State v. KarsonState v. Karson
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A nоw deceased David Karson appealed his drug convictions, claiming the incriminating evidence found in his car should have been suppressed because it was illegally obtained after his arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant. At the time of his arrest, state law authоrized a search incident to arrest for the purpose of “discovering the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of a crime.” (Emphasis added.)
Karson argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the drug evidence obtained from the vehicle search, which was prophetically based on an argument that the search incident to arrest was illegal. The State concedes the search was illegal under Gant but asserts we do not need to decide this case because Karson died while the appeal was pending. In the alternative, the State argues application of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule based upon the police officer s objectively reasonable reliance on a then-valid statute. Karson counters that the exception should not apply, in part, because the State did not prove tire officer actually relied on the statute. We affirm Karson s convictions based on our two recent decisions in State v. Dennis, 297 Kan. 229, 300 P.3d 81 (2013), and State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2114 (2011).
Factual and Procedural Background
The facts are not disputed. On March 12, 2007, Karson parked his car at a gas station, where a nearby police officer performed a routine check of the car’s license plate. The officer determined the vehiclе was registered to Karson and that Karson had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. The officer approached Karson, confirmed his identity, and arrested him before securing him in the backseat of a patrol car. The officer then began searching Karson’s vehicle, where drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered. The State charged Karson with one count of possession of cocaine and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.
Karson moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing caselaw precedent limited searches incident to arrest to those circumstances when the officer is searching for evidence related to the crime of arrest. He claimed the 2006 amendment to
Karson appealed his cоnvictions to the Court of Appeals, focusing exclusively on the denial of his suppression motion. Before the appeal was decided, the United States Supreme Court issued Gant, which held that warrantless vehicle searches were unconstitutional unless the arrеstee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search or there is reasonable belief the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest. 556 U.S. at 351. Shortly thereafter, this court decided Henning, which declared
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that although the search was unlawful, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies since tire police officer conducting the search acted in reasonable rebanee on settlеd caselaw. State v. Karson, 44 Kan. App. 2d 306, 314-15, 235 P.3d 1260 (2010). Karson petitioned this court for review, which we granted along with two companion cases involving the same issue but containing differing outcomes and rationales. See State v. Dennis, No. 101,052, 2011 WL 425987 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished decision) (denying application of good-faith exception), rev. granted May 31, 2011; State v. Carlton, No. 103,086, 2010 WL 2817048 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished decision) (reversing district court’s suppression order and applying good-faith exception), rev. granted May 17, 2011.
Karson died while this appeal was pending. The State now argues his death makes our
Karson’s Death Does Not Abate this Appeal
We have previously held that a defendant’s death during the pendency of a direct appeal does not abate the appellate process. In State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 137, 551 P.2d 801 (1976), we determined:
“A defendant’s conviction is at this state in midair. The judgment of conviction is not final due to the pendency of the appeal. While death moots thе sentence, renders impossible a new trial and abates any fine imposed, the matter of costs remain. . . . The family of the defendant and the public have an interest in the final determination of a criminal case.” (Emphasis added.)
This has been a long-standing principle in Kansas. See State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 265, 200 P.3d 464 (2009) (defendant’s death 12 days after his notice of аppeal was filed did not render his direct appeal moot); State v. Burnison, 247 Kan. 19, 32, 795 P.2d 32 (1990) (“[I]n Kansas the death of a defendant does not abate his direct appeal as it is in the interest of the public that the issues raised on appeal be adjudicated upon the merits.”); State v. Ellvin, 51 Kan. 784, Syl. ¶ 1, 33 P. 547 (1893) (court reviewed judgment for costs related to late defendant’s conviction for selling intoxi-eating liquors); State v. Fisher, 37 Kan. 404, 405, 15 P. 606 (1887) (considered merits of case after defendant’s death to resolve issues of costs).
The State points out that when a defendant’s conviction is affirmed on direct appeal and the defendant dies while the case is pending discretionary review, many states dismiss the discretionary appellate proceeding and keep the judgment below intact. See Surland v. State, 392 Md. 17, 19, 895 A.2d 1034 (2006). But in Kansas a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals has the statutory right to petition this court for review.
More importantly, when review was granted, this case and its companions collectively presented questions of public importance because they touch on rights under the Fоurth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights relating to vehicle searches incident to an occupant’s arrest. And Karson’s case is somewhat different factually because it is based solely on a search incident to arrest basеd on an outstanding warrant. In other words, in Karson’s case the officer did not observe prior criminal activity before the arrest. In addition, Karson directly challenged
The Good-faith Exception Applies
Karson argues the evidence obtained by a search later found to be unconstitutional should be suppressed. The State argues the good-faith exception applies, rendering suppression unnecessary. We agree with die State and hold that the good-faith exception applies because an оbjectively reasonable officer could have reasonably relied on
Standard of Review
Our review of an evidence suppression issue is bifurcated. Without reweighing the evidence, the appellate court first examines tire district court’s findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 54, 272 P.3d 34 (2012). The district court’s legal conclusions are then reviewed de novo. If there are no disputed material facts, the issue is a question of law over which the appellate court has unlimited review. 294 Kan. at 54.
Discussion
Warrantless searches are considered unreasonаble and invalid unless they meet one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See 294 Kan. at 55 (citing State v. Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. 1124, 1127, 192 P.3d 171 [2008]). The officer searched Karson’s vehicle incident to his arrest, but as the State concedes that search was later found to be unconstitutional. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351; Henning, 289 Kan. at 148-49. It is the State’s burden to demonstrate a warrant-less search was lawful. Dennis, 297 Kan. 229, Syl. ¶ 2.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule, which was created by the United States Supreme Court tо deter police misconduct. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 251-52, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). Kansas similarly recognizes the exclusionaiy rule in criminal proceedings as an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter violations by the State. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492.
In Daniel, this court considered whether to apply a good-faith exception for warrantless searches incident to arrest authorized by
Karson makes two arguments to avoid application of the good-faith exception. First, he claims that Gant and Henning require suppression based on the doctrine of retroactivity, citing United States v. Gonzales, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). Second, he contends there was no evidence the officer actually relied on
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court made cleаr the good-faith exception is applicable to searches conducted incident to arrest, even if Gant subsequently rendered them illegal. The Court reasoned that Gant rendered the search unconstitutional, but examined whether the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be met by excluding the evidence obtained from the unlawful search. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27. In declining to exclude the evidence, the Davis Court noted that the binding federal court precedent in the jurisdiction in which the search occurred allowed the search. Given the lack of police culpability or evidence of recurring or systemic police negligenсe, the Court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. 131 S. Ct. at 2428-30. Based on Davis, Karson’s first argument that Gant and Henning require suppression is without merit.
Similarly, Karson’s contention that there is no evidence the officer relied on
In Dennis, we recently held that an officer’s subjective understanding or explicit reference to
We see no substantive difference between the officer’s testimony in Dennis and the officer’s testimony аt Karson’s hearing. In both instances it was confirmed the officer was conducting a search incident to arrest, so
Affirmed.