*1
81
OF
STATE
MONTANA,
Respondent,
Plaintiff
MICHAEL LEE KEYS,
Appellant.
Defendant
No. 98-349.
Submitted
Briefs
November
1998.
January 25,
Decided
1999.
For R. Daniel P. Mazurek, General; Hon. P. C. Respondent: Joseph Attorney For Fowler, General; J. Attorney Helena; Assistant Thomas Mark Esch, County Attorney; Kalispell. Flathead the the Opinion REGNIER delivered of Court. 7, 1996, Keys charged by Lee informa On October Michael ¶1 Court, County, the Judicial District Flathead with tion in Eleventh 45-6-301(l)(c), Keys felony theft violation of MCA. in 1997, 17, 9, plea On entered Keys June an on October Alford 26, 1997, the agreement. On June District Court longer Keys’ years, years sentence be deferred for six two ordered July 3, 1997, Keys agreed to in the On than plea. The District denied filed motion February 26, 1998. Keys April on appeal filed a notice the motion on 21, 1998. the of the District Court. judgment We affirm on the District Court abused appeal The issue raised whether ¶2 Keys’ it motion to withdraw his when denied its discretion FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1995, By Lee to Lance Vitt. late $550 In Michael loaned ¶3 Keys’ money, Keys accept so with Vitt to agreed had not returned Vitt money later needed and so motorcycle as collateral for the loan. motorcycle. Keys pawn permission for and received Vitt’s asked it at his father’s residence motorcycle to his father left pawned Shortly felony charge theft was filed Kalispell. near the mo- complaint regarding received a department sheriff’s sheriff, the mo- provided According to information torcycle. Quentin Vitt, Vitt’s belonged Lance father. torcycle actually Attorney 7,1996, County charged the Flathead On October theft, Keys’ with the felony, charged father the offense with 17,1996, on October arraignment for Keys appeared same offense. guilty. of not time he entered whereby Keys negotiated settlement he would enter an Alford felony to the offense theft. The plea provided that Keys’ exchange in plea, State would recommend that imposition of his sentence be deferred for a period of four provided and further would dismiss the related crimi- charge against nal plea hearing, At the District Court tried to determine party not a
agreement. Keys responded first did not understand what the then judge saying. that he had plead guilty order receive the sentence contained or in paper.” “for Although Keys expressed words what’s some court, difficulty the District Court was assured that Keys finally understood that it was not bound follow the State’s sen- tencing lengthy question period, recommendation. After and answer during which said he did not understand that the court is not agreement, you, asked “do now?” and replied “yeah.” The District then asked if he still wanted to “yes.” forward said sentence, When District Court announced declined to follow the deferring imposition sentence for *3 years. days later, six rather four than Seven filed a motion guilty plea, urging District the Court to find that the plea knowingly was not and intelligently made. The State opposed timely. motion but conceded that the motion was Keys’ attorney later testified at hearing ¶8 on the motion to with- that, Keys’ guilty plea opinion, Keys draw in his really never plea that the District Court was not agreement. Keys’ attor- ney testified that he assumed would read the himself questions pleading and formulate his about it guilty, own but that he did know that not not could read. later to the Dis- trict pled guilty loyalty out of a sense of to his father. The District Court entered an order which denied motion to plea. court guiliy withdraw his determined that the timeliness of highly questionable, that there inter- adequate motion was an understanding of of rogation regarding consequences and signed guilty plea, plea agreement and that a which constituted of rights. waiver
STANDARD OF REVIEW appeal 10 The issue raised on is whether the District Court abused ¶ denied his its discretion when it motion to withdraw 46-16-105(2), MCA, may for good Pursuant cause plea guilty of and a of not sub permit guilty be withdrawn grant deny review a district court’s discretion to or a mo stituted. We a guilty plea for the withdrawal of for an abuse of discretion. See (1997), 298, 304, 938 592, 595. Bowley v. 282 Mont. P.2d To deter State and good mine whether cause existed whether there an abuse of (1) discretion, following adequacy of we consider factors: interrogation regarding district court’s time de (2) of consequences plea; fact fendant’s plea bargain was the result of a (3) another exchange charge; dismissal of given attempted which the defendant to withdraw the promptness 150, 152. (1995), 124, 127-28, 907P.2d 274 Mont. See State v.Johnson determining validity guilty plea of a The test for is “voluntary, knowing, intelligent plea represents a whether the open to the among the alternative courses of action defendant.” choice 1203, 1206 155, 159, 818 (1991), (quoting P.2d v.Radi 250 Mont. 160, 27 (1970), 25, 91 S. L. Ed. U.S. Ct. 2d Carolina North 162). plea involuntary appears deem a when it This Court will inducement, laboring strong such a the defendant was under mistake, the possibility or serious mental condition that fundamental is guilty to a crime of which he innocent. See may exists 308, 310. (1991), If there 248 Mont. v.Miller voluntarily made, intelligently not guilty plea doubt favor the defendant. See State v. must be resolved in the doubt 175, 181. 8, 18, 269 Mont. 887 P.2d Enoch
DISCUSSION interrogation the time the the District Court’s adequacy A.The by signing maintains that he did understand guilty, the District Court was entering inability claims that his un- plea agreement. not bound only recommen- contains sentence derstand that to the fact that he cannot guarantee is due and not sentence dation *4 agree- never attorney properly his read and because times many matter how he contends that no ment to him. further District significance told about regarding plea policy agreements, Court’s he was never made to com- however, admits he pletely understand. that was told no less than not by ten times that the District Court was the plea by the District Court at arraignment, first instance the sec- by Keys’ attorney, ond own the third by agree- written by Keys days he signed pled guilty, ment three before and the other seven change District of plea hearing. instances were 46-12-201(1), MCA, the District duty Pursuant Court has a Keys’ understanding consequences to determine of this accepts guilty plea. The statute does quire Court guarantee District that continues to retain understanding plea hearing his after the and the ends court renders a sentence. The issue here therefore whether when he entered his consequences record, on our Based review the we conclude that District not err when found that understood its policy regard- ing plea agreements plea voluntarily knowingly. and entered his At plea hearing, the District Court agree- referred to the ment provision regarding rights waiver of in which acknowledged suffering any “I am not from mental disease or defect... I acting nor am alcohol, drugs, prescription under the influence of medicine.” told the Court that he District was sober and clearheaded noth- ing Yet, evidence, impeded judgment. without offering now claims that suffered from a fundamental mistake about the District policy regarding plea agreements. disagree Court’s We with the District Court was allegedly should known suffering disability Moreover, from hearing. at the time of the at the end of a lengthy colloquy and Keys between District Court regarding understood that the District Court is not bound following dialogue occurred: say I part.
KEYS: I’ll didn’t understand you THE Do Okay. COURT: now?
KEYS: Yeah. Okay. you
THE COURT: Do want still forward this agreement?
KEYS: Yeah. We conclude the District Court did not abuse its discre sober, by accepting representations person clear-minded who, showing proceedings, while some difficulties a clear statement of un- expressed District Court’s satisfaction *5 derstanding time accepted plea. his The District difficulties, great Keys’ took to pains Court resolve and the record es- did Keys stated that he in fact understand. The tablishes Dis- Keys’ rely representa- trict Court is entitled to on oral and written and, disability indication of a tions absent some the time accept voluntary as hearing, intelligent. Keys’ plea bargain
B. The was the result Alford fact claims Keys pled pursuant 17 that the fact that he ¶ bargain against plea. should not militate withdrawal of his disregard agreement this Court to the State’s to dismiss the urges against his father as consideration because claims charges Contrary Keys’ claim, directly did not benefit from the dismissal. to however, did charges against the State’s dismissal of father di- Keys prevented the loss rectly Keys. potential benefit of his father’s stated, and, liberty loyalty as out of to his father. the State is a bargain between subject to contract law standards. See State v.Butler contract which is 908, 911. Thus, 286, 291, 900 (1995), 272 P.2d must Mont. show support there no consideration existed (1997), 304, it. See v. Mont. order to invalidate Nitzel Wickman 283 case, 309, 451, In 940 P.2d 454. this there was consideration promises including of the State’s of benefits to dis form against his father. This was both benefit charges missal pros The fact that the State forewent its and a detriment State. Keys’ for the contract. ecution of father creates valid consideration By charge Keys’ its dis right pursue against The State had a case, right which the missing deprivation the State suffered 28-2-801, See MCA. Valid contract consideration require. law did not suing See Devon promise pressing to refrain from claim. includes 227, 523, (1985), 223, 707 Ayers Co. 218 Mont. P.2d 526. Oil & Gas Moreover, promises refraining other than State fulfilled father, namely promised a deferral of prosecuting his from Finally, dismissed the case Keys’ own sentence. after and the District ren father sentence, attorney, get didn’t the deal was told his “I dered that the get.” The record therefore refutes assertion supposed inducement charges father’s sole promise to dismiss his State’s Keys clearly the benefit he would re plead guilty. him to plea. entering an. by accepting plea agreement ceive have held that we We will assist defendant in escaping obligations plea agreement of his after he has received its benefits. See (1947), 554, State v. Nance 120 Mont. We con 561. clude did benefit from the with the State and has failed to invalidate it establishing no consideration existed. C. The promptness attempted withdraw his In a determination of whether a defendant should permitted be guilty plea, finally withdraw we consider how promptly the defen- dant moved Bowley has to withdraw See State v. 298, 592,
Mont. 938 P.2d Because State conceded that timely made, however, promptness motion was dispute is not in appeal. and therefore we need not address issue this record, we Upon review conclude the District *6 by denying Keys’ not abuse its discretion motion guilty to withdraw his (1) interrogation because the District Court’s provided him (2) adequate understanding an of the effect of plea agreement; Keys’ plea bargain agreement which he struck with the State is valid and (3) Keys; did although Keys’ request benefit and guilty timely, promptness outweigh cannot all evidence which weighs in favor of the District Court’s decision when analyzing the other guilty plea factors. entered his voluntarily and intelligently and good permit Keys there exists no cause to now to withdraw it. judgment The of the District Court is affirmed. TURNAGE, CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICES GRAYand NELSON concur. LEAPHART, dissenting. I dissent. If there is doubt that a was not volun made, tarily intelligently the doubt must be resolved in favor of the 175, 181 defendant. See State v.Enoch Mont. (citations omitted). Given the fact that this defendant could not read given and his obvious state of confusion as to the role the court in ac it cepting me that apparent to voluntarily there was doubt that and intelligently made. colloquy In his with the court at the change hearing, very it clear that that agreement made he understood an period years that his would be deferred for a of four sentence that charged would dismiss the related “[w]ell, stated, that, signing pleading guilty, the reason I’m be- do, agreed say pa- what to what’s on that cause that’s I I’m Judge the sen- per.” “change” When advised the court that the can on, “[w]hy agreed Keys responded paper what is the tence from up? really ... So paper anything?” Again, made don’t mean agreement that court was between the State agreed make upon was bound to recommenda- but the court was not bound to follow recommendation. “Well, expressed Again, Keys paper good, confusion: if Or, mean, signed, you I if way one ain’t that should be? don’t it, no The paper good?” aint’ court then continued in its ef- agree him of his belief that the him a agreement guaranteed fort disabuse Finally, sentence. indicated he understood what specific proceed to saying the court was and that he wanted to question great His then him and took proceeded pains counsel that, something unexpected unless came in the point up out think investigation, there was no reason to presentence go along importantly with the More how- court would discussion, ever, court, in reaf- subsequent on two occasions that the court was with the firmed four-year The agreed deferment. court asked upon if he what deferred sentence was. indicated that trouble, my out “then it’s off stayed what he was told and you And replied: “Exactly. To understood that cord.” which thereafter, Shortly Keys indi- years?” be for four you’ll probation because, good complied, deal if he ev- cated that the was a court, confirming his understand- erything dropped. be would upon four-year referenced the defer- ing, again specifically “Because, all though you even have to abide rules and ment: that, assuming you four at the end of that stuff for to, important you?” that’s you’re supposed done what fully explain all that it could The court did *7 Nonetheless, plea agreement. the fact party court is not a accepting the court’s role mains that in the In re- confusing to those schooled law. even us, un- convinced that who was viewing record before I am itself, controlling or the but statutes able read “agreement,” of an was confused layman’s had a who no to think that there was reason assurances concluding along the court’s would resolve upon four-year deferment. would references guilty. allowing in favor of the doubt foregoing in the dissent join and HUNT JUSTICES TRIEWEILER LEAPHART.