State v. King

Minnesota, Respondent, STATE Petitioner, KING,

Arron Scott

Appellant.

No. C9-99-298. Minnesota.

Supreme Court

March aiding abetting counts of first-

two trial, At degree burglary. version introduced redacted accom- plea testimony alleged King objected to the of the plice. use inad- grounds on the that it was hearsay and that admission missible its his violated Sixth Amendment Confronta- allowed the rights. tion Clause an on the gave and instruction alleged unavailability and his accomplice’s prior Following convictions. verdicts, on one the court sentenced in prison. count to serve 57 months panel and Minne- appealed a divided sota We re- Appeals Court affirmed. verse and remand for a new trial. King was of a Appellant Arron convicted July burglary private of a resi- Grant, burglar- in dence Minnesota. The country is in ized house and is some- in what secluded. The owner resided house, two a ten- upper levels of ant, Koelbl, walk- Andreas resided in the out basement level. bartender, evenings

Koelbl worked as a during so he was often home the after- July noon. On the afternoon- of Koelbl apartment inwas his when he heard the barking. homeowner’s heard dog He then knocking someone on the front door. continued, the knocking When he walked window to his and looked out to the drive- someone, way. He as saw later identified King, driveway. day On incident, reported police Koelbl to the standing by was a car in the drive- way King began walking toward the house after Koelbl heard a loud trial, bang upstairs. from At Koelbl testi- OPINION fied that as looked at the knock- King, he ANDERSON, H. PAUL Justice. ing continued. He further that he testified house, toward walking saw case, In this we are asked to determine after moved away Koelbl from testimony given guilty plea whether a up- a loud bang window heard from by a hearing alleged accomplice an stairs. reliability crime bears adequate indicia of exit- hearing bang, such can be admitted After the loud Koelbl through criminal same charged defendant with the ed house basement-level crime. A Koelbl walked front of Washington County found door. then house, defendant/appellant Arron was King guilty where he able to observe $7,000 open jewelry the front and that the over her door was taken from jewelry lying ground. lock on the house. This was never deadbolt found. car Koelbl had parked approximately mostly saw an unfamiliar He also $75 one-dollar and a cellular driveway running, phone with the motor bills taken from apartment. Koelbl’s persons other were visible. VCR no driver or unplugged car, sitting and left on a chair out- got neigh- into the drove to a Koelbl apartment. side his neighbor and instructed bor’s then police. call the Koelbl returned to manhunt, After an extensive the house with the intent to block the Weatherspoon were arrested several hours driveway get description and to a better later while hiding some brush near burglary. whoever involved Highway King voluntarily surren- returning began to the Koelbl Upon dered to police, Weatherspoon the but re- driveway, the car into the which pull to King sisted arrest. was taken to the yards estimated to be about 40 Koelbl County Washington Jail and All booked. pulled driveway, As he into the long. of the items on King during found both a spotted King by the squatting Koelbl side search incident to arrest and a at search driveway. of the jail the were later determined to his be own. receiving King’s consent, After the King was Koelbl testified that closer to police searched car and found house than street. the There is King’s property. During inci- the search to conflicting testimony exactly as where arrest, dent to Weatherspoon’s police the he was King squatting, but not next to recovered 54 one-dollar bills. house area the because that would not position been visible from Koelbl’s During booking process, the in- King end of the Koelbl driveway. the testified quired Washington County about his car. King appeared to see startled Koelbl Gribble, Deputy Sheriffs James who was driving what turned to be King’s out car processing King, acted as did though he King began motioning and Koelbl to come King’s questions. not understand Gribble King began to him. then to run toward King explained testified that then situ- the waistband, Koelbl his hand on his so ation to a way suggested Gribble in Koelbl, fearing safety, for King his backed the had been the inside house. Gribble of driveway car out the and into the street. could not remember the exact words used King by King, Koelbl further testified that gave following testimony. started the him, [King] to follow but then turned and ran off “After I told him I didn’t know' through about, a pasture. talking Koelbl what he subsequently he stated some- spotted King’s alleged accomplice, effect thing guy’s Arron close to the house in, Weatherspoon, toward we running my the same were he took car.” Gribble also Once pasture. King Weatherspoon King and testified that when he told that his out sight, King were of Koelbl returned to car had impounded, responded the been house, where he for police. why police waited the that he did not know the were holding he go his car because did not into arrived, they the police When discovered the house. closets on up- disturbed drawers and County level of the and in per Washington Investiga- house Koelbl’s Sheriffs tor apartment. Tilley King basement Socks from the Dean interviewed twice regarding burglary, homeowner’s drawers were found giving around his role Miranda upper King house and in him each warnings level time. agreed to to yard. yard right Some of the socks con- waive his remain silent pieces Tilley. The and inter- jewelry. police tained also then talked to both views, yard King found sock in the that did stated that had repeatedly not he belong to not either the homeowner or Koelbl. been inside the house and that police The ascertained that the homeowner reason he at the house was because uncle, Koelbl, his would holding pager so he who is Weatherspoon, started ride to the house of some- it. stated that Koelbl him for a lose asked to know. him and then speed claimed toward at full he Weatherspoon drive one scared, away. so ran became following version King gave that Weath- Tilley. stated events were Both pay him and offered erspoon paged aiding with two charged counts give him a ride some- gas King if would abetting first-degree burglary violation house. told one’s (2000) §§ Minn.Stat. 609.582 609.05 because going he was house (2000). burglary requires statute Weather- person lived there owed who building accused either the enter without him pay spoon money going and was crime and intend to commit a consent di- Following Weatherspoon’s back. actually enter without consent and commit rections, house King drove car to the 1(a) 609.582, § Minn.Stat. subd. a crime. arrived, they Grant. When King Weatherspoon were both (2000). car and on the front got knocked out statute, charged accomplice under Af- door, stayed car. while with the accomplice that an provides which liable answer, Weatherspoon no be- receiving ter accomplice if principal for the crime ini- King around gan walking the house. intentionally in some manner. assists out Weatherspoon claimed that came tially (2000). 609.05(a) § Minn.Stat. counts door, King but stated he the front then King Weatherspoon and were un- exactly Weatherspoon not sure what was theories, alternate charging der first waiting did because after for Weather- entering on with the in- based the house minutes, spoon King a few decided to a to commit and the tent crime second look for him around the back of the house. actually entering taking based on and It he front only was when returned to the something from the house. yard was that he noticed the front door Weatherspoon pleaded guilty to one open missing. and his car was part plea agreement. as of a count interview, Tilley at- During second Weatherspoon requested part that as King by asking to catch in a lie tempted agreement plea pending his he be released pool he King whether walked around sentencing arrangements so he could make no backyard, though even there was his In for the care of sick wife. exchange Til- pool. responses In five different to plea plea testimony, for his and ley’s questions pool, King about the stated recommended receive seeing pool that he did not remember a 37-month sentence and that Weather- pool. King that he did not notice a did spoon pending sentencing. be released his way admit that he had not all the walked 16, 1998, September Weatherspoon en- On stated, he initially around the house as had guilty plea tered a and testified to his but that he had walked around the plea in the his participation burglary. Per back of the house and then turned around he was agreement, pending released sen- and returned to front of the house. tencing, which was scheduled for Novem- gave a of the back- King description also 13,1998. ber yard Tilley that is with the to consistent layout state’s exhibit on the of the lot. requested not King pleaded thought jury place stated that he Weath- trial. trial took on No- first car, 2-4, 1998, left with then he erspoon postpone- had his but vember after two spotted appeal. reasons to this Koelbl car at the end ments for unrelated trial, to three driveway. King said he motioned Before state made unsuc- attempts explain subpoena Koelbl because he wanted to cessful Weather- on at trial. The going spoon appear King’s was not involved was state what the house. next ran toward to serve once for attempted attempt, given On the second cause it was oath each trial date. under and was attempting to serve Weather- the officer against Weatherspoon’s penal interest. mother spoon spoke Weatherspoon’s Weatherspoon’s plea testimony redacted moved, who he had did indicated read jury. was then Before the police with further in- provide any not presentation, the court instructed the formation. November On on unavailability in- the court worker state contacted services the jury Weatherspoon’s formed prior pre- who performing Weatherspoon’s Additionally, offenses. the court ruled investigation. The made sentence worker King’s attorney could elaborate in her Weatherspoon by one to contact attempt argument closing on the difference be- phone unable to do On that and was so. testimony given tween at trial and the plea state day, requested same that Weath- testimony. erspoon be declared unavailable and it plea testimony read his plea be allowed to testimony, Weatherspoon jury. King’s objection, the court Over stated that was with him at the time found that unavailable burglary and that he and had of law as a matter and instructed the gone house with the intent to break- attorneys together develop a to work in. Specifically, Weatherspoon indicated plea of Weatherspoon’s redacted version and King planned that he that King jury. that could be read to the However, would kick the door. Weath- did erspoon who actually indicate trial, day of the district On the last door, only kicked in the that was kicked that Weatherspoon’s ruled redacted that he entered the admissible 804(b)(3) trial R. under Minn. Evid. be- house.1 The state also introduced past- Weatherspoon’s 1. Below text of redact- is the A: Yes. Now, plea testimony jury. ed as read to the moving investigator, Prosecutor: Q: 15, 1998, Weatherspoon, page 11. July Mr. on is Q: you City it true were in the Grant in of And was there some discussion as to Washington County? you go going the fact that were in and was, yes. A: I that's believe something take from this residence? Q: were with another named You fellow Well, yeah. A: Yeah. King, right? is that Arron Q: What was that discussion? A: Yes. Well, going A: we didn't talk about Q: you of came to The two Grant Town- going say but we did was to kick he Paul, ship right? is that from St. it, the door. We went in. down Q: did A: Yes. going intent that Your into residence in Q: you got City when of Grant And to take an that was item or items were in you Manning on went north Avenue and there, is that correct? up ended a residence located at 9850[sic] there, yes, We went we A: Yes. in were Street, right? is that 65th going Q: something. to take A: Yes. you inAnd fact did come out of that Q: you When arrived at the residence with residence with various items? car, King, you got two Mr. of out of A: Yes. right? is that Q: cash, that And included some some A: Yes. things jewelry, like that? Q: get got out Did he out first? You first? A: Yes. first, got got A: I he out out second. Q: you had consent And no one’s to enter Q: door, you up Okay. And went residence, right? is that eventually the door and broke knocked on No, we A: didn't have it. down, the door is that correct? Q: point you At what did become aware A: Yes. somebody Q: was in this residence? out, it And as turned there was some- guy there A: When I came out and was a time, body this residence at home driving car down the backwards in the right? driveway, out, somebody knew that’s when I yes. A: As it turned Q: had to been—he had to come from the your you intent when knocked And I didn’t know he was there before- go of was to house. down the door this residence nothing something, like that. right? hand and take that appeals. argues He the admission years that 3 earlier of Spreigl evidence crime im attempted burgla- plea testimony an was King Weatherspoon’s had committed of The state intro- Hennepin County. ry in of proper under both the Minnesota Rules show a similar mo- the evidence to duced and the Sixth Amendment Con Evidence of because the 1995 operandi dus States frontation Clause the United King pleaded guilty, burglary, to which In order for Constitution. attempted take accomplice and an testimony to be under the plea admissible during a VCR from a house jewelry and evidence, must rules the district court their hands with the break-in covered find that was unavailable found on then socks. made, statement, was when first- aiding abetting counts both R. against Weatherspoon’s Minn. interest. burglary and the court sentenced degree 804(b)(3). Evid. In order tes serve 57 months in King on one count to timony admissible to be under Con prison. Clause, must frontation the district court appeals, King appeal the court On find that unavailable court district erred argued and that the statement reliable. Ohio plea testimony admitting Weatherspoon’s Roberts, 65-66, 100 448 U.S. S.Ct. therefore is entitled to new trial. (1980). Here, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 because we claimed that the district court erred conclude constitutional claim is dis- finding Weatherspoon unavailable be- will positive, proceed directly we to our good-faith make a cause the state did not analysis claim. of that Weatherspoon. King to locate also effort improper to admit argued provides The Sixth Amendment Weatherspoon’s testimony because it was prosecutions, “[i]n all criminal the ac against Weatherspoon’s not a statement * * * enjoy right cused shall to be further maintained interest. him confronted with the witnesses if were appeals even to con- * * *_» ppg. Const, Even amend. VI. clude that admission though analysis a Confrontation Clause 804(b)(3), proper under Minn. R. Evid. ad- involving questions one of both fact and mitting Weatherspoon’s violated law, our review must be inde conducted King’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation pendently analyses the lower courts’ rights. claimed the error Clause guarantee protections that the in the Con beyond could not be a reasonable harmless Lilly frontation are Clause satisfied. doubt because 116, 1887, 136, Virginia, U.S. 527 119 S.Ct. only direct evidence show that (1999). Therefore, 144 117 appel L.Ed.2d a in a participant burglary. Fi- late courts must review novo the issue de argued if it was nally, King proper that of whether admitted violates a Weatherspoon’s testimony, dis- allow rights. defendant’s Confrontation Clause court should included in- trict its 136, 1887; Lilly, 527 at U.S. 119 S.Ct. a about the for structions statement reason (Minn. 75, v. Leroy, State 604 N.W.2d 77 A Weatherspoon’s unavailability. divided 1999). panel appeals of the court of affirmed unpublished opin- conviction in an A literal reading Sixth ion. hearsay Amendment would bar all use of I. defendant, against a statements criminal court, actually but the do appeal On amendment does not to our raises 805, 813, Wright, the same issues he raised before the court so. Idaho v. 497 U.S. Q: again, And this occurred Wash- A: all Yes. Grant, ington County City in the is that right?

807 (1990) 3139, even in daughter, emergency. 110 111 L.Ed.2d 638 an S.Ct. Id. On facts, an un- (holding hearsay statements of these the Court concluded in- adequate 60-61, available declarant bear witness was Id. at unavailable. 100 dicia of do not violate the Sixth reliability S.Ct. 2531.

Amendment). A court must follow two- us, In the case before the district court a hear- step inquiry to determine whether found unavailable after the may say statement be admitted without state made three attempts unsuccessful Sixth violating a criminal defendant’s subpoena serve on him. claims Roberts, Amendment U.S. at rights. 448 that it error for to find that 65, 100 S.Ct. The state must first 2531. put forth state a reasonable effort to necessity hearsay establish Weatherspoon. King locate also argues showing unavailability by statement that the nature of the error is compounded If unavailability the declarant. Id. because of the responsibility state’s proved, prove then the state must that the Weatherspoon’s absence. asserts adequate relia- statement bears “indicia of that if the state had not facilitated Weath- 66, bility” for it to admissible. at be Id. erspoon’s part release as of his agree- 100 S.Ct. 2531. ment, Weatherspoon would been ^have previously We have not ad testify. available to proved dressed what be for a witness must undisputed It the state made purposes to be unavailable for of the Con some to locate Weatherspoon, effort Clause, frontation but the States United the effort was not at the level same as the Supreme Court did address this issue state’s efforts The state did Roberts. Roberts, 65-78, 2531. 448 U.S. 100 S.Ct. attempt to contact Weatherspoon Roberts, held that the state Court through his court services worker until bears the that a establishing burden after trial had and then begun, therefore, that, witness is unavailable and attempt worker made one to locate hearsay testimony Rob necessary. by telephone. him The state did not follow erts, 65, 77, 100 To U.S. at S.Ct. 2531. up Weatherspooris mother. Nor did unavailability, the state show prove must attempt to contact good pro that a faith effort was made wife, though through even knew she cure the presence. witness’ Barber v. area, contact with lived had some 719, 724-25, Page, 390 U.S. S.Ct. Weatherspoon, and that (1968). 20 L.Ed.2d What are efforts his release to specifically sought take required of a in each is a state situation Further, her. unlike the care of situation Roberts, question of reasonableness. Roberts, any not have state did However, U.S. at “[i]f S.Ct. testify Weatherspooris witness as to una- remote, is a albeit possibility, there vailability. the might produce affirmative measures declarant, take a The state did not number of obligation good may the of faith the affirmative that had a rea (emphasis demand their measures effectuation.” Id. Roberts, original). possibility locating In the five sonable of Weather- state made a attempts spoon. ascribing a a 5- Without motive to the subpoena to witness over 59, state, at 2531. of the period. month Id. 100 S.Ct. the cumulative effect state’s (1) Additionally, witness’ is troublesome: the state made mother actions questioned daugh Weatherspooris dire about certain that testimo voir her incriminating ny Id. The testi statements ter’s whereabouts. mother contained (2) way agreed no her reaching King,2 fied she had about the state However, acknowledge participated We Weath- 2. crime. charged aiding abetting, and a neces- erspoon need not have identified to es- sary person element of which is that another 808 (3) release, hearsay exception, a there firmly-rooted the state particularized showing guar- must be “a find minimal efforts to Weather-

expended guar- Id. The antees of trustworthiness.” cir for trial. Under these spoon from gauged antees of trustworthiness are cumstances, vigorous attempt a than less that exist- totality of the circumstances questionable is of locate made. ed when the statement was to the defendant because allows fairness 819, Wright, at 3139. 497 U.S. 110 S.Ct. inherent risks avoid pro- The has Supreme Court declined Instead, putting a witness on the stand. vide a list of factors to consider specific use from a the state can circum- evaluating totality when of the is under the direct plea setting, which stances, held that the Court has requires prosecutor dis control is so key inquiry is whether the statement only the elements the of closing basic reliable that cross-examination would have necessary accept for the court fense Id. only “marginal utility.” been of at plea. Despite our concern about Weather- 820-22, 3139. the absence of 110 S.Ct. In only need unavailability, we to de spoon’s reliability, the such Confrontation Clause met its cide whether state burden hearsay bars the use of a statement was unavail showing against a criminal defendant. Id. “[Un- that Weatherspoon’s able if we feonclude reason, arising less an from the affirmative Roberts, statement was reliable. 448 U.S. in which circumstances the statement Therefore, 66, re at 100 S.Ct. 2531. we made, rebutting a provides basis for deciding the state met its serve whether that a presumption hearsay statement in establishing Weatherspoon’s burden trial, worthy of reliance at the Con- unavailability and will determine if first requires frontation Clause exclusion Weatherspoon’s plea testimony ade out-of-court statement.” Id. at 821. reliability. indicia of We nonethe quate less caution state that when the una 1999, a plurality of the Su issue, a at vailability of witness is we will preme concluded that the statement Court carefully good-faith for a look effort hearsay against exception interest such a locate witness. rule, 804(b)(3), found Fed.R.Evid. is not “firmly-rooted” exception purposes

a II. analysis.3 Lilly, Confrontation Clause 527 134, at Confrontation Clause re U.S. 119 S.Ct. 1887. When we hearsay that a quires prove analyzed against the state to statements interest bears indicia of under adequate statement relia the Confrontation Clause otherwise, bility; pre past, the statement' we have either assumed that sumptively against exception barred cannot be admitted statement interest Wright, firmly-rooted exception a criminal 497 have consid defendant. we 816, 3139; Roberts, at 110 ered U.S. S.Ct. 448 such statements reliable under the 66, totality at U.S. S.Ct. Statements of the circumstances because of “firmly-rooted” fall hearsay self-inculpatory E.g., within their nature. State v. Aubid, (Minn.1999); exception are to be assumed reliable 591 N.W.2d (Minn. Roberts, Dukes, therefore State v. are admissible. N.W.2d 1996). 66,100 However, However, in Lilly, Supreme U.S. S.Ct. 2531. if the by to that an accom- state seeks admit a statement not within Court stated confessions 134, proved. Lilly, that he the crime an- be 527 119 tablish committed with U.S. at S.Ct. concurrence, other. 1887. Scalia In a Justice stated against use he believed the of statements justices were four There who concluded that “paradigmatic” interest is a Confrontation against exception the statement interest 143, at Clause violation. Id. 119 S.Ct. 1887 firmly-rooted exception hearsay not (Scalia, concurring). J. reliability therefore of such statements must

809 plea the criminal defen plice “you” that incriminate used the term with- “inherently clarifying dant are unreliable” even ab “you” out whether meant leniency. any express promises Weatherspoon sent Weatherspoon or and his 139, 131, 527 at 119 S.Ct. 1887. The U.S. accomplice. presented, As the testimony to emphasized Court further that due their comported with the charge aiding and accomplice unreliability, statements abetting, might but cross-examination subject blame must be spread shift have revealed that acted 182, Id. at 119 cross-examination. S.Ct. in certain respects. alone We also recog- v. Illi (explaining holding 1887 Lee despite nize that the oath tell 530, 2056, nois, 106 90 476 U.S. S.Ct. truth,” story “whole the full is often not (1986)). L.Ed.2d 514 But the hold Court’s in guilty plea testimony. revealed Con- not mean that ing Lilly does statements factors, all sidering we conclude the state will against automatically interest violate did not overcome the presumption against Clause. What does Confrontation admissibility of Weatherspoon’s testi- affirmatively mean is that the state must mony and did not prove that cross-exami- reliability against of a prove the statement only nation of would be of interest and cannot rest on the mere fact marginal utility. We hold the admis- against If that it is a statement interest. sion of Weatherspoon’s plea testimony vi- affirmatively prove the state fails to relia olated Sixth Amendment Confron- bility, use will the statement’s violate rights tation Clause and therefore the right to defendant’s Confrontation Clause admitting district erred in the testi- cross-examine a witness. mony. testimony was at given plea hearing, under oath his III. cross-examination subject he was not at Our decision that the admis hearing. Weatherspoon did not re Weatherspoon’s plea testimony sion of vio sentence, although ceive a reduced lated Clause rights Confrontation agree state did to recommend a sentence A does not end our defendant inquiry. range at the bottom of recommended automatically to a entitled new trial guidelines. sentencing Additionally, when his are rights constitutional violated. plea, in return his 18, 21, Chapman California, U.S. custody pending sentencing. released from 824, (1967); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 705 State v. Weatherspoon’s plea agreement was not (Minn.1997). Juarez, 572 N.W.2d his contingent testimony against King, on if only A conviction can stand error although testimony was with his consistent beyond committed was harmless a reason gave police one of the statements he dur at Chapman, able doubt. 386 U.S. ing interrogation, his custodial when 824; Juarez, S.Ct. 572 N.W.2d 291. In arguably seeking curry favor Juarez, we explained that harmless the investigators. analysis error harmless error actually a Here, Lilly analysis light holding impact inquiry and the is not requiring an of relia- convicted the showing affirmative “whether would have * * * error, Supreme bility and the of defendant without the rather Court’s distrust reasonably co-conspirator statements interest whether the error could have * * * blame, jury’s spread impact shift or the oath an deci [had on] given Weatherspoon explanation, in favor of at 292. weighs sion.” Id. As further being “surely that if unat admissible. ben- we held the verdict error, provided Weatherspoon efits the error is tributable” then unreliability accomplice beyond inherent state- harmless a reasonable doubt. (Minn. Keeton, 85, 91 weighed against ments must State v. 589 N.W.2d be Weather- 488, 1998); spoon’s Greenleaf, oath. Rote that in the v. N.W.2d We State Minnesota, “in” 503, denied, its case on distinction between cert. Greenleaf “at” assurance that the term any 120 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d without 528 U.S. (1999). difficulty in rely- “in” ever The used. ing testimony is further com- on Gribble’s Weatherspoon’s plea Part of testi by the that also plicated fact testi- Gribble by direct mony corroborated other testi is King directly fied that went on to state King as of mony. Koelbl identified one that had not he been house. day burgla the present two on men piece jury that the The other of evidence that King admitted he was the ry and was the fact that could considered However, key criminal the ele house. King attempted burglarize to a house dispute are the elements ments same earlier, years attempt and in that he and that the state used testi accomplice attempted jewelry his to take mony King’s of convictions prove. to Both and a covered their to VCR and hands assumption King rest the that assisted on leaving fingerprints. avoid Past-crime evi- in some manner with at Weatherspoon to dence cannot be used show conduct a crime. To committing least the intent of character, conformity with it can be prove King’s under either theo assistance operandi. used show7 modus Minn. R. that ry, prove King the state needed to 404(b)(3), Here, offered, the Evid. knowing drove house of approved, the the use the illegally intended to something, past-crime house take evidence to show modus oper- enter the explained house and andi. The the pur- entered the intended state something, actually evidence, take that King pose sought or took it to use the something. only The direct evidence that upon the accept- which court found its use King’s burgla to assist with a able, shows intent entry the show into house ry participation actual in the burgla Therefore, ease, without consent.5 in this ry testimony Weatherspoon.4 is of could jury properly King’s consider prior only to conviction establish that any only testimony providing cor- attempted he had past to take valuable critical parts roboration for the of Weath- from a things jewelry— home—VCR and erspoon’s plea testimony is the and covered his hands-with socks—to admitted Deputy Gribble. Gribble leaving fingerprints. This type avoid exact could remember information, relevant, identification while But Gribble testified that words. is hardly unique King and it is not the told “something him close to the effect of in, unique burglary method of characterized guy’s house were he took my we by If the were jury car.” is the dissent. important This considering proper the evidence for its state because “in” the house places purpose, it is strong as to “at” the as has not as as direct opposed provided claimed. This a critical distinction. evidence essence, plea testimony.6 a critical aspect state rests assertion, 4.Contrary King's thorough to the dissent’s review of In- interviews with during interrogation statements did not con- vestigator Tilley indicates these inter- inconsistencies,” tain “several but rather his support views do not the dissent's harmless pertinent were statements points consistent on the argument. error interrogation despite persistent by questioning Investigator Tilley. This con- explained, 5. The state on “[t]he element sistency all the more remarkable because which this evidence would be offered would King's interrupted answers were often here, entry question be without consent. The questions further which resulted in confusion course, go into house.” did he question being as to which answered and questioning consisted of numerous untrue past-crime 6. The dissent characterizes the evi- misleading questions statements and which relied, the type dence as on which appear trap to have been intended to trick or relying on the direct Weather- instead more making damaging into admissions. A

811 LANCASTER, completing impact” (dissenting). In a “harmless error Justice analysis, we do not consider whether the I concur in I and II Parts of the opinion, jury could have convicted absent but respectfully dissent as to Part III. Rather, testimony. it Weatherspoon’s pieces Numerous of evidence support the what necessary to determine effect Weath- conviction, jury’s only one of which was on erspoon’s testimony jury’s the ver- Weatherspoon’s plea statement. I there- specifically, and more whether the fore dict conclude that the district court’s deci- sion to admit jury’s “surely verdict is unattributable” to the statement was harmless beyond a Juarez, reasonable doubt. 572 testimony. the N.W.2d at 292. King, jury convict must have

To the found When an error reviewing to determine intended assist Weatherspoon whether it beyond is harmless a reason burglary. we look to When the doubt, able thorough we must conduct a intent, King’s used to evidence establish examination of record as the a whole jury equivocal the could consider the testi- if order to the determine verdict was unat Gribble, mony of Juarez, the circumstantial evi- tributable to the error. State v. 286, (Minn.1997); 572 while N.W.2d 292 v. dence activities State (Minn. VanWagner, 746, 504 N.W.2d 749 King’s prior conviction, evidence of 1993) (“The impact error and its be are to and the direct statements contained examined within the context of the record Weatherspoon’s plea testimony. Of the whole, as a considering strength evidence, strongest and clear- available any state’s evidence and weaknesses of est evidence of involvement evidence.”). defense may Weatherspoon’s incriminating plea testi- view each incident in isolation when decid Hence, mony. we that it believe is coun- ing if an harmless. error is State v. Dil suggest terintuitive to would lon, (Minn.1995) 558, 558 N.W.2d ignore strongest and clearest evidence * * * (“The reviewing court must read the it, Weatherspoon’s plea testimony, before * * *.”). entire record Whether an error weaker, rely equivocal and instead on evi- is harmless on factors such depends as the Therefore, upon dence. review of the en- statement, importance or record, tire we conclude that Weather- presence of corroborating or absence spoon’s plea testimony reasonably could evidence, contradicting and the overall had an impact have on verdict. As a strength of prosecution’s case. State result, we say jury’s cannot ver- (Minn. v. Wildenberg, 573 N.W.2d surely dict unattributable to the error. 1998); Dillon, (“As N.W.2d at 558 Accordingly, we hold that the district rule, general stronger the evidence admitting error in court’s guilt, likely any the less error prej plea testimony was not harmless error and udicial.”). therefore is entitled to a new trial. King admitted that he used his car to Reversed and remanded for further pro- drive to the house in Grant. ceedings He opinion. acknowledged being consistent with this at the dur- house However,

spoon plea testimony. way, we much the we should have same not affirm affirming concerns about a conviction based through obtained conviction that was the use prior earlier on conviction. Evidence of con- constitutionally prohibited sim- may permissibly victions be used in lim- ply using a because committed a crime jurors ited circumstances. "While the in this similar, common, years albeit method 3 earli- were entitled case to consider this evidence in Further, expand- er. we concerns about determining whether in fact [the defendant] ing past-crime beyond the use of the evidence alleged, they committed the acts were not purpose for which was offered and entitled to convict him based on their assess- accepted justify order that we at trial in can person or ment of him as a based on what he affirming a under a conviction harmless error Bahe, past.” has done in the United States analysis. (D.N.M.1998). F.Supp.2d 812 complaint in the I charged con- defendant is eyewitness and an

ing burglary, the you. have read to During the presence there. firmed his King the rob- described booking process, majority the remarkable The dismisses as to bery way in such a Deputy Gribble case present similarities between the and he, the King, been inside imply that had prior Specifically, conviction. the King’s Further, King’s interviews house. burglary accomplice and an King 1996 Tilley contain inconsistencies Investigator into and ransacked a residence. Dur- broke the during he did and saw relating to what were ing burglary, jewelry the boxes over- interview, During his robbery. second emptied, open and drawers were turned full disturbed, that he not tell the King sitting admitted did and a on a and VCR initial and conceded chair, truth at his interview taken. ready to be At apparently jury scene, “bogus” story.7 that told a The police found several socks the King about, fled the a also heard evidence that near fence strewn found socks and being by King jumped, pair discovered Koelbl and found a of scene after hours capture ultimately evaded for several socks close where wide-spread involving surrounding manhunt facts during apprehended. a The officers, 1996 are police dogs, burglary local the state conviction essen- police tially identical to case at hand. the patrol, patrol helicopter. a state the and case, the broken current house was into of The state also introduced evidence ransacked, drawers, and the contents bur- attempted second-degree closets, were disar- jewelry boxes glary op- modus conviction demonstrate stolen, ray, jewelry was a VCR sat outside 404(b) (“Evidence R. Evid. erandi. Minn. home, socks about the were strewn the crime, not wrong, of another or act is scene, and some of the socks contained * * * * * * prove admissible character jewelry. pieces * * * may prove] [but be admissible it] [to The combined all of this effect of evi motive, intent, opportunity, preparation, King’s guilt. points unerringly dence plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of the Despite majority’s concern that accident.”). majority ac- mistake or only Weatherspoon’s testimony was the di that intent in the knowledges was an issue placing King rect evidence case, but asserts the other-crimes evi- circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to not dence here could be used to show support E.g., conviction. State Whit jury properly intent: could consider “[T]he (Minn.1997). taker, 568 N.W.2d conviction King’s prior to establish Moreover, the crime for which that in he had to take past attempted the convicted, aiding abetting burglary, * * things valuable from *.” Su- home require entered does added). However, pra (emphasis at 810 (2000) 609.05, § house. Minn.Stat. subd. upon the dis- introduction evidence (“A for a person criminally liable crime trict court instructed: by person if committed another inten aids, counsels, advises, hires, tionally THE At COURT: this time conspires procures to introduce of an oc- with or intends evidence otherwise crime.”). 14th, Further, commit September currence on other to Hennepin County. any possible prejudice resulting is be- from This evidence purpose Weatherspoon’s for the introduction of statement ing offered limited jury assisting determining whether defen- was minimized because the was aware Weatherspoon’s for aiding dant committed those acts with which of conviction yard, King King gave false about what he back that he failed tell information confessed burglary, during explaining that did first truth and fact never circled the full that he in he made a full circle house to look for the house instead looked Weather- Investigator Weatherspoon. Then Til- when spoon yard. from corner of the ley questioned King layout about the abetting used the burglary, conviction to statement. impeach jury charge, judge

During also it should

reminded the consider when deciding conviction weight give to the statement. summary, strength

In given King and mini-

state’s evidence impact

mal statement jury,

could have had on the the verdict was

surely unattributable admission of Therefore, statement. I would

hold that the admission statement

was harmless error is not enti-

tled to a new trial.

STRINGER, (dissenting) Justice

I join in the dissent of Justice Joan

Ericksen Lancaster. Marriage re the of Rolf Edward

ROGERS, petitioner,

Appellant, ROGERS, Respondent.

Lisa Anne

No. C2-99-1325.

Supreme of Minnesota. Court

March

Case Details

Case Name: State v. King

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Mar 1, 2001

Citation: 622 N.W.2d 800

Docket Number: C9-99-298

Court Abbreviation: Minn.