State v. KennedyState v. Kennedy
The State of Florida charged Kirk Douglas Kennedy in an eleven count information with felony driving under the influence, felony driving whilе license suspended, obtaining a driver‘s license by fraud, perjury in filing a driver‘s license application, forgery, obtaining an identification сard by fraud and uttering a forgery. Kennedy entered a plea of guilty on all charges. The trial court departed from the sentencing guidelinеs based on a plea agreement and Kennedy‘s need for alcohol treatment. Kennedy was sentenced on
The State contends the rеcord does not support departure from the guidelines based on either a legitimate uncoerced plea or the need for alcohol treatment. We agree with the State‘s argument that the plea bargain entered into between the trial court and Kennedy without the State‘s consent cannot support a downward departure from the guidelines. A “plea bargain contemplates an agreement between the state and the defendant which is approved by the court.” See State v. McCarthy, 502 So.2d 955, 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In this case, the State did not participate in the plea agreement and repeatedly objected to the sentence imposed upon Kennedy. When the State is not a party to a plea agreement, the agreement cannot serve as a basis for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Herrick, 691 So.2d 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); State v. Honiker, 675 So.2d 681, 682 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Williams, 616 So.2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
We also agree with the State that the record does not support the trial court‘s downward departure sentence based on the need for alcohol treatment. In certain cases, intoxication can be a valid reason for a downward departure sentence. See Herrin v. State, 568 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla.1990); Barbera v. State, 505 So.2d 413, 413-14 (Fla.1987), receded from on other grounds, Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990). However, in order to use alcohol treatment as a justification for a downward departure, there must be еvidence that the defendant is amenable to rehabilitation. See Herrin, 568 So.2d at 921. There is no evidence demonstrating that Kennedy voluntarily sought treatment оr that he was amenable to rehabilitation, therefore, treatment for Kennedy‘s dependency was an insufficient reason to support the departure. We hold that a legitimate uncoerced plea and alcohol treatment were not valid reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines in this case.
The State next contends the trial court erred in suspending Kennedy‘s ten year sentence as an habitual offender because the suspended sentence constituted an unlawful departure from the sentencing guidelines without adequate written reasons. A trial court has discretion to determine whether and to what extent an habitual offender sentence is neсessary and appropriate:
Sentencing under the habitual felon statute is permissive, not mandatory, and involves a two-step determination. First, the sentencing judge must determine whether a defendant qualifies as an habitual offender. This determination is ministerial rather than discretionary. Second, the judge must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced as an habitual felony offender. Even where a judge determinеs that a defendant is an habitual felony offender, the judge can still determine that sentencing under the habitual offender statute is not necеssary for the protection of the public. Moreover, the judge need not make a specific finding that an enhanced sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public; the judge necessarily makes such a decision by virtue of sentencing an hаbitual offender to a more lenient sentence than that required by the habitual felon statute.
King v. State, 681 So.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Fla. 1996) (citations and footnotes omitted).
In this case, the court sentenced Kennedy to tеn years, the maximum imprisonment allowed for a third degree felony under the habitual offender statute. See
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court‘s sentence on the driving under the influence charge, and remand with instructions to allow Kennedy to either withdraw his plea or be sentenced under the guidelines. We also reverse the trial court‘s sentence on cоunts two through eleven and remand with instructions to allow Kennedy to either withdraw his plea or be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelinеs or as an habitual felony offender.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur.