State v. KnightshedState v. Knightshed
Defendant, Ronald Knightshed, was convicted of aggravated battery against his wife in violation of
The facts at trial show that, at approximately 5:50 p.m. on March 9, 1999, Angelina Knightshed called 911 and reported that her husband had just cut her neck with a knife. Deputy Jodie Kaough responded to the call which was dispatched as an aggravated battery by cutting. When he arrived at the victim‘s apartment, located in the Woodmere subdivision in Harvey, the victim was crying and had a four-inch laceration to the left side of her neck. The victim informed Deputy Kaough that her husband, the defendant, had inflicted the wound. Paramedics were called to the scene and medical treatment was rendered to the victim.
Defendant was not present when the police arrived at the scene but was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated battery.
In this appeal, defendant first alleges that the trial court erred in finding that Angelina Knightshed had waived the health care provider-patient privilege when she spoke to the 911 operator.
At trial, the victim, through her own attorney, asserted her patient-health care provider privilege under
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in finding that the victim waived her patient-health care provider privilege. Defendant argues that the victim could not have waived the privilege when she spoke to the 911 operator because the privilege did not yet exist. Specifically, defendant asserts that the victim had not yet spoken to the EMT when she made the statements to the 911 operator and, therefore, there was no privilege.
The State responds that even if a privilege existed, the admissibility of that portion of the EMT‘s testimony was harmless error because it was merely cumulative to other evidence, namely the 911 tape and Deputy Kaough‘s testimony, both of which contained evidence of the victim‘s statement that her husband inflicted the wound.
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 510(C)(1) provides:
In a criminal proceeding, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of advice, diagnosis or treatment of his health condition between or among himself, his representative, and his physician or psychotherapist, and their representatives.
There are six exceptions to this general privilege,
We agree with the State‘s contention and we decline to address the issue of whether a privilege existed and/or if the
In applying the harmless error analysis, the reviewing court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Winfrey, 97-427 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/97), 703 So.2d 263; writ denied, 98-0264 (La.6/19/98), 719 So.2d 481. In this case, the testimony of the EMT was merely repetitive of prior testimony, and therefore, it does not appear there is any reasonable possibility that it contributed to the verdict. Because the testimony of the EMT was merely cumulative to other testimony, any error in its admission, if any, is harmless. State v. Winfrey, 97-427 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/97), 703 So.2d 63, 78, writ denied, 98-0264 (La.6/19/98), 719 So.2d 481.
In his second allegation of error, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence and failing to adequately consider the sentencing guidelines found in
In the present case, defense counsel orally objected to his sentence by stating, “Judge, at this time, as required by Article 881.1, I‘m asking for a reconsideration of sentence.” The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and defense counsel responded, “Note my exception and our intention to appeal both the conviction, as well as the sentence, feeling the sentence is excessive. Mr. Knightshed has no prior convictions.” At no time did defendant include the issue of failing to comply with
A sentence is constitutionally excessive, even if it is within the statutory limits, if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than the needless and purposeless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Robicheaux, 412 So.2d 1313 (La.1982); State v. Wickem, supra. Trial judges are granted great discretion in imposing sentences and sentences will not be set aside as excessive absent clear abuse of that broad discretion. State v. Riche, 608 So.2d 639, 640 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992), writ denied, 613 So.2d 972 (La.1993).
A sentence for aggravated battery ranges from zero to ten years with or without hard labor and a fine of up to $5,000.00.
In the present case, there was no evidence regarding the circumstances of defendant‘s attack on his wife. However, the evidence did show that defendant used a knife and cut his wife along the left side of her neck leaving a four-inch laceration. The victim was six months pregnant at the time of the attack. And, upon his arrest, defendant was overheard saying, “Oh, that‘s my wife, I cut that bitch.” In sentencing defendant, the trial court stated that defendant had “demonstrated an utter lack of respect for life, limb or the law.” Based on these facts, it does not appear the trial court abused its discretion or that defendant‘s sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. The mere fact defendant did not have any prior convictions does not lessen the severity of his crime.
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to
For the above discussed reasons, the defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED