*1 bеyond even appropriate look to deter- language plainest contractual parties.”). The court mine the intent balanced, reasonable
should strive for Mo- interpretation. See General
contract Erves, 241, Corp. tors Mich. Here, (1976). reasonable in- allow to unilater-
terpretation necessary. only when
ally alter the contract New York Trust Co. States
See United 1, 1505, 25, 97 S.Ct. Jersey, Newv. 431 U.S. (Laws im- 52 L.Ed.2d obligations own
pairing state’s only if “reason- they аre constitutional
are important necessary to serve an
able
public purpose.”).
Contrary majority in the the statement “wheth- of this case is not
opinion, crux may impose midstream rule CSC
er terms of a collective
changes which affect CSC
bargaining agreement,” but whether “unnecessary” changes. If
may impose overreaching, wrong or rules are
the CSC here, they
or, unnecessary, then cannot nego- immediately superimposed on why agreement or contract —that
tiated negotiation. Wright subject to
they are East Or- City
Board Education (1985). ange, A.2d N.J.
Therefore, to the extent that the I concur changes necessary, rulе were
midstream changes the extent the were dissent to
unnecessary. Dakota, Plaintiff of South
STATE Appellee, KLEIN, Defendant
Ronald John Appellant.
No. 16349.
Supreme of South Dakota. Court April on Briefs
Considered July 12, 1989.
Decided
FACTS April 1987, In Rapid City Fire De- partment investigation received a smoke concerning call a residence. Appellant Ronald John Klein was the owner and sole occupant Upon of the arrival, house. firemen observed through flames the win- dows of the house. The firemen were forced to break down thе front door which was secured from the inside chain inside, lock. Once the firemen found that the house personal contained few items. (Earlier neighbor afternoon a had ob- served Klein packing many personal items van.) Klein, into his who had been at a movie, returned home to find the firemen extinguishing the investigators blaze. Fire later concluded that the home was dam- aged fires, by two both of which had been intentionally set. fire,
At the time of the Klein was a student who had limited sources of income loans) (mostly and was undergoing finan- cial difficulties. He was on default purchase contract for deed for the home with remaining the entire balancе due at the time the fire occurred. previously coverage had let his insurance lapse, on the house obtain new coverage thereon one month before the fire. fire, proof
After the Klein submitted a loss form his insurer. The amounts Meyer, Gen., Ann Atty. C. Asst. for property listed for the value of lost were plaintiff appellee; Roger Tellinghui- and A. sen, Gen., higher Pierre, significantly property than the Atty. val- the brief. previously he ues had listed when he had Pahlke, Shawn Jensen Office of Public applied court-appointed legal assistance Defender, Rapid City, for defendant and in June 1986. Klein had not appellant. any purchases made substаntial between time made his initial MILLER, Justice. legal assistance and the of his submission In appeal this we affirm convictions for company. to the insurance claim
burning to insurer attempt- defraud an deception charging ed theft hold State filed an information that the trial burning court did not abuse its discretion with defraud an insurer in viola- by аdmit- ting appellant’s prior crimes, attempted tion of SDCL 22-33-4 and theft deception, contrary and bad acts. to SDCL 22-30A-3.1 er, fire, provides: against property 1. SDCL 22-33-4 which is insured guilty felony. Any person of a Class 4 injure who with intent to or de- provides: fraud an insurer set fire to burns or causes to SDCL 22-30A-3 any any personal property be burned real оr kind, property himself or anoth- earlier counsel related house fire. Both counts guilty to pleas both would entered be admissible. entered a Information counts of the concerning Our standard of review *3 Information, which as Part II denial to of trial court’s admission of evidence a habitual offender alleged he wаs prior wrongs or is whether the acts in of conviction October of because his trial court abused its discretion. State v. deception. by counts of theft Champagne, N.W.2d jury both counts of by a convicted was provides: SDCL 19-12-5 later, days he entered an I. Part Several crimes, wrongs, Evidence of other or thereafter, Part II. Soon admission to is not prove acts admissible to the char- trial, new which filed a motion for person acter of a in order to show that he He ultimately denied. was sentenced was in conformity may, acted therewith. penitentiary for years in the state to 10 however, pur- be admissible for other to burning to an insurer and defraud 7V2 motive, poses, proof opportu- such as of by deception, years attempted theft intent, nity, preparation, plan, knowl- concurrently. Klein sentences to run both edge, identity, of or absence mistake or affirm. appeals. We accident. DECISION SDCL 19-12-3 states: relevant, Although may evidence be THE TRIAL COURT WHETHER if its probаtive excluded value is substan- BY AD- ITS DISCRETION ABUSED outweighed danger tially by the of unfair OF EVIDENCE KLEIN’S MITTING issues, prejudice, of mis- confusion or CRIMES, BAD PRIOR OR WRONGS leading jury, by or of considerations ACTS. time, delay, undue of or needless waste claims that the trial court Klein first presentation of cumulative it its discretion when allowed abused determining by decep- The test of Klein’s theft whether admission (two stemming of crimes or was from evidence other tion convictions counts incident) in copy properly against of admitted a defendant and a sanitized the same attorney two-step inquiry. It first must court-appointed volves a be proffered charge, criminal determined whether the from an earlier both prob- proving is to one of stated which evidenced Klein’s relevant State exceptions 19-12-5. advised the trial court SDCL lems.2 was Bradley, take in his own if he should the stand Titus, also State defense, for theft his convictions Champagne, supra. 1988), If in the evi deception charges and the contained his property Any person prоperty transfers or en- obtains of another ment of which he who guilty deception person property of theft. A de- he ob- cumbers consideration for tains, if intent defraud he: ceives with to impediment is or is not whether such (1) impression, a Creates or reinforces false valid, a or is is not matter official or law, value, including impressions as false to record. mind; decep- other intention or state however, not, include The term "deceive" does perform person’s a intention to a tion promise to having signifi- falsity pecuniary to no as matters shall not be inferred from fact cance, unlikely puffing by to de- statements or subsequently рerform alone that he persons. ceive reasonable promise; the (2) acquiring informa- Prevents another from by attempting "sanitized” 2. This judgment his tion which would affect might to therefrom information which delete transaction; previous criminal tend to infer was related to impression Fails correct a false which aрpli- activity. be that the It should also noted reinforced, previously created or the deceiver cation retained one reference influencing to'be or which the deceiver knows been removed counsel. This reference had fiduciary or whom stands another to request at the of Klein’s State but was reinserted relationship; or confidential counsel. lien, (4) Fails disclose a known adverse enjoy- legal impediment to the claim other relevant, is found to it next must dence Evidence of Klein’s convictions prejudicial determined its effect also would be admissible under the intent probative substantially outweighs value. to SDCL 19-12-5. As wе stated Bradley, supra; Cham Champagne, supra, where in SDCL 19-12-3. pagne, supra; see also offense, tent is an element of proof probative has Evidence is relevant and val similar acts be admitted so that the any if it contains fact which tends to ue may carry its burden even if the the commission of an accused with connect charge complete defense ais denial. Reutter, 374 crime. See beyond dispute It is that intent is an ele if the court de ment of both burning with intent to de *4 relevant, termines that the evidence fraud an insurer by deception.3 and theft unfairly prejudice its that submission will We believe that prior evidence of similar casе, evidence defendant’s such cannot the crimes is admissible to show that Klein’s Bradley, admitted. su be action was done with the intent Reutter, supra. v. pra; Under State Hol necessary to convict under these two stat land, (S.D.1984), 346 this bal N.W.2d 302 Pedde, utes. See also State v. 334 N.W.2d ancing process the sound is within discre 41, wherein stated that Further, tion of thе trial court. this bal prior evidence of acts need not be that of ancing process must be conducted on the identical only an offense but “of similar Hawk, Eagle record. See State v. involvement reasonably related to the of N.W.2d 120 fending Citing conduct.” United States v. Gocke, (8th Cir.1974), 507 F.2d A. Klein’s Prior Convictions cert, denied 420 U.S. S.Ct. reviеw of the evidence leads us (1975).
Our L.Ed.2d 660 the trial conclusion that the court did not Having pri- determined that Klein’s by admitting abuse its discretion Klein’s relevant, or convictions were we must next prior felony for theft convictions to the turn issue of their admis believe, deception. We as did the trial prejudicial. unfairly sion be The below, conviсtions, the especially court that evidence tends to that Klein show was charging count the him with theft de previ dire financial straits that he had ception which a check scheme involved de ously committed similar acts'because of his signed pay to assist Klein with his house financial do condition. We not believe that mеnts, was show his motive relevant to determining the trial court erred in that the intent. We note that his convictions were evidence, probative value of the as admit to be admitted in a “sanitized” fashion so ted, outweighed prejudicial was not jury the that would not able to consider effect. The trial court not abuse its other, aspects. less relevant in admitting discretion such See prior The admission of Klein’s convic- Swallow, supra. squarely fits the excep- tions within motive
tion to SDCL 19-12-5. Klein was motivat-
We
that Klein’s
further note
coun
sel,
during
at the time of
ed
difficulties
cross-examination
one of
fire,
witnesses,
previously
expert
“opened
the
as he hаd been
when he State’s
the door”
scheme in order
the
committed
1986 check
admission
Klein’s
convic
payments.
make his house
Even Klein tions when
witness whether
he asked the
admit that
himself went so far as to
he had
he was aware
Klein was
convicted
by deception
previously committed theft
be-
felon. The
noted that this
trial court later
Thus,
question by
cause of his financial
was the func
difficulties.
Klein’s counsel
equivalent
putting
the admission of his
convictions is
tional
himself
clearly
evidence con
relevant on the issue Klein’s mo- on
stand and therefore
Swallow,
cerning
See
v.
Klein’s status as
convicted felon
tive.
opened the door
Having
was admissible.
1, supra.
footnote
HENDERSON,
(concurring
of Klein’s
Justice
in re-
admission
convictions,
chal
now
sult).
See United
appeal.
admission on
lenge its
Although
affirming
I agree with
the con
(8th
Gipson,
4. See footnote
circumstances,
the
the
could
law and
view
reasonably
*
Rose,
that conclusion.”
making
have reached
at
"In
said in
895-96:
We also
decision,
Rose,
the
a unanimous
anteceded
by the rule that the
review we are bound
such
years.
case
Rose was written
judges
present
seven
court
question is
this
not whether
with former
ruling,
Jon Fosheim
original
then Chief Justice
like
have made
Here,
two fires were
to
started
avoid
the evidence was not admissi
collapse: (1) Igniting by wrapping
ble under
exception
the “intent”
as claimed
cloth around the base of an iron turned on by
majority.
The intent
ap
high position,
ignition
by leav- plies in
person
situations where a
admits
ing
burning
crawlspace
candle
in a
of an
act,
intent,
but denies
e.g., person
facing
attic. Klein was
foreclosure. He
charged
minor,
with sexual contact with a
had little financial resource. He could not
admits
bathing
the contact while
the child
obligations.
meet his financial
“Prior bad but denies the sexual intent. See- also
acts”,
proximity
close
time when
Titus,
(S.D.1988),
State v.
pra, Roden v. Solem (S.D.1988) (Both pedo- 670-1
philia cases). cases, In those admission of
such evidence was within the discretion of
the trial court. Mary JAGER, Appellee, Plaintiff and
SABERS, result). (concurring Justice I only. concur the result I believe that evidence of Klein’s EDUCATION, RAMONA BOARD OF by deception convictions for theft DISTRICT, RAMONA SCHOOL “financially situations where he was Appellant. Defendant and strapped” was admissible because the de- No. 16450. “opened fense by asking the door” a wit-
nеss whether he was aware that Klein was Supreme Court of South Dakota. a convicted felon. May on Briefs Considered 1989. The evidence was also under admissible July Decided the motive of SDCL 19-12-5 be- desperation cause the financial of all three motive, highly
instances were relevant to
which was a material issue because Klein
claimed to have financial resources. Justice, Roger Morgan, myself.
Chief Justices Wollman and Frances now our Senior Court, sitting together Dunn on the with Justice