State v. KealaikiState v. Kealaiki
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We hold that a conditional plea under Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 11(a)(2) is inconsistent with the granting of a deferred acceptance of a guilty plea pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 853, the former premised on the acceptance of guilty or no contest pleas and the latter on the deferral of that acceptance. The policies embodied in these provisions are not reconcilable. We are led, then, to the conclusion that the appeal of Defendant-Appellant Henry James Kealaiki (Defendant) from the order of the second circuit court (the court) granting his motion for a deferred plea, does not provide a jurisdictional basis for review of an adverse pretrial suppression order purportedly preserved by the court’s allowance of Defendant’s conditional plea. An order granting a plea deferral is not final for the purpose of taking an appeal, and the continued deferral of plea acceptance in this case
I.
On March 15, 1999, Defendant was indicted for the offense of place to keep firearm,
On May 30, 2000, Defendant filed his notice of appeal “from the Order Granting Motion for Deferred Acceptance of Guilty/No Contest Plea filed herein on March 28, 2000 . . . which followed the Conditional Plea entered January 18, 2000,” pursuant to an order extending the time for appeal. 1
II.
In a circuit court criminal case, a defendant may appeal from the judgment of the circuit court,
see
Under
It appears that the appeal from the March 28, 2000 DANC order is an appeal from an interlocutory order. However, Defendant did not seek certification from the court to take an interlocutory appeal from the deferral order. The court’s decision on such a request, had it been made, would, of course, be unreviewable.
See Baranco,
77 Hawai‘i at 353, 884 P.2d at 731 (citing
Defendant acknowledges that under
Oshiro
an order granting a DANC plea is not a sentence, but maintains that the strict holding of
Oshiro
is that a DANC order is not appealable by the prosecution under
III.
We agree that in
Oshiro,
the prosecution conceded it could not appeal under
Despite the absence of a judgment and sentence, it was pointed out in
Oshiro
that “[b]eeause [the] State cannot appeal the granting of a DANC plea and possesses no other adequate legal remedy, this case may be decided pursuant to
Jurisdiction and powers. The supreme court shall have jurisdiction and powers as follows:
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(4) To exercise original jurisdiction in all questions arising under writs directed to courts of inferior jurisdiction and returnable before the supreme court, or if the supreme court consents to receive the ease arising under writs of mandamus directed to public officers to compel them to fulfill the duties of their offices; and such other original jurisdiction as may be expressly conferred by law[.]
But Defendant did not assert that jurisdiction over his DANC plea order lies in
In his jurisdictional statement, Defendant discloses that he could have, but did not seek interlocutory certification of the de
nial
IV.
Appeals from judgments entered pursuant to conditional pleas are permitted pursuant to HRPP Rule 11(a)(2). A conditional plea is an exception to the general rule precluding nonjurisdictional appeals after a guilty or a no contest plea:
“Generally, a guilty plea made voluntarily and intelligently precludes a defendant from later asserting any nonjurisdictional claims on appeal, including constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings.” State v. Morin, 71 Haw. 159, 162, 785 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1990) (citations omitted). “An exception to this general rule precluding nonjurisdictional appeals after a guilty plea is a plea conditioned upon the right to appeal certain pretrial rulings.” [Id.] at 162, 785 P.2d at 1319. “In some jurisdictions, conditional pleas are authorized by rule or statute,” while “most states require a defendant to plead not guilty and to go to trial in order to preserve his or her right to appeal nonjurisdictional issues.” Id. . . . (citations omitted).[ 5 ]
State v. Domingo, 82 Hawai‘i 265, 267, 921 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1996) (brackets omitted) (emphasis added). See State v. Lei, 95 Hawai‘i 43, 47, 18 P.3d 905, 909 (2001). HRPP Rule 11(a)(2) provides as follows:
With the approval of the court and the consent of the State, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(Emphases added.)
HRPP Rule 11(a) has the force and effect of law.
See Domingo,
82 Hawai‘i at 269 n. 6, 921 P.2d at 1170 n. 6. Inasmuch as “HRPP Rule 11(a)(2) is substantively identical to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) Rule ll(a)(2)[,]”
Lei,
95 Hawai‘i at 47-48, 18 P.3d at 909-10, we may consider federal authority in interpreting HRPP Rule 11(a)(2). According to the Advisory Committee Notes on the
While it is true that the conditional plea does not have the complete finality of the traditional plea of guilty or nolo contende-re because “the essence of the agreement is that the legal guilt of the defendant exists only if the prosecution’s case” survives on appeal, the plea continues to serve a partial state interest in finality, however, by establishing admission of the defendant’s factual guilt. The defendant stands guilty and the proceedings come to an end if the reserved issue is ultimately decided in the government’s favor.
Id.
(emphasis added). We observe, also, that in the ease where the pretrial motion seeks to suppress the evidence incriminating the defendant and the appeal is decided against the government, the proceedings would also ordinarily come to an end,
6
the question ap
pealed
V.
As related
supra,
at the time the court received the conditional plea, it did so “without prejudice” to a DANC plea motion and subsequently granted the motion pursuant to HRS chapter 853.
But if the motion is granted, acceptance of the plea is then deferred.
See
In enacting HRS chapter 853, the legislature found “that in certain criminal eases, particularly those involving first time, accidental, or situational offenders, it is in the best interest of the prosecution and the defendant that the defendant be given the opportunity to keep his or her record free of a criminal conviction, if he or she can comply with certain terms and conditions during a period designated by court order.” 1976 Haw. Sess. L. Act 154, § 2, at 279 (emphasis added). Therefore, “the purpose of HRS chapter 853 was to establish a means whereby a court in its discretion may defer acceptance of a guilty plea for a certain period on certain conditions.” Id. The legislature further explained that “the completion of such period in compliance with such conditions may then result in the discharge of the defendant and ex-pungement of the matter from his or her record.” Id. The effect of a DAGP was, thus, to enable a defendant to retain a “record free of a criminal conviction’’ by deferring a guilty plea for a designated period and imposing special conditions which the defendant was to successfully complete. Id. (emphasis added).
Putnam, 93 Hawai’i at 367-68, 3 P.3d at 1244-45 (brackets omitted).
Under the foregoing procedure, there has been no plea entered for purposes of HRPP
Moreover, nothing in HRS chapter 853 allows the reservation and appeal of adverse pretrial rulings during the pendency of the deferral period. By invoking chapter 853, a defendant enters an unconditional and unqualified plea, waiving all nonjurisdictional defenses, in the hope of removing a criminal charge from his or her record. The requirement in
Your Committee received testimony that many individuals have caused the State to proceed through an entire trial and, subsequent to the presentation of the defenseease, enter a plea of guilty and ask for and receive a DAG plea.
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Your Committee finds that allowing DAG pleas only prior to trial would certainly eliminate a considerable amount of extra cost and would provide for a more meaningful plea bargaining arrangement. . . .
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Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 671, in 1979 House Journal, at 1476-77.
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Your Committee is of the distinct view that the DAG plea should not be available to the person who is convinced of his [or her\ own guilt, but who would like to chance a trial to see if he [or she] can “get away with it” and who would use the DAG plea at the very last minute when that wrongful hope has been dispelled. We expect that our criminal justice system will have availed every accused sufficient time to obtain counsel or otherwise evaluate his [or her] circumstances prior to commencement of trial. With such commencement begins the imposition upon witnesses and the court, and the accrual of public expense for the cost of trial. Accordingly, we feel it is proper that the availability of the DAG plea should terminate with the commencement of trial when the prosecution presents its first witness....
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No, 855, in 1979 Senate Journal, at 1384-85.
State v. Matyas, 10 Haw.App. 31, 38-39, 859 P.2d 1380, 1384, cert. denied, 75 Haw. 581, 863 P.2d 989 (1993) (emphasis added).
Were we to consider an appeal from the conditional plea while the deferral period is pending, as it is here, we would undermine the objectives served by that plea and circumvent the intent of the DANC plea order. To permit an appeal during the deferral period would be inconsistent with the objective of the deferral plea statute—that is, to grant special dispensation to certain conviction free defendants who have waived their nonjuris-dictional rights in the hope that completion of special conditions will result in a dismissal of the charge.
On the other hand, HRPP
We believe that the entry of both a deferral order under HRS chapter 853 and a conditional plea under HRPP
VI.
In Baranco, this court applied the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule to a criminal case.
Under this exception, certain orders fall “in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”
77 Hawai‘i at 353, 884 P.2d at 731 (quoting
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). Accordingly, “an interlocutory order is appealable if it: (1) fully
We could assert supervisory jurisdiction under
Notes
. Pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(b)(5), Defendant timely moved for and was granted a thirty-day extension of time until May 30, 2000 to appeal the March 28, 2000 order. The notice of appeal was filed timely by Defendant on May 30, 2000.
. In
Bikle,
this court denied the prosecution’s appeal of an order granting a conditional discharge pursuant to
. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, the object of which is not to cure a mere legal error or to serve as a substitute for appeal, but to restrain a judge of an inferior court from acting beyond or in excess of his [or her] jurisdiction.... Only where special circumstances are shown to exist which render the matter a rare and exceptional case will this court, in its discretion, consider deviating from [its] settled rule.
Wolfe v. Au, 67 Haw. 259, 262-63, 686 P.2d 16, 20 (1984) (citations omitted).
. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates: (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief; and (2) a lack of other means to adequately redress the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Such writs are not meant to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they meant to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures. Where a trial court has discretion to act, mandamus clearly will not lie to interfere with or control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before the court in which it is subject to a legal duty to act.
State ex rel. Kaneshiro v. Huddy, 82 Hawai‘i 188, 193, 921 P.2d 108, 113, reconsideration denied, 82 Hawai‘i 360, 922 P.2d 973 (1996) (citing Straub Clinic & Hosp. v. Kochi, 81 Hawai’i 410, 414, 917 P.2d 1284, 1288 (1996) (internal citations omitted)).
. “A plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty in terms of waiving alleged nonju-risdictional defects.” State v. Morin, 71 Haw. 159, 162, 785 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1990) (citations omitted).
. HRPP
. The three preconditions enumerated in
(1)When a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere, prior to commencement of trial, to a felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor;
(2) It appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct; and
(3) The ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law.
. The collateral order doctrine would not apply to an order granting or denying a motion for plea deferral since the motion follows the entry of a plea in which a defendant waives all “important rights” prior to a final judgment.
. It has been suggested that “any attempt to fit the collateral order doctrine within [