209 N.W. 881 | Minn. | 1926
The first contention is that the evidence does not support the conviction. It is said the state produced no eye witness of the tragedy; no one who saw how defendant was driving at the moment of the impact; negligence is never presumed; this may have been an unavoidable accident; or may have been due to the negligence of Stodola; and it was for the state to negative accidental injury and negligence of the victim. These contentions are fallacious. The state had no greater burden than to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was culpably negligent in driving his automobile against Stodola so as to cause his death. When that is done any other cause of the homicide is negatived. Negligence of the victim would not be a defense, State v. Peterson,
Next it is asserted that it was error to charge that to drive an automobile when intoxicated is a statutory offense, and that a violation of that law raises a presumption of negligence. Of course, as stated in State v. Goldstone,
This language from People v. Townsend,
Common sense, in the absence of any statute on the subject, suggests that for an intoxicated person to undertake to drive an automobile on a much traveled highway is gross or culpable negligence. And, if such negligence is shown to result in so driving as to strike down and kill a person traveling in the proper place upon the highway, there should be no difficulty in finding that the driver's culpable negligence caused the homicide.
We think the evidence presented a state of facts which made it proper to call the jury's attention to other statutory provisions regulating the driving of automobiles upon highways, such as speed, meeting, passing and warning other users thereof. State v. Peterson, supra.
Error is assigned upon the charge that the word negligence was sometimes used without making clear to the jury that culpable negligence was meant. The court correctly defined culpable negligence, distinguished it from ordinary negligence, and specifically impressed upon the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was culpably negligent in striking Stodola.
The statute (G.S. 1923, §§ 2714), provides: "Whoever operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." It was intended to make it unlawful for a drunken person to drive a car. Plainly this was to safeguard life, limb and property. And the court was clearly right in stating to the jury that the presumption is that where a person drives an automobile in violation of law he is negligent. But the court was careful to leave to the jury whether his intoxication so exhibited itself in his driving against Stodola that the jury could say that such driving was culpably negligent. We find no substantial error in the charge. The requested instructions, so far as applicable and correct, were either given or sufficiently covered. There was no evidence which warranted the jury in considering in any manner any negligence of Stodola as a cause of his death, and the court was right in so instructing. *268
In addressing the jury defendant's counsel asserted that the burden was upon the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that striking Stodola was not an unavoidable accident and was not due to his own negligence. The court interrupted counsel with the statement that such was not the law and an argument on the basis of the asserted law should not be made. Error is assigned upon the action of the court. As already indicated, counsel was wrong in his view of the law, and the court properly stopped a line of argument based on a fallacious legal proposition. It is the duty of the court not only to hold counsel in his argument to the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences therefrom, but also to an accurate statement of the law upon which he wishes the jury to act.
Over objections evidence was received as to the manner in which defendant drove the car after the accident and some distance from the place thereof. The evidence was relevant and material. It was near enough in time to be valuable upon the extent to which defendant's intoxication at the time of the collision caused culpable negligent driving. Where violation of the speed limit is charged as the culpable negligence causing homicide, a quite different situation is presented from the one where violation of the statute against driving a motor vehicle while drunk is the charge. The former was the case in People v. Barnes,
We find no error in the record.
Order affirmed. *269