delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thеre is no legal principle better established than that a free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit; for it is not to be presumed that one will falsely accuse himself of a crime, especially when he knows that a conviction of it will incur a forfeiture of his life. But it is essential to the admission of such confessions, as evidence against the accused, that they should he freely and voluntarily made. If they are madе under the influence of hope or the torture of fear, they are wanting in the great essential of being free and voluntary, and come in too questionable a shape to be considered evidеnces of guilt. This is the rule of law applicable to all cases. There is no doubt about the rule itself, but the application of it is beset with difficulties. Such is the diversity of the human mind: so much greater is the capacity of some minds to maintain composure under the pressure of adversity, that to determine whether the confessions are free and voluntary, must of necessity depend on a greSt variety of circumstances; such as age» situation, character, and the circumstances under which they were made. No one acts without motive. One man may admit himself to have committed a crime, from a high sentiment of honor, because he will not tell a falsehood; another from motives of penitence and a hope of reconciling himself to his offended maker; whilst the third may be influenced by the hope of some temporal advantage to result to himself. To such confessions no possible objection can arise. In the two first cases, the confessions are the offspring of a virtuous motive, and are therеfore true; in the latter, they may be false, but they come from his mind uninfluenced by the operation of external causes. Plow far he shall be protected against the influence of these external сauses, by excluding his confessions from the jury, must of necessity be determined in the first instance by the presiding Judge, whose situation best enables him to decide whether the confessions were free and voluntary, or “forced from his mind by the flattery of hope or the torture of fear.” If the inducements held out to the prisoner be made by one having authority over him or over the prosecution, as by the prosecutor, or his wifе—if the prisoner be his servant,
After an attentive consideration of all the facts connеcted with the prisoner’s confession, I have come to the conclusion that they were properly received. The suggestion of the witness (Kirby) as to the effect of the negro’s confession in estа-
Yet, notwithstanding I havе come to this conclusion, in which nearly all my brethren concur, yet my mind does not rest with entire satisfaction on the result of the trial. If the case had rested on the confessions alone, (unsupported by the confirmatory facts,) opposed as they were by the proof of alibi made by so many witnesses—although many of them were of bad and doubtful character, the jury might well have paused in coming to the cоnclusion of guilt. It might have been no strained inference, considering the prisoner’s situation, and the character of those to whom the confession was made, that the hope of placing himself in the fаvorable position of Dill, whose case was mentioned, and which had occurred in his own district, and was probably known to him, or other benefits which had been presented to his mind, had operated on him to confess that of which he was not guilty. But the greatest difficulty of the prisoner’s case was, to reconcile his innocence with his knowledge of the independent facts proved by other witnesses in confirmatiоn of his statement. How could he know the truth of these facts unless he was present when they occurred? The murder of Vance was so atrocious; the public mind far and near was so agitated by it, that it was no dоubt the subject of general conversation, and all the leading facts of the case well known to every one before the prisoner’s arrest; such as that the gun was loaded with slugs, that Vance had been shot
The very extraordinary facts disclosed by the trial; the peculiarly unfriended condition of the prisoner; the state of the public mind, arising out of the perpetration of so black and bloody a deed as the murder oí Vance, have all pressed upon me the propriety of giving the prisoner another chance for his life. To doom a human being to death, is no ordinary matter. If on another trial he should be able to exculpate himself from the guilt which his confessions have fastened upon him, every noble and generous mind will rejoice at the result. Should he be again convicted, he cannot complain that he has not had, in full measure, the benefit of all the humane maxims of the law.
The motion for a new trial is granted.
