A Pеnobscot County grand jury returned two indictments against the defendant, Donna King. Count 1 of each indictment was conjoined and the defendant ultimately went to trial on charges of sale of amphetamine. Following a verdict of guilty, shе was sentenced to the Maine State Prison at Thomaston on each indictment, for^a term of not less than two years nor more than four years, the sentence in each case to run concurrently. From the judgments entеred, the defendant appeals.
The appeal relies on four separate points. First, we note that defendant’s points (1) that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and (2) that the verdict was unsupportеd by substantial evidence were not appropriately preserved for appellate review since the appellant failed to lay a foundation at trial pursuant to M. R.Crim.P. 29 or 33. State v. Call, Me.,
A third point of appeal is presented as a two-pronged attaсk upon a demand for notice of alibi filed by the State pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 16(b). 1 *126 Appellant contends that the State’s demand prejudiced her at trial on two grounds: (a) by reason of the demand for notice of alibi served upon her less than 10 days prior to trial; and (b) that her compliance with the demand for notice of alibi compelled the defendant to give self-incriminatory testimony in violation of her Sth amendment rights under both federal and state cоnstitutions.
Concededly, the State’s demand for notice of alibi on the fifth day prior to the scheduled trial date was a procedural inexactitude under Rule 16(b), which requires that such a demand be made “[n]o less than 10 days beforе the date set for trial”. But the record reveals that quite without objection or delay the defendant prepared and filed her response to the State’s demand on the day before trial, that is, four days after the Statе’s demand. It was open to the defendant, if she truly felt imperilled, to apply to the Superior Court to vacate the State’s motion, or to seek a continuance to compensate for any prejudice inherent in a foreshortened answer. The issue was not submitted in any form, oral or written, for examination by the presiding Justice and cannot be entertained for the first time on appeal. See State v. Dematteo, Me.,
The notice of alibi filed by apрellant in answer to the State’s demand stated simply: “At the time stated, in Demand for Notice of Alibi, the defendant, Donna King, was at her home at 124 York Street, Bangor, Maine.” At her trial, the defendant gave testimony compatible with her rеsponse to the demand made upon her. Four witnesses, not identified in the notice of alibi, were called by the defendant and each gave direct testimony supporting defendant’s whereabouts at the times and plaсes alleged as her 124 York Street residence. We see no prejudice. A factual issue was clearly generated. The record gives ample support to the jury finding.
Defendant next argues that the State’s Rule 16(b) demand effectively compelled defendant to give self-incriminating testimony. Such an argument strains judicial credulity. Our previous discussion shows that defendant by her conduct waived any rights arising from the State’s technical violation of Rule 16(b). We сan scarcely credit the notion that by presenting her alibi as planned, including a number of corroborating witnesses, defendant was compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. The precious right of freedom from sеlf-incrimination would be trivialized by further discussion with regard to the facts of the instant case. Besides, defendant did not include her self-incrimination argument among her points of appeal. In view of the issue’s lack of merit and our full consideration of other issues generated by the State’s tardy demand for notice of alibi, we have no reluctance to invoke the letter strictness of M.R.Crim.P. 39(d) in deeming defendant’s self-incrimination argument to be waived. See Statе v. Kidder, Me.,
We further mention our opinion that any failure of trial counsel to make appropriate motions as allowed by M.R. Crim.P. 37(a) is quite immaterial to the propriety of the final outcome at trial. In our view, any putаtive omissions by trial counsel did not prejudice defendant’s substantial rights and would not constitute manifest error. M.R.Crim.P. Rule 52(b).
*127
The record makes it clear that the determination of guilt turned essentially on varying factual accounts, and that on all the evidence the jury was warranted in believing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. See State v. Pullen, Me.,
Finally, appellant contends that since punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense committed, State v. Alexander, Me.,
The traffic in illicit drugs is a social phenomenon causing widespread concern. The legislature is the voice of the sovereign people, who are entitled to expect that lеgislative enactments rationally related to valid public policy will be given full effect. We cannot say that an obligatory prison term under 22 M.R.S.A. § 2215 lacks rational relation to a public policy of suppressing unlawful traffic in regulated drugs.
2
The fixing of an adequate penalty is properly and legitimately a matter of legislative concern. It is not the office of the judiciary to interpose constitutional limitations where none need be fоund. In the instant case, each concurrent sentence imposed was within the range of statutory limits under 22 M.R.S.A. § 2215. There is no question that a prison term is an entirely ordinary and constitutionally defensible mode of punishment for the offensе herein committed. Of course a mandatory sentence of great severity may at some point lose its rational relation to a permissible legislative purpose; a disparity between the sentence and the evil to be avoided might then be a cruelty of constitutional dimensions. Cf.
Farmer,
supra,
Appellant’s contention that mandatory sentencing usurps an inherent judicial function and deprives her of a right to judicial discretion in the imposition of sentences has been answered by this Court on a previous occasion. In
Farmer
we held that the authority of the judiciary to suspend the imposition or execution of sеntences, and to grant probation, derives fundamentally from statute.
It seems to us that the interest of the legislature is paramount in the field of penology аnd the public safety. The legislature defines the contours of the crime itself, sets the limits for punishment, and provides for implementing and administer *128 ing the system of correction. The underlying structure of the penal system is statutory; the coherence of the system is to be found in legislative direction. Courts have an important role to play in furthering the operation of the penal system and in reconciling that operation with the principles of justice sеcured to a free society by our charters of government. However, to vindicate their function, courts do not need to claim inherent administrative powers as-sertedly beyond the purview of the legislature. We think that duе process of law is not traduced when courts accede to legislative authority to frame a coherent statutory scheme for the administration of sentencing for certain criminal offenses. To that end, we hоld that in the instant case sentencing was properly controlled by statute, even to the exclusion of judicial discretion in the imposition or execution of sentence, or the granting of probation.
The entry must be :
Appeal denied.
Notes
. (b) Notice Of Alibi. No less than 10 (lays bеfore the date set for trial, the attorney for the state may serve upon the defendant or his attorney a demand that the defendant serve a notice of alibi if the defendant intends to rely on such defense at the triаl. The demand shall state the time and place that the attorney for the State proposes to establish at the trial as the time and place where the defendant participated in or committed the crime. If such a demand has been served, the defendant, if he intends to rely on the defense of alibi, shall not more than five days after service of such demand, serve upon the attorney for the State and file a notice of аlibi which states the place which the defendant claims to have been at the time stated in the demand. If the defendant fails to serve and *126 file a notice of alibi after service of a demand, he shall not be permittеd to introduce evidence at the trial tending to show the defense of alibi other than his own testimony unless the court for cause shown orders otherwise.
. Section 2215 provides, in pertinent part: “Whoever violates any provision of section 2210-A [which declares unlawful the sale of amphetamines] shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 5 years and by a fine of not more than $1,000 for the first offense; . . . The imposition or execution of sentences for conviction of violation of section 2210-A shall not be suspended and probation shall not be granted.”