228 Mo. 367 | Mo. | 1910
The defendant has brought this cause to the Supreme Court by appeal from a judgment of conviction in the circuit court of Benton county, Missouri, for a violation of the provisions of section 1842, Revised Statutes of 1899. That section provides that “every person who shall take away any female under the age of eighteen years from her father, mother, guardian or other person having the legal charge of her person, either for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, and any father, mother, guardian or other person, having the legal charge of her person, who shall consent to the same, shall upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years.”
The information in this case, which was filed on the 12th day of July, 1909, by the prosecuting attorney of Benton county, duly verified, charged1 defendant substantially with the taking of Rettie Smith, a female under the age of eighteen years, that is, of the age of fifteen years, from the custody of her father, J. H. Smith, who had the legal charge of the said Rettie Smith.
At the regular July term of the circuit court of Benton county this cause was set for trial on August 12, 1909, and on said last above named date the State and the defendant announced ready for trial; the defendant was duly arraigned in open court and entered his plea of not guilty and the trial proceeded. Upon such trial the State introduced evidence tending to show that defendant, William Kebler, about the time it is alleged the offense was committed, lived in Cooper county, Missouri, about six miles south of Boonville; that he was known sometimes as Williams and some
Defendant was a laborer and worked in his neighborhood cutting corn, cord wood, clearing land and! fishing. After the arrival of Rettie Smith at his house she was his constant companion and helped him with his. work and accompanied him in his boat up the river at all times of the day and night, and went with him to
In October, 1908, Alice Shackleford and her children returned to Warsaw, leaving Rettie with defendant and his son, Walter Kebler, a boy twelve years old, living together in a tent on the river in Cole county.
The State’s evidence further tended to show that Rettie Smith was born December 3, 1891; that her mother died in 1905; her father, J. H. Smith, died in 1908; that Robert Lincoln Smith, a brother of Rettie Smith, was living at the defendant’s home in 1907, and at the time defendant and Rettie Smith arrived there he was employed in cutting corn, and defendant assisted him; that defendant would have Rettie Smith with him all the time; that Robert Smith complained about it and wanted Rettie to leave there and go to a neighbor’s to work; that he, defendant, objected, saying he would see that Rettie had a home as long as he lived; that she was not going to work out; that Robert Smith remained in defendant’s home until October, 1907, when he went to Warsaw and there remained until the 30th day of May, 1908, when he returned to defendant’s home and found” there defendant, Alice Shackleford, Rettie Smith and the children all living-together. Robert Smith remained at defendant’s home through June and July, 1908; that defendant’s occupation during that time was fishing- and that Rettie was on the river with him all the time.
This witness stated on cross-examination that defendant and Rettie when out together working or fishing on the river were nearly all the time in sight of the house; that you could see for three or four miles either way; that she advised Rettie not to go out at night with anyone; that at times Rettie would go to a neighbor’s house where there were young men and young girls and be gone pretty near a half a day at a time; that at times defendant and witness had left Rettie at home alone and on returning often found men and boys with her.
The defendant offered evidence tending to show that Rettie Smith resided at Warsaw with her father three or four years; that defendant came to Warsaw to pay off a mortgage for Rettie’s father'and that Alice had been writing Rettie to come out where she lived, and that Blanche Dickey had also urged her to go, and that morning after breakfast Rettie said to the defendant, “Will, if I hadi the money I’d go home with you,”
The defendant testifying in his own behalf stated that his name was W. C. Kebler, but that he was sometimes called Williams; that he was thirty-seven years old; that when a small boy he was placed with a family named Williams, and that he did not know his real name until he reached the age of seventeen years; that he resided in Cooper county during the year 1908; that he went to Warsaw, and that James Smith was in hard luck, had his team mortgaged and had written him to come and pay off the mortgage, which he did, arriving at War saw. about 2 o’clock in the morning, and spending the night at the home of Mr. Smith; that at the breakfast table Rettie said: “ If I had the money I’d go home with you; sister Blanche and Alice both urge me to go; Alice wrote to me and Blanche urges me and her man, Ed, urges me to go,” to which defendant replied: “Well, Rettie, if you want to go I’ll let you have the money to go if your pa has no objections,” and .that her father said, “I don’t care what she does; I don’t care (where she goes.” Rettie went home with defendant and stayed with them all the time. “After I got home I went out with a threshing machine that fall and threshed a while, and Rettie stayed with Alice. Bob Smith was there cutting corn, and when I came back from threshing I went to cutting corn with Bob. Rettie would come out in the field and Alice would come out in the field1 and bring us water, and there was two other gentlemen there sawing wood. Sometimes Rettie would take the corn knife and cut three or four stalks just to bother us; she wanted to
In rebuttal the State offered evidence tending to show that defendant said it didn’t make any difference what the outcome of this trouble was, he loved Rettie and that he was going to marry her; and that he and Alice were not married; that in the summer of 1909, defendant left his son, Walter, in a tent at Osage Bluff, twelve miles from Jefferson City, in Cole county, and went to Warsaw to get Rettie and her baby and was gone several days; that on his return they remained in the tent two days, going then by boat to Chamois; left Osage Bluff in the afternoon and camped that night on an island in the Missouri river; got to Chamois the nest morning at ten o’clock, and defendant was pitching his tent when arrested.
At the close of the evidence the court instructed the jury upon all subjects to which the testimony was
OPINION.
Learned counsel for appellant challenges the sufficiency of the information in this cause. This insistence is directed to the failure of the prosecuting attorney to charge in the information that Rettie Smith, the female charged to have been taken from her father, J. H. Smith, “was so taken away without the consent and against the will of her father, J. H. Smith.”
Section 1842, Revised Statutes 1899, upon which this information is predicated, provides that “every person who shall take away any female under the age of eighteen, years from her father, mother, guardian or other person having legal charge of her person, either for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, and any father, mother, guardian or other person, having the legal charge of her person, who- shall consent to the same, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years.”
It will be observed that section 1842 is subdivided; the first subdivision is directed to any person who shall take away any female under the age of eighteen years
The- charge against the defendant in the case at bar is predicated upon the first subdivision of this statute and charges the offense in' the language of the statute, that is, that the defendant did feloniously and unlawfully take away Rettie Smith, a female under the age of eighteen years, from one J. H. Smith, her father, he, the said J. H. Smith, then and there having the legal charge of the person of her, the said Rettie Smith, for the purpose of concubinage, etc.
While a number of the cases to which our attention has been directed by the learned Attorney-General embrace in the charge in the information that the female under the age of eighteen years was taken away from her father without his consent and against his will, yet in our opinion that allegation is not essential to the validity of the information.
As heretofore indicated we have pointed out the two subdivisions of section 1842, and that the offense with which the defendant in the case at bar is charged is embraced entirely within the first subdivision. The offense with which the defendant is charged is substant'ially in the language of the statute, that is, that he unlawfully and feloniously took the female from her father who had the legal charge of her, for the purpose of concubinage; and this, under the repeated rulings of this court, is all that is necessary to constitute a valid charge of a crime defined by the statute. As heretofore pointed out, if the father having charge of a female under the age of eighteen years, should consent' to her being taken away for the purpose of prosti
II.
Numerous complaints are directed to the action of the trial court upon the subject of the admission of incompetent evidence and the exclusion of competent evidence during the progress of the trial. Upon this proposition our attention is directed to the cross-examination of Mrs. Dickey, a witness for the State, by counsel for defendant. This witness, during the progress of her examination in chief, had detailed fully her knowledge of the manner in which Rettie Smith was taken away by the defendant, and upon cross-examination one of the questions propounded to Mrs. Dickey by counsel for defendant was, “Did you advise Rettie to go up to see her sister?” To this question there was an objection interposed by the State, which was sustained by the court. Clearly this was proper cross-examination, and but for the disclosures of the record, which shows substantially that same question had been fully answered by Mrs. Dickey in response to another question it would perhaps invite some serious consideration, but upon an examination of the record we find that counsel for defendant upon cross-examination had made full inquiry of Mrs. Dickey, this same witness, as to the receipt of letters by Rettie Smith from her sister, and also inquired as to whether or not this witness had not told Rettie she ought to go up there, and the witness emphatically replied, “No, sir, I did not
Another objection is made to questions propounded by the prosecuting attorney in the nature of a cross-examination of Alice Shackleford, a witness who had been introduced by the State. It is sufficient to say upon this proposition that the record discloses that the State did introduce Alice Shackleford as a witness, and during the progress of her testimony the State doubtless discovered that she was not as friendly to the State as she was supposed to have been by reason of former conversations and conduct on her part; hence the prosecuting attorney indulged in asking her some questions refreshing her memory, and which, of course, were in the nature of a cross-examination. We have examined very carefully the disclosures of the record touching upon this examination and have reached the conclusion that there was no reversible error in the questions propounded to Alice Shackleford by the prosecuting attorney. The decided weight of authority is favorable to the rule that there should be an exception to the rule forbidding a party to contradict his own witness where the witness during his or her examination proves unexpectedly hostile in his or her testimony upon the stand. [Underhill on Crim. Ev., sec. 235, p. 289, and cases cited; 1 Greenleaf in Ev., sec. 444.]
Numerous other exceptions are preserved to the admission and exclusion of evidence during the progress of the trial. It is sufficient to say that after a careful examination of the record applicable to those subjects we are unable to find that there was any such
III.
This brings us to the consideration of the instructions given by the court. Learned counsel for appellant complains at instruction number 1 and insists that this instruction was erroneous for the same reason upon which the challenge to the sufficiency of the information was predicated, that is, that it did not require the jury to find that the defendant had taken the female under the age of eighteen years from her father who had the legal charge of her without his consent or against his will. What was said in the discussion as applicable to the sufficiency of the information may be applied to the challenge to the correctness of instruction number 1. As heretofore pointed out, we held that it was not essential to the sufficiency of the information to charge that the act of the defendant was against the will of the father and without his consent; it therefore follows that if it was not essential to be charged in the information it was not necessary to make proof of it, and if there was no necessity to prove it the court was not required to direct the jury to find such facts. Instruction numbered 1, in our opinion,correctly declared the law.
As to the other instructions, both for the State and the defendant, we find that the court covered every phase of the case to which the testimony was applicable. The instructions as given for the defendant are exceedingly favorable to him and were all that he was entitled to under the rules of law applicable to criminal trials.
Complaint is made that the court refused an instruction upon circumstantial evidence. There is no merit in this complaint. The trial court, by instruction numbered 4, very appropriately and fully covered the subject of the nature and character of testimony
IV.
It is nest insisted by learned counsel for appellant that the testimony developed upon the trial was insufficient to support the verdict as returned by the jury. We have upon this proposition carefully read in detail all the testimony disclosed by the record, and in our opinion it clearly furnishes full support to the verdict of the jury. In fact after reading all the details of the defendant’s acts in relation to Rettie Smith, we are unable to comprehend how any other conclusion could have been reached by the jury than that the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged in the information. Whatever conflicts there may be in the testimony, it was entirely the province of the jury
We have indicated our views upon the legal propositions disclosed by the record in this cause, and finding no reversible error the judgment of the trial court should'be affirmed, and it is so ordered.