State v. ZapataState v. Zapata
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Donald, Colón, Geenen
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 12, 2026
Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Court of Appeals
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See
¶1 GEENEN, J. In 2022, the Deputy Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission, Kimberly D. Zapata, requested three military absentee ballots using fictitious names and directed that the ballots be sent to a state legislator. As a result of the requests, Zapata was charged with and convicted by a jury of three counts of election fraud under
¶2 Zapata appeals from her judgment of conviction, arguing that she did not violate
¶3 We conclude that
BACKGROUND
¶4 In November 2022, the State charged Zapata with misconduct in public office (acting in excess of lawful authority) and three counts of making a false statement to obtain an absentee ballot. According to the complaint, in the fall of 2022, Zapata was the Deputy Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission. After the local news reported that “an unknown” individual fraudulently applied for military absentee ballots and had them sent to a state legislator who was advancing “outrageous conspiracy theories” about election fraud, Zapata told her supervisor that she was the person who falsified the requests for absentee ballots. She explained that by requesting the ballots, she was trying “to show how easy it is to commit fraud” when it comes to military absentee ballots.
¶5 Zapata subsequently met with police about her conduct. She admitted that through the “MyVote website,”2 she “fabricated three individuals who did not exist, ... used those fabricated names to have military voter absentee requests sent to the municipal clerks in Shorewood, South Milwaukee, and Menomonee Falls,” and then “had the absentee ballots sent to” the state legislator. Zapata wanted to “make a point that there is fraud in existence” and have the legislator “focus” on “actual true fraud[.]” Zapata acknowledged using her work laptop and accessing a “voter registration database” that is “only available to the municipality employees” in order to obtain the legislator‘s address.
¶6 After the meeting, the State filed the charges at issue in this case, and the case went to trial. The evidence at trial consisted of testimony from the three municipal clerks who received Zapata‘s military absentee ballot requests, the deputy administrator for the Wisconsin Elections Commission, the lead investigator in this case, and Zapata‘s supervisor, the Executive Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission. The jury also heard Zapata‘s police interview. This evidence established the following.
¶7 As deputy director for the Milwaukee Election Commission, Zapata worked to ensure that elections ran smoothly and securely, including overseeing absentee voting. Her obligation was to follow the statutorily prescribed processes.
¶8 Prior to the fall 2022 election, Zapata became concerned about the process for requesting military absentee ballots. Because a person requesting a military absentee ballot on the MyVote website did
¶9 Frustrated with public criticism of her office and by conspiracy theories about election fraud, Zapata wanted “the truth to come out” about “actual problems” with elections. Using her work laptop in the early morning hours of October 25, 2022, she accessed the MyVote website and requested military absentee ballots in the names of three fake individuals: Holly Jones, Holly Adams, and Holly Brandtjen. Zapata looked up random home addresses in South Milwaukee, Shorewood, and Menomonee Falls, and assigned one to each fake name. She chose residences in South Milwaukee and Shorewood because she felt these areas had “subpar” municipal clerks who would not catch the fraud.
¶10 Zapata requested that each ballot be sent to the home of a state legislator because the legislator was “the most vocal election fraud politician” that she knew. To locate the legislator‘s address, Zapata logged into “WisVote,” which is a statewide voter registration database only accessible to “employees who are responsible for administering elections.” Zapata hoped that the municipal clerks would issue the ballots and that when the legislator received them, the legislator would “redirect ... her focus away from ... outrageous conspiracy theories to something that‘s actually real.”
¶11 The municipal clerks in South Milwaukee, Shorewood, and Menomonee Falls mailed absentee ballots to the legislator‘s residence. After receiving the ballots, the legislator issued a press release opining that “someone was trying to point out how easy it is to get military ballots in Wisconsin.” When Zapata‘s supervisor shared a news article about the legislator‘s statement, Zapata responded that the legislator “had a point.” Zapata later told her supervisor that she was the person who falsified the requests for absentee ballots.
¶12 At the close of the State‘s evidence at trial, Zapata filed two motions to dismiss. The first motion exclusively addressed the misconduct in public office charge. Zapata argued that the State “failed to show Ms. Zapata‘s actions of sending three absentee ballots were done in her capacity as a public employee.” She maintained that she “was acting as a private individual[.]”
¶13 Zapata‘s second motion to dismiss addressed all four charges. She maintained that the State “completely failed to show Ms. Zapata made a false statement for the purpose of obtaining an absentee ballot.” She asserted that she did not commit election fraud within the meaning of
¶14 The circuit court denied Zapata‘s motions to dismiss. The court reasoned that, as to the election fraud charges,
¶15 The jury found Zapata guilty on all charges. Zapata appeals from her judgment of conviction, challenging the circuit
DISCUSSION
I. The circuit court correctly denied Zapata‘s motion to dismiss the election fraud charges under WIS. STAT. § 12.13(3)(i) .
¶16 Zapata argues that the legitimacy of the election fraud charges depends on the meaning of the phrase “for the purpose of obtaining” in
¶17 The well-established rules of statutory interpretation guide our analysis. Statutory interpretation “‘begins with the language of the statute.‘” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. Context and structure are also “important to meaning.” Id., ¶46. “Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id.
¶18 A statute‘s purpose is “perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as” the purpose is “ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history.” Id., ¶48. “[A] plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose.” Id., ¶49; see also State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶29, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787 (“An interpretation that contravenes the manifest purpose of the statute is unreasonable.“).
¶19 We first consider whether the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear. Under
¶20 The term “obtaining” is not defined in the statute. “When a term is not defined, a general principle of statutory construction is that the term should be given its ‘common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.‘” Dinkins, 339 Wis. 2d 78, ¶37 (citation omitted). We often refer to dictionary definitions to ascertain an undefined term‘s common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.3
¶22 “In cases interpreting criminal statutes governing possessory offenses, [the supreme court] has consistently concluded that the term ‘possession’ includes both actual and constructive possession.” State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 14-15, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994). Constructive possession is “a description of circumstances that are sufficient to support an inference that the person exercised control over, or intended to possess, the item in question.” State v. Allbaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 807, 814, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). “Constructive possession may be established by demonstrating that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the object, either directly or through others, thus establishing a nexus between himself and the object.” United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2009).
¶23 We agree with the State that “obtaining,” as used in
¶24 Having construed the term “obtaining” to include constructive obtainment, we turn to Zapata‘s argument that she did not constructively obtain the ballots. Zapata asserts that she did not know or control the person to whom she sent the ballots, so
¶25 We conclude that she did. The evidence demonstrates that by requesting the ballots, Zapata set off a series of actions she knew the ballots would be subjected to. She knew that by requesting the ballots, the ballots would be generated under the fake names that she provided. She also knew that the ballots, once generated per her request, would be sent to the address that she provided. In other words, Zapata controlled both the names under which the ballots would be generated and the destination to which those ballots would be sent. She “knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over” the ballots “through others” (i.e., via the election officials that create and send out absentee ballots), “thus establishing a nexus between” Zapata and the ballots. Katz, 582 F.3d at 752. In our view, directing the creation and destination of the false ballots is “exercising control” over them. Because Zapata “exercised control” over the ballots, her conduct violated
II. The circuit court correctly denied Zapata‘s motion to dismiss the misconduct in public office charge under WIS. STAT. § 946.12 .
¶26 Zapata also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting her of misconduct in public office under
¶27 We begin with the language of the statute.
In the officer‘s or employee‘s capacity as such officer or employee, does an act which the officer or employee knows is in excess of the officer‘s or employee‘s lawful authority or which the officer or employee knows the officer or employee is forbidden by law to do in the officer‘s or employee‘s official capacity[.]
To convict Zapata of misconduct in public office under this statute, the State needed to prove that: (1) at the time of the offense, Zapata was a public employee; (2) in her capacity as a public employee, Zapata fabricated names in order to obtain absentee ballots; (3) Zapata‘s actions were in excess of her lawful authority; and (4) Zapata knew that her conduct was in excess of her lawful authority. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1731.
¶28 Zapata argues that she did not act in her capacity as a public employee when she requested the absentee ballots, but rather, she was acting “as a concerned
¶29 We considered what constitutes a public employee‘s official authority in State v. Schmit, where the defendant, a prison guard, engaged in consensual sex with an inmate while on duty. Id. at 658. The prison guard was charged under
¶30 We affirmed, concluding that
¶31 We observed that acts which are “inherently related to the duties of the office in question” may fall within the official capacity of the officer, but “[a]bsent any material connection between the forbidden act and the public office ... [the] statute does not apply.” Id. at 665. The forbidden act must “inherently implicate the power of her public office[.]” Id. at 663.
¶32 The cases cited in Schmit confirm that acting in an “official capacity” requires a material connection between the public official‘s duties and powers and the forbidden act. Although those cases did not involve
¶34 Before concluding, we address Zapata‘s other arguments. Zapata argues that the rule of lenity precludes punishing her for violating
¶35 Similarly, Zapata makes vague arguments related to the First Amendment and whether she acted in excess of her authority under
CONCLUSION
¶36 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court correctly denied Zapata‘s motions to dismiss her charges under
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.