State v. Kennison

55 N.H. 242 | N.H. | 1875

Lead Opinion

Complaint — Jurisdiction of Police Courts. It seems to me very clear that this complaint must be dismissed, for the reason that it contains no sufficient description of the offence sought to be charged under the statute. The statute is, — *244

"No person shall make any brawl or tumult, or, in any street, lane, alley, or other public place, be guilty of any rude, indecent, or disorderly conduct," c. Gen. Stats., ch. 252, sec. 1. The material averment, that the alleged offence was committed in a street, lane, alley or other public place in Pittsfield, is entirely wanting. The words might have been spoken openly and in the presence of divers persons as stated in the complaint, and still the place where there were spoken might answer none of the definitions of a street, lane, alley, or other public place. As to the place where they were spoken, the complaint is silent. I think the defect is material and cannot be cured by amendment.

This view makes it unnecessary to inquire whether the defendant was too late in taking his objection to the jurisdiction of the police Court of Concord, or whether that court had jurisdiction; although on the latter question it is difficult to see how there can be much doubt, when the statute expressly gives exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences committed in a town where there is a police court, to such court. Gen. Stats., ch. 234, sec. 8. Of course, where an offence is committed in a town in which no police court has been established, the police court of any other town has the same jurisdiction with respect to it as justices of the peace. State v. Ricker, 32 N.H. 179; State v. Bean, 36 N.H. 122. But this does not affect the question of jurisdiction of an offence committed in a town where there is a police court. The statute certainly seems to me so explicit as to admit of but one construction, whatever may have been the practice. The police court of Concord cannot have jurisdiction of offences committed within the territorial limits of Pittsfield, because exclusive cognizance of such offences is given to the police court of the latter town.

CUSHING, C. J., concurred.






Concurrence Opinion

1. It is not enough to subject a person to punishment that he be guilty of rude, indecent, or disorderly conduct, unless the offence be committed in some public place. The statute does not prohibit such conduct, except in a public place. It being material, then, to prove that the offence was committed in a public place, it is essential that it should be so alleged; and unless alleged, the offence is sufficiently set forth. The want of a direct allegation of everything material in the description of the substance, nature, or manner of the offence, cannot be supplied by any intendment. State v. Divoll, 44 N.H. 142.

2. Police courts have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences committed within the town in which such court is established, so far as justices of the peace have jurisdiction. Gen. Stats., ch. 234, sec. 8.

If the police court of Pittsfield has exclusive jurisdiction of offences committed in that town, how can the police court of Concord acquire jurisdiction of this case? The language of the statute is so clear as to leave no room to hang a doubt upon. *245

The respondent's neglect to plead to the jurisdiction of the police court of Concord when arraigned in that court did not help the matter. Where jurisdiction is wholly wanting, it cannot be conferred by consent. Griffin's petition, 27 N.H. 346.

Complaint dismissed.

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