State v. KirkbrideState v. Kirkbride
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Todd
delivered the Opinion
¶1 Travis W. Kirkbride (hereafter Kirkbride) appeals from his sentence in the District Court for the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, on charges of deliberate homicide under
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err by imposing a restriction on Kirkbride’s parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years?
¶5 The instant appeal requires the Court to determine whether a trial court judge can legally pronounce a sentence that is partially based on a need for retribution and whether a trial court can legally pronounce a sentence containing a partial parole restriction. The Court answers both questions in the affirmative.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶6 On the evening of December 8, 2006, Paul Raftery (hereafter Raftery) was walking home in Helena, Montana. Kirkbride and Robert Rickman (hereafter Rickman) agreed to commit robbery in order to obtain money for drugs. When they saw the victim, Raftery, walking up Lawrence Street, they began following him. Raftery noticed they were following him and crossed the street. Rickman approached Raftery, called out to him, and punched him in the face. Raftery yelled for help and attempted to get away, at which point Kirkbride stabbed him in the back with a large hunting knife. This blow was fatal, puncturing Raftery’s left lung and pericardial sack and striking the pulmonary artery. Raftery again attempted to get away. This time Rickman tripped him. While Raftery was on the ground bleeding, Rickman and Kirkbride took Raftery’s wallet. Rickman and Kirkbride returned to their vehicle and fled.
¶7 Kirkbride and Rickman threw the wallet, knife, Kirkbride’s coat, and Rickman’s jacket into a dumpster in central Helena. Meanwhile, two citizens heard Raftery’s cry for help and called 911. Emergency responders found Raftery unresponsive and bleeding from his back. He was transported to St. Peter’s Hospital and pronounced dead upon arrival. On December 11,2006, Kirkbride confessed to involvement in the slaying of Raftery, implicated Rickman, and took law enforcement officers to the dumpster where officers found the wallet and a bloody knife.
¶8 Kirkbride was charged with deliberate homicide, a felony, under
¶9 “[The Court] reviewfs] criminal sentences that include at least one year of actual incarceration for legality only.” State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 59, 342 Mont. 1, ¶ 59, 180 P.3d 1102, ¶ 59. “Our review is confined to determining whether the sentencing court had statutory authority to impose the sentence, whether the sentence falls within the parameters set by the applicable sentencing statutes, and whether the court adhered to the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes.” Rosling, ¶ 59. “This determination is a question of law; as such, our review is de novo.” Rosling, ¶ 59. “Trial judges are granted broad discretion to determine the appropriate punishment for offenses.” State v. Erickson, 2008 MT 50, ¶ 10, 341 Mont. 426, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 1043, ¶ 10. “On appeal we will not review a sentence for mere inequity or disparity.” Erickson, ¶ 10.
¶10 Issue 1. Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride?
Retribution is a component of punishment
¶11 Kirkbride correctly argued that retribution is not specifically among the sentencing policies articulated in
¶12 Matter of B.L.T. and Matter of C.S. are not the only cases in Montana that establish retribution is a component of punishment. See e.g. State v. Mount, 2003 MT 275, ¶¶ 70, 73, 317 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 70, 73, 78 P.3d 829, ¶¶ 70, 73. (“[One] factor addresses traditional aims of punishment-i.e., retribution and deterrence.” The Court also said, “the more a statute promotes the traditional aims of retribution and deterrence, the more likely the statute is punitive....”) “A civil sanction will be deemed . . . punishment in the constitutional sense only if the sanction ‘may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.’” Frazier v. Montana State Dept. of Corrects., 277 Mont. 82, 86, 920 P.2d 93, 96 (1996) (quoting Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[A] civil penalty is ‘punishment’ . . . if it ‘cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.’” State v. Nelson, 275 Mont. 86, 91, 910 P.2d 247, 250 (1996) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901-02 (1989)). The Court’s decisions spanning over two decades establish retribution is one of the components of punishment.
¶13
“Stare decisis
is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
“[SJtare decisis
is a fundamental doctrine which reflects our concerns for stability, predictability and equal treatment.”
State v. Gatts,
279 Mont. 42, 51, 928 P.2d 114, 119 (1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is of fundamental and central importance to the rule of
law.”
Gatts,
279 Mont. at 51, 928 P.2d at 119 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court follows prior precedents and holds a judge may consider retribution because prior precedent deems retribution a component of punishment.
¶14 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this is not a case where the only basis for the sentence is retribution. The trial court judge did not say there was little need for either general or specific deterrence and that there was only the slimmest chance for the defendant to reoffend. Instead, the judgment and commitment of the sentencing judge reflected retribution as only the third basis for the sentence. The other bases were “the likelihood of defendant’s rehabilitation is minimal, [and] the defendant poses a grave risk to society.” Kirkbride had a juvenile criminal record and spent six months at Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility until he turned 18. He was kicked out of Job Corps and stole property from his parents a few days before Raftery’s homicide to get money for drugs. Based on a psychological examination, the sentencing judge found that “the defendant lacks conscience, and . . . his sociopathic personality will not change over time.” The psychologist had rarely, if ever, seen a young man with a worse chemical dependency problem.
¶15 Kirkbride also asserts the content of the PSI renders his sentence illegal because the PSI referred to Raftery as a Montana lawyer and Montana Supreme Court law clerk. Kirkbride further argues nothing in
¶16 Issue 2. Did the District Court err by imposing a restriction on Kirkbride’s parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years?
Judges may impose partial parole restrictions
¶17
¶18 The Court has, on prior occasion, examined other parts of Title 46, chapter 18 in order to determine the meaning of
¶19 Kirkbride correctly argues
State v. Thomas,
285 Mont. 112, 121-23, 946 P.2d 140, 145-47 (1997), arose on the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea and did not address the lawfulness of partial parole restrictions. However, in order to conclude the guilty plea was lawful, the Montana Supreme Court deemed the partial parole restriction imposed under
¶20 Moreover, giving the trial court judge discretion is one of Montana’s sentencing policies.
See e.g.
¶21 The passage of time and the actions, or more appropriately
inactions, of Montana’s legislature provide a final reason to hold partial parole restrictions lawful. Montana sentences containing partial parole restrictions have been upheld against other challenges at least since 1988.
See e.g. State v. Wirtala,
231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177 (1988),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane,
1998 MT 76, ¶ 41, 288 Mont. 286, ¶ 41, 957 P.2d 9, ¶ 41. Montana’s legislature has convened every two years since. The legislature is presumed to know how the Court has interpreted its statutes.
Sampson v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,
2006 MT 241, ¶ 20, 333 Mont. 541, ¶ 20, 144 P.3d 797, ¶ 20. Therefore, if the Montana legislature disapproved of partial parole restrictions, it could have changed the text of
CONCLUSION
¶22 The Court holds an illegal sentence did not result from the sentencing judge partially basing the sentence on the need of the victim’s family for retribution. Multiple decisions of the Montana Supreme Court establish retribution as a component of punishment. The content of the PSI did not render Kirkbride’s sentence illegal. An illegal sentence did not result from the imposition of a partial parole restriction. The phrase “is ineligible for parole” does not limit a sentencing judge’s discretion to impose all or nothing parole restrictions. To hold otherwise would harm Montana’s sentencing policy of promoting discretion. Furthermore, partial parole restrictions have been a part of Montana Supreme Court decisions since 1988, and the Montana legislature has not altered the text of the statute. Therefore, the Court presumes the Montana legislature concluded partial parole restrictions do not offend