification from those who are not must not be arbitrary or fanciful, but rather must be natural and reasonable. Finally, the classification must be germane to a lawful objective. See, also, 3B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 1700, and State v. Reps, 302 Minn. 38, 228 N.W. 2d 780 (1974).
In the instant case it is clear that defendant falls not only within the class of those persons civilly committed to MSH, but also in the class of persons in the custody of the commissioner of corrections who have been convicted of a criminal offense. The obvious, and unquestionably legitimate, legislative purpose behind applying the criminal sanctions of
2. Sufficiency of Evidence.
Defendant does not deny that his actions, if they fall at all within the proscription of
Under
Defendant bases his claim of lack of capacity on the testimony of two witnesses, Merle Campbell, defendant‘s companion in the escape, and Norman Holby, another inmate of Stillwater, who was with both defendant and Campbell at MSH at the time of the escape. Their testimony, defendant asserts, established that he had reverted to his delusional state on the night of the escape and that he left MSH under the influence of a delusional compulsion. The testimony of these two individuals was at best inconsistent, and at times conflicted as to the details of the events of the night in question, a factor that the trial court considered in weighing the testimony. The court also heard the contradictory testimony of Dr. Gerald Ziesemer, who examined defendant 5 days before the escape and found him to be stable, aggressive, and without delusional tendencies. Mere evidence that an individual charged with a crime was suffering from a mental illness does not act to excuse that person from criminal liability, unless the mental illness caused such a defect of reason that the defendant did not know the nature of his act or that it was wrong. State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W. 2d 48 (1976). The trial court specifically found that there was not a “mental state on the 10th of June, which would eliminate criminal responsibility.” On appeal, this finding does not appear to be clearly erroneous. Additionally, the trial court found that irrespective of defendant‘s mental condition at the time of the escape, there was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that he was equally guilty under the statute for his failure to return to custody.
Defendant asserts that in making this finding the court was indulging in mere speculation, in that no evidence was presented regarding defendant‘s conduct and mental condition between the time of his escape and the time of his recapture which could
At oral argument, counsel for defendant asserted that defendant‘s condition upon his return necessitated heavy dosages of antipsychotic drugs on an emergency basis, indicating that defendant was delusional upon his return. We have carefully reexamined the record, and it appears that whatever medication defendant received upon his return was prescribed not to treat delusional behavior, but rather was administered to relieve feelings of anxiety that defendant was experiencing. This is in accord with the trial court‘s findings that defendant‘s mental capacity just prior to his recapture was not delusional. Additionally, it appears that the court felt that its first finding, that defendant was responsible for his acts in leaving the hospital, was sufficient for conviction. The two findings are obviously not inconsistent.
3. Assistance of Counsel.
At the last of three pretrial hearings defendant appeared without his counsel to that date, Mr. Howard Haugh. At that hearing the court found, inter alia, that a report received from the Sioux Trails Clinic regarding defendant‘s competency to stand trial failed to show that defendant was incompetent. It is asserted that the trial court, in making this finding without defense counsel present, denied defendant his right to assistance of counsel.
The situation which occurred on October 8, 1974, must be viewed in perspective with the proceedings at the prior pretrial hearings.
At the July 23, 1974, arraignment of defendant, his counsel requested a psychological evaluation of defendant, directed at both his sanity at the time of the offense and his competency to stand trial. An examination was ordered.
On August 6, 1974, having received a letter from defendant alleging mistreatment at the hands of his jailers, the court or-
On August 8, 1974, the day set for trial, defendant appeared again with Mr. Haugh. Two issues principally concerned the court: First, who would represent defendant, and second, whether further psychiatric examinations should be conducted. The first issue was never resolved. As to defendant‘s competency, the examination which had been ordered on July 23, 1974, had been conducted and the results made available to counsel for defendant. Counsel was satisfied from the report that defendant was competent. Defendant on the other hand felt that the examination had not been adequately conducted and demanded another examination. The second psychological evaluation was reluctantly ordered by the court after an extended colloquy with defendant, and then only when the county attorney urged the court to grant the request in order to foreclose any question of defendant‘s competency. The trial court judge indicated on the record his strong feeling that there was no question that defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial date was, nonetheless, continued to allow for this second examination.
The proceedings on October 8, 1974, must be viewed against this background.
On October 8, defendant appeared without counsel. The court was under the impression that Mr. Haugh had been dismissed by defendant, and the principal purpose of that hearing was to determine who would represent him. Eventually another public defender was appointed.
The matter of defendant‘s competency to stand trial was really not a central issue. The trial court found nothing in the new
In his brief, defendant categorizes this conversation as an adversary confrontation in which he stood alone against the state and the court, and was “frightened” into agreeing that he was competent to stand trial. Read in context, it appears that the court was merely trying to explain to defendant the effect of a finding of competency and what alternatives the court had rejected.
We do not approve of the absence of counsel at the October 8, 1974, appearance. We feel that counsel should have been present before the court proceeded, even though it appears that a valid determination of competency had already been made at the earlier hearing. However, viewing the incident in context, it seems certain that defendant was competent to stand trial, and any error was, at best, harmless.
4. Speedy Trial.
Defendant was returned to custody on October 30, 1973; he was not charged with the offense of escape until May 14, 1974. He was not tried until October 29, 1974. This delay, defendant contends, amounted to an abridgment of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In his brief, defendant argues that the due process guaranty of the Fifth Amendment was also violated by this delay. The Sixth Amendment guaranty of a speedy trial becomes operative upon the accusation of the defendant. Such accusation occurs
The standard by which a claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial should be judged is well set out in United States v. Dowl, 394 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (D. C. Minn. 1975). That court said:
“The difficulty of determining when a defendant has been denied speedy trial is caused by the vagueness of the concept and the inability to define with precision the exact number of months or years which amount to denial. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S. Ct. 2182. Due to this imprecision, the Supreme Court has formulated a balancing test that should be ap-
plied in an effort to weigh the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant.
“A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182.”
Applying those factors to the instant case, we find that the crucial delay in this case was the 7-month period between the time defendant was returned to MSH and the date formal charges were filed against him. Prior to that time he was not in custody and his whereabouts were unknown; subsequent to that time his prosecution proceeded with sufficient dispatch, and any delays were at the request of the defendant. The reason for the 7-month delay is somewhat more problematical. It appears not to have been an intentional tactic as intimated by defendant‘s counsel on appeal, but rather merely a difficulty in communication between MSH and the appropriate prosecuting authorities. Such delays are not uncommon, but nonetheless cannot be tolerated if they work a prejudice to an accused‘s ability to defend himself. The extent to which defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial (a factor weighed heavily by this court in other contexts, e. g. State v. Borough, 287 Minn. 482, 178 N.W. 2d 897 [1970]), does not seem to be an appropriate consideration in this case.
The final element, the extent of prejudice the delay caused defendant, is obviously both the most important and the most difficult to assess. Defendant claims that the delay made it more difficult to establish his mental condition at the time of the offense. At trial, his only two witnesses regarding his mental state testified in a confident, coherent (if inconsistent) manner, seemingly unaffected by the delay. No expert testimony was
On balance, it seems as though the delay, though not to be condoned, was not so prejudicial as to require a dismissal of the charges against defendant.
The conviction of the defendant is affirmed.
YETKA, JUSTICE (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. At oral argument the county attorney stated that although the escape statute involved in this case was not intended to apply to a patient who is under direct civil commitment by a court to a mental institution, it was intended to apply to one who has been previously sentenced to a prison, and then transferred from that prison by commitment order to a mental institution.
If the purpose of the statute is to discourage attempted escape from a mental institution on the theory that the public is in danger from an escapee, why should the statute not apply equally to either patient, that is, one committed from a prison or one committed directly under a civil commitment order? Moreover, if the one under a civil commitment order who attempts to escape is not guilty of a crime on the theory that he is a patient in a mental institution and therefore should be deemed to not have the capacity to commit the offense, how can the patient there under commitment from a prison be any more responsible for his actions?
It appears to me that the statute should be applied equally to either patient, or to neither.