*1 271 Const, Ill, (finding legislature power that the has the principle 1. “This is art. Iowa pur- limit government preclude parole, per- if of or even violated one branch crimes). clearly forbid- powers use that are found of ports guilty sons certain den, granted by attempts powers to use Through delegation, parole the act of deci- to another branch.” State the constitution typically sions are made “executive or (Iowa 840, 842 Phillips, v. 610 N.W.2d administrative action taken after the door 2000) C.S., 851, (citing In re 516 N.W.2d Klouda, has been closed on the convict.” 1994)). (Iowa (citations 858 omitted); 642 at 262 see N.W.2d (1986) the Although (vesting the distinction between pow- Iowa Code 906.3 the judicial is often powers prisoners executive and if qualify er determine unclear, they The executive early do differ. of an parole, release the board general power Iowa, has the department agency). executive most laws; carry the execute and parole legitimately decisions are within the power has the judicial department discretion of the executive branch. laws, ap- the constitution and interpret screening policy pur- DOC them, and decide controversies. ply length of an inmate’s port deal with Flett, City Falls v. 380 N.W.2d Cedar of sentence; proce- simply establishes 251, 254-55 determining the status dure for inmate’s argues Doe that the DOC’s not in policy vis-a-vis the SVPA. The does an at screening procedure any usurp sentencing authority “constitute[s] sense Branch ... tempt by the Executive Sepa- the court and does not violate the of imposed by the alter the sentence Judicial We affirm on ration of Powers Clause. course, judi Sentencing, Branch.” is well. this issue as Ct., v. Iowa Dist. cial function. See State AFFIRMED. (“Al (Iowa 2000) N.W.2d pun though legislature prescribes crimes, sentencing actual
ishment for an function independent
of a defendant is judiciary.”); province
that the sole of the is (Iowa 471, 475 Longo, v. 608 N.W.2d
State
2000) prerogative (“sentencing is the sole sentencing falls judge”). “Because Iowa, Appellant, STATE of judicial power, the realm of within is a power encroachment on this violation doctrine.” separation-of-powers KLAWONN, Ryan Lynn Appellee. Dep’t Klouda v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Servs., 261-62 Corr. No. 03-1118. of Iowa. Supreme Court however, Sentencing parole, 22, 2004. Oct. sentencing different matters. While are “ judicial ‘relates to action taken before ” closed,’ at 262 prison door is see id. Wright,
(quoting State (Iowa 1972)) omitted), (emphasis system solely is a creature of
“parole at 842
legislature.” Phillips, 610 N.W.2d *2 Miller, General,
Thomas J. Attorney Boesen, Martha E. Attorney Assistant General, Sarcone, John P. County Attor- ney, Noble, and Jeff County Assistant At- torney, appellant.
Maggi Moss and Matthew Oetker of Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn, Boles, Parrish Moines, Cook, L.L.P., jeopardy, pro- notions of double violate Des & Gribble process rights. cedural or substantive due appellee. Id. at 522. WIGGINS, Justice. 3, 1999, On March before the district *3 ask- petition filed a Ryan Lynn Klawonn order, Boykin court entered its restitution previous to reduce a
ing the district court
wrongful
filed a civil
death action
chapter
under
of restitution entered
order
individually
filed the action
Klawonn. She
his
by the amount
910 of the Iowa Code
personal representative
and as
of the Es-
of a
paid in a settlement
insurance carrier
I Boykin’s petition alleged
tate. Count
of
of the same facts or
arising
action
out
civil
negligence against
a claim of
Klawonn and
proceeding.
the criminal
event as
sought damages
pain
suffering,
the order of restitu-
district court reduced
injuries,
mental
loss to the
physical and
subsequent settlement amount
tion
death,
premature
Estate due to
actual ex-
of restitution. Be-
and modified the order
penses,
present
value of the
in a
we hold a settlement obtained
cause
amount the Estate would have accumulat-
same facts or
petition prayed
II
ed. Count
criminal
previous
proceeding
as a
event
damages
by Boykin
sustained
because of
restitution, we
prior
a
order of
reduces
spousal
consortium.
her loss
court.
judgment of the district
affirm the
Klawonn’s auto insurance carrier de-
Background
I.
Facts and Procedure.
action. The
en-
fended the civil
22, 1997,
sped
Klawonn
On November
Boykin signed a
tered into a settlement.
through an intersection and collided with
stating
release
she received
general
Boykin. Boy-
vehicle driven
Nathaniel
$275,000
return, Boy-
and in
from Klawonn
injuries
kin
a result of the
he
died as
kin, individually,
personal represen-
and as
in the collision. The State
received
of the Estate would “release and
tative
homicide,
with vehicular
charged Klawonn
from
discharge
forever
[Klawonn]
to involun-
pled guilty
Klawonn later
but
action and claims for or
all causes of
in violation of
tary manslaughter
Iowa
loss, suffering or
any damage,
reason of
707.5(1) (1997). On March
Code section
...
injury
persons
property
sus-
gave
Klawonn a
the district
consequence
of this
by anyone
tained
him on
suspended
placed
sentence and
injury,
including claims for
incident and
Additionally,
years.
for two
probation
9, 2000,
August
loss of consortium.” On
$4,702.23 in
ordered to
Klawonn was
action
Boykin dismissed the civil
widow,
damages to the victim’s
pecuniary
prejudice.
Klawonn with
$5,000
Boykin (Boykin),
to the Iowa
Velma
Program, and
Compensation
Crime Victim
modify the
filed a motion to
Klawonn
Boykin Estate
to the Nathaniel
in the criminal
restitution order entered
(Estate)
by Iowa
in restitution as
received
action to reflect the
(1999).
Code section 910.3B
action.
in the civil
Boykin and the Estate
the restitution
The district court reduced
order,
the restitution
appealed
Klawonn
by Boykin
by the amount received
constitutionality challenging in the civil action. The
and the Estate
State v. Kla
order of restitution.
discretionary review of
applied for
wonn,
State
II. Issue. ages defined under section 910.1 and de determine whether settle- We must termined under section 910.3. Iowa Code action out of ment made a civil 910.3B(1). Therefore, the common-law facts or event as the crimi- the same prohibiting recovery rules double of dam the amount due to proceeding nal reduces ages apply do not restitu the restitution the victim under 910.3B(1). under section Cf. imposed payment of res- which Paxton, State v. 108-11 section under (Iowa 2004) (holding pecuniary damages 910.3B(1). 910.1(3) are limited to those Scope damages that a victim could III. of Review. recover *4 action; thus, against the offender in a civil a restitution Our review of the common-law off apply rules set to is for correction of errors at law. State v. prevent recovery). a double (Iowa 1998). Watts, 750, 751 reviewing restitution When “we chapter provides “any Iowa Code 910 findings determine whether the court’s payment by restitution the offender to a evidentiary support, lack substantial against any victim shall be set off judg- properly applied whether the court has not ment in favor the victim in a civil action Bonstetter, the law.” State 637 N.W.2d arising out of the same facts or event.” 161, 165 Iowa Code 910.8. While this section payment credits restitution against a Analysis. IV. judgment subsequent a victim receives in a $150,000, The which the district out of the same facts or event, pay provision this does not ordered Klawonn the Es address tate, whether is restitution under Iowa Code sec a settlement of a civil action aris- 910.3B(1), provides ing in out of the which relevant same facts or event must be part: against prior credited order of restitu- tion.
In in all criminal cases which the offend- felony of a in er is convicted which the Because chapter Iowa Code 910 by act committed or acts the offender expressly address the situation person, caused the death another us, attempt before we must to determine addition to the amount determined be by the result intended the legislature. If payable and ordered to be to a clear, the statutes are not we look to other pecuniary damages, victim for as defined intent, indicia of including the 910.1, under section and determined un- subject act, matter of object to be 910.3, der section the court shall also accomplished, purpose of the act. offender to pay order the at least one Olson, 869, 872-73, Case v. 234 Iowa 14 fifty thousand hundred dollars in resti- (1944). N.W.2d 719 tution to the victim’s estate. 910.3B(1) added). (emphasis Restitution has a purpose: two-fold (1) previously We have held the protect res- public by compensating (2) under activities; this section is a victims for criminal Izzolena, fine. State v. 609 by N.W.2d rehabilitate the instilling offender re Klawonn, 2000); 549 Izzolena, 609 sponsibility N.W.2d at in the offender. 609 910.3B(1) 518-19. Section is clear and un- N.W.2d at 548. Additionally, a restitution ambiguous that punitive awarded as award contains several elements. preserved right have the Estate’s to re- does not file a civil a victim Typically, Id. an of- an offender because action ceive the ordered the court have the means or usually does not fender its order of restitution as additional consid- judg- coverage satisfy a civil insurance release, eration for the she failed to do so. $150,000in restitution awarded ment. release, plain Boy- Under the terms of the punish- 910.3B is considered accepted kin as full satisfac- compensation to to the offender and ment any damages may tion of she or the Estate Klawonn, family. the victim’s be entitled from Klawonn as result of at 520. husband’s death. Her release of her the offender has In those cases where claims Klawonn has no effect on $150,000 of restitu- the means to Abeyta the criminal order of restitution. tion ordered the court under section State, (Wyo.2002) P.3d entry judg- of a civil 910.3B “[wjhere (holding imposed restitution is as same facts or event out of the sentence, part of a criminal it is not a debt subsequently prosecution, as the criminal victim, the defendant between reduced obtained civil will be agreements between those have no payment made a sentencing effect on courts order of res- *5 § In other the offender. Iowa Code 910.8. except to the extent that the stat- words, has in situations where the offender offset”). settlement, requires ute restitution, pay the means to his or her however, final equivalent judg- was to a legislature has limited the victim’s total ment in the civil action because it covered in recovery damages to the damages all and the Estate could have she this appears purpose civil action. It in civil action without re- recovered legislative scheme is to coordinate restitu- serving any damages. claims or damage tion civil awards in order to with facts, if Under these the settlement is receiving from a prevent a victim windfall restitution, not used to reduce the order of awarded to the victim under 910.3B(1) in to Boykin compensable section addition the collect- will collect the dam- judgment damages ible recoverable she would have been entitled to if her ages entered in the civil action. plus judgment, action was reduced to civil pay to Klawonn was ordered case, present In the the release additional restitution under section as by its released and forev agreement terms 910.3B(1). 910.8, if section Kla- Under “from and all discharged er Klawonn but allowed wonn did not settle lawsuit action and claims for or rea causes of judgment paid to final and proceed to loss, inju any damage, suffering son $150,000 in he ordered was ... ry persons property and sustained 910.3B(1)prior consequence in of this incident by anyone judgment, being reduced to injury, including claims for loss of only al- Boykin and the Estate would be into the re Boykin consortium.” entered damages awarded in lowed to recover the individually per agreement lease and as action. Iowa 910.8.We do the civil Code of the Estate. We representative sonal timing of Klawonn’s restitu- not think the agreements according interpret settlement Boykin entitle should the intent of the as determined This the Estate to a windfall. by the terms of the release. Waits in- Co., with the result is consistent United Fire & Cas. un- to coordinate criminal restitution Although Boykin could tent 910.3B(1) prevent achieving civil the statute from an ab- with Iowa’s der section 910.8. damage scheme. See I limit surd result. would the statute to plain language, its as courts are Having determined the settlement do, plain language because this judg to a final equivalent in case is this any way create an absurd result. ment, it would be an absurd result to allow has his or her court- an offender who agree majority pur- I with that ordered restitution to offset the restitution pose prevent of the statute is to a financial judgment, while subsequent civil and, plaintiff conversely, windfall for the person setting from off the prohibiting imposition avoid the of an additional finan- final settlement of a civil action Yet, hardship cial on the defendant. of the same facts or event as the statute does not need to be read to include proceeding against criminal amounts or accomplish purpose. settlements to this should not inter dered as restitution. We that, The reason is absent a statute or results, pret provide our absurd statutes a restitution order entered construing chapter way 910 in a that by any judg- a criminal case is unaffected timing allows set offs on the based in a entered civil case out of recovery payments and the method of cre the same facts and circumstances. The Booth, an ates absurd result. See State order and are both enforceable There prevent court orders. the wind- fore, the district court was correct when it result, fall that would legis- otherwise our permitted the settlement made Kla- However, provided lature for a setoff. if a company on behalf wonn’s insurance his civil action is concluded in- settlement off order of restitu be set *6 stead of a judgment, parties to the tion. necessary pro-
settlement can include the Disposition. visions in V. agreement the settlement prevent any windfall. For example, the Boy- Because the received agreement pro- settlement could include a kin and the Estate from the settlement of vision that the first of the settle- the civil action exceeded the amount due proceeds ment paid plain- would be to the under the restitution order entered tiff through the clerk of court or other court, district the restitution order as it person designated under the restitution Boykin relates to and the Estate has been full, so the defendant would dis- receive trict court is affirmed. credit on the restitution.
AFFIRMED. problem majority’s with the conclu- know, sion is twofold. For all we because LAVORATO, justices except All concur agreement the settlement contained no C.J., LARSON, J., part who take no special provisions, parties to the settle- CADY, J., dissents. who agreement in this case could have CADY, (dissenting). Justice intended for both orders to be satisfied. majority only not interferes with I respectfully Although dissent. the set- the role of the branch in this off clearly rule of section 910.8 is limited statute, adding language case language judgments, its majority ultimately may rights also have interfered with concludes it is inter- pret short, statute to include settlements to In contract. the stat- job, and we should its intended ute does it as written.
apply