State v. KerekgyartoState v. Kerekgyarto
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Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer L. Donovan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
David A. Baker, for appellant.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Timothy Kerekgyarto, appeals the March 21, 2012 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which sentenced him to a total prison term of 14 years following his guilty pleas to two counts of rape of a minor. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion we affirm.
{¶ 3} On March 6, 2012, appellant withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 2 in the indictment, rape, in violation of
{¶ 4} The court then determined that a minimum sentence would demean the seriousness of the offense, which took place over the course of 13 years. The court imposed seven-year prison terms for each count of rape. Ordering the sentences to be served consecutively, the court indicated that a “consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime” and not disproportionate to the offender‘s conduct. The court further found that “the harm caused was so great and unusual that no single
{¶ 5} Based on his convictions, appellant was then classified as a Tier III sex offender and the matter proceeded to a hearing on whether appellant would be subject to community notification under
{¶ 6} The court then found that the victim grew up in an isolated environment being home-schooled and that appellant used this to aid in grooming his sister for the sexual abuse that fully began when she was 12 years old. The court noted that the cruelty of the abuse was evident in the victim‘s letter to the court. The court then concluded that the community must be notified because appellant‘s family, despite knowing that the abuse was taking place, never attempted to stop it. Further, the court noted that appellant only stopped the abuse after police intervention.
I. The consecutive sentences handed down by the trial court was [sic] excessive and not supported by sections
2929.11 or2929.12 .II. It was an abuse of the court‘s discretion when it found that community notice was appropriate.
{¶ 8} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences does not align with the purposes of felony sentencing. Specifically, appellant argues that because the crimes were committed against one specific individual, there is little or no threat of recidivism. Appellant further notes that he has expressed genuine remorse for his actions. Appellant does not dispute that his sentences are within the statutory range.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} In sentencing appellant, the trial court carefully reviewed the facts of the case, including the long history of grooming and abuse, the isolation and threats, and the psychological damage suffered by the victim. The court noted that it reviewed the presentence investigation report and the numerous letters in support of defendant and on
{¶ 11} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the court erred when it determined that he be subject to community notification.
(2) * * * [I]f a court finds at a hearing after considering the factors described in this division that the person would not be subject to the notification provisions of this section that were in the version of this section that existed immediately prior to the effective date of this amendment. In making the determination of whether a person would have been subject to the notification provisions under prior law as described in this division, the court shall consider the following factors:
(a) The offender‘s or delinquent child‘s age;
(b) The offender‘s or delinquent child‘s prior criminal or delinquency record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses;
(c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made;
(d) Whether the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made involved multiple victims;
(e) Whether the offender or delinquent child used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim of the sexually oriented offense or to prevent the victim from resisting; (f) If the offender or delinquent child previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to, or been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that if committed by an adult would be, a criminal offense, whether the offender or delinquent child completed any sentence or dispositional order imposed for the prior offense or act and, if the prior offense or act was a sex offense or a sexually oriented offense, whether the offender or delinquent child participated in available programs for sexual offenders;
(g) Any mental illness or mental disability of the offender or delinquent child;
(h) The nature of the offender‘s or delinquent child‘s sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context with the victim of the sexually oriented offense and whether the sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context was part of a demonstrated pattern of abuse;
(i) Whether the offender or delinquent child, during the commission of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made, displayed cruelty or made one or more threats of cruelty;
(j) Whether the offender or delinquent child would have been a habitual sex offender or a habitual child victim offender under the definitions of those terms set forth in section 2950.01 of the Revised Code as that section existed prior to the effective date of this amendment;(k) Any additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the offender‘s or delinquent child‘s conduct.
{¶ 12} While the statute requires the trial court to consider the factors set forth above, the statute does not require the trial court to make specific findings of fact in order to justify community notification. The statute vests discretion with the trial court in making the determination. Based upon the factual circumstances in this case as discussed above, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that appellant be subject to community notification. Appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶ 13} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having a fair proceeding and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
C.A. No. L-12-1115
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. _______________________________
James D. Jensen, J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.