State v. Kamana`oState v. Kamana`o
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Acoba, Nakayama, Duffy, Moon, Levinson
STATE of Hawai`i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
Andrew K. KAMANA`O, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court of Hawai`i.
Mary Ann Barnard, Honolulu, for petitioner/defendant-appellant.
Donn R. Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for respondent/plaintiff-appellee.
NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ.; and MOON, C.J., and LEVINSON, J., Dissenting.
Opinion of the Court by ACOBA, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Andrew K. Kamana`o (Petitioner) seeks review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on January 3, 2008, *725 pursuant to its December 13, 2007 Summary Disposition Order (SDO)[1] affirming the October 16, 2006 amended judgment of the first circuit court[2] (the court) convicting Petitioner of two counts of rape in the first degree, Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-730(1)(a)(i) (1985) (Counts VI and IX); and one count of sodomy in the first degree,
We hold that the ICA did not gravely err in affirming the court‘s judgment because in Petitioner‘s case (1) under
I.
The following matters, some verbatim, are from the application.
Petitioner was convicted on October 13, 1983 of, inter alia, three Class A felonies. As Petitioner states in his application,
[o]n February 18, 1982[,] the [g]rand [j]ury indicted [Petitioner] for 14 counts, including three Class A felony sexual assault charges and three burglary charges. The incidents giving rise to the charges occurred on September 16, 18, and 29, 1981. On October 13, 1983[, Petitioner] was convicted by a jury of the three counts that are the subject of this appeal, two counts of rape in the first degree in violation ofHRS § 707-730 , and one count of sodomy in the first degree in violation ofHRS § 707-733 . All three counts were Class A felonies, requiring a maximum indeterminate prison sentence of 20 years underHRS § 706-659 .[[6]] State v. Kamana`o, 103 Hawai`i 315, 82 P.3d 401 (2003).
(Emphasis added.)
This sentence was subsequently vacated and in April 2004, Petitioner was sentenced *726 to an extended term. As Petitioner alleges in his application,
[his] first sentence was vacated by the [s]upreme [c]ourt based upon a Fifth Amendment violation claim that he was sentenced to an extended term solely on the grounds that he refused to admit guilt. [Kamana`o], 103 Hawai`i [at] 324, 82 P.3d at 410.
Resentencing hearings were held on April 21 and 23, 2004. The [c]ourt granted. . . [the] motion for an extended term [filed by Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai`i (Respondent)] under findings other than [Petitioner‘s] refusal to admit guilt, including psychological harm caused.
On June 21, 2006, the Hawai`i United States district court vacated the extended term sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Petitioner‘s application states that:
The April 2004 sentences were vacated by the United States District Court of the District of Hawai`i on June 21, 2006 under [Apprendi], the “Apprendi rule,” and its progeny. [Petitioner‘s] extended term sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole ([as a multiple offender pursuant toHRS § 706-662(4)(a) & (b)]) was ruled to have been imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution‘s right to a trial by jury.
As recounted by Petitioner, at resentencing, the court adjudged that the rape convictions would be served concurrently, but that the sodomy conviction would run consecutively to the rape convictions.
On October 6, 2006[, Petitioner] was resentenced as to Counts 6, 9, and 11, the three Class A counts. The [c]ourt resentenced [Petitioner] to mixed concurrent and consecutive terms, i.e., concurrent 20-year terms as to counts 9 (rape in the first degree) and 11 (sodomy in the first degree), to be served consecutive to a 20-year term as to count 6 (rape in the first degree), with credit for time served.
(Emphasis added.) As noted previously, the court also imposed mandatory minimum sentences of five years, for each of Counts VI, IX and XI, based on Petitioner‘s status as a repeat offender pursuant to
*727 The court‘s October 16, 2006 amended judgment[8] stated as follows:
MANDATORY MINIMUM: FIVE (5) YEARS FOR Counts VI, IX and XI as a Repeat Offender
INCARCERATION:
TWENTY (20) YEARS for each of COUNTS VI, IX and XI.
COUNTS IX AND XI to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to COUNT VI.
Said terms are to run concurrently with Cr. No. 52291.
Defendant is to receive credit for time already served. Mittimus to issue forthwith
OTHER: DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT (CIV. NO. 05-00681 SOM-KSC) FILED JUNE 22, 2006.
(Counts I and II: Severed)
[(]Counts IV, V and XIII: Dismissed)
[(]Counts III, VII, VIII, X, XII and XIV: Terms of incarceration have been completed)
Defendant shall provide specimen samples and print impressions as required by H.R.S. Chap. 844D
(Emphases added.) (Capitalization in original.)
The seeming conflict between the concurrent sentencing ordered by the court pursuant to
(1) The circuit court was not statutorily barred from imposing consecutive terms. Consecutive terms were authorized byHRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3), as amended in 1981.
(2) Imposition of consecutive sentences was pursuant toHRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3) and was not in violation of federal due process or ex post facto.HRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3) provided adequate notice. See State v. Vinge, 81 Hawai`i 309, 321, 916 P.2d 1210, 1222 (1996).
(3) The consecutive terms were not inconsistent with the District Court‘s order or Apprendi. State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai`i 267, 141 P.3d 440 (2006).
SDO at 5.
II.
Petitioner presents the following questions in his Application.
*728 1. Did the ICA gravely err in holding that the pertinent repeat offender statute,HRS § 706-606.5(1) and (3), permitted consecutive maximum terms when the plain meaning of that provision is that it only provides for consecutive mandatory minimum terms for repeat offenders, and not for consecutive maximum terms?
2. Did the ICA gravely err in upholding a new judicial construction that allows consecutive maximum term sentencing, which was expressly forbidden under the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses, as a violation the due process and ex post facto provisions of the federal and Hawai`i constitutions?
Petitioner does not present argument with respect to paragraph (3) of the ICA‘s SDO pertaining to Apprendi, and, thus, that holding is not discussed. Cf. Hill v. Inouye, 90 Hawai`i 76, 82, 976 P.2d 390, 396 (1998) (“The general rule provides that `[i]ssues not properly raised on appeal will be deemed to be waived.‘” (Quoting Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 613, 837 P.2d 1247, 1268 (1992).) (Brackets in original.))
III.
On February 12, 2008, Respondent filed a response to the Application. Essentially the response reiterates its Answering Brief arguments. See infra. It repeats Respondent‘s position that
[(1)] The “mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment” proscribed inHRS § 706-606.5 were part of the statutorily mandated indeterminate terms of imprisonment for the enumerated crimes and not sentences unto themselves. See State v. Feliciano, 107 Hawai`i 469, 503, 115 P.3d 648, 682 (2005) (Acoba, J., dissenting). Therefore, the “sentences” referred to inHRS § 706-606.5(3) that could result from the application of the statute were the “enhanced criminal sentences” that consisted of the indeterminate terms of imprisonment for the underlying crime and the “mandatory minimum period of imprisonment” that directed “how a certain period of the indeterminate term was to be served.” [Id.]
. . . .
[(2)] . . . [T]he [court‘s] authority to order Petitioner to serve the sentences consecutively derived from the clear and unambiguous language ofHRS § 706-606.5 .. . .
. . . .
[(3)] . . . [A]s far back as his original sentencing hearing in 1984, the precedent regarding statutory construction was well settled and made the imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant toHRS § 706-606.5 foreseeable[ ] . . . [and, thus Petitioner] does not demonstrate the . . . consecutive sentences [were] without “fair warning” or a “judicial expansion of his penal liability.”
(Brackets and footnote omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
IV.
A.
As to his first question, Petitioner argues that “[w]ith no explanation of its reasoning, the ICA held that the repeat offender statute applicable to the offenses in 1981,
Petitioner states that
However, Petitioner maintains (1) that “[t]he plain and obvious meaning of this statute[,
Further, Petitioner contends (2) “as a matter of law . . . concurrent maximum terms do not contradict consecutive minimum terms.” (Boldfaced font omitted.) Pointing to the instant case, he argues:
TheHRS § 706-668 bar to consecutive sentencing in multiple count indictments would not stop the sentencing court from sentencing [Petitioner] to 4 consecutive 5-year mandatory minimum terms, requiring him to serve the entire 20 year maximum without possibility of parole. The fact that 4 consecutive mandatory minimum sentences in [Petitioner‘s] case would have led to a mandatory 20 out of 20 years, in fact is the exact amount of time without parole the prosecutor requested at the initial sentencing hearing in 1984. The prosecutor said, “. . . if there could be some [guarantee] that he would be out of the community for that 20 years, then [Respondent] might consider asking for the 20 *730 years.” [Kamanao], 103 Hawai`i [at] 317, 82 P.3d [at] 403.
(Emphasis added.) According to Petitioner, this is because
[w]here the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, as “repeal by implication is disfavored.” State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 330, 984 P.2d 78, 89 (1999) (quoting State v. Vallesteros, 84 Hawai`i 295, 303, 933 P.2d 623[632], 640 (1997); State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 19 n. 16, 904 P.2d 893, 904 n. 16 (1995) (further citations omitted)).
Petitioner argues (3) that “[t]here is an irreconcilable conflict between
B.
In its Answering Brief Respondent first argued that the specific sentencing provisions of
Second, Respondent argues that “[t]he clause `notwithstanding . . . any other law to the contrary’ [in]
V.
A.
With respect to Petitioner‘s argument (1) that
*731 In this regard,
With respect to “overlapping” and Petitioner‘s argument (3),
Although
B.
In this regard and with respect to Petitioner‘s argument (2),
“It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject.” Id. Thus, “[l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai`i 20, 31, 979 P.2d 1046, 1057 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation-omitted).
Reading the statutes in pari materia, it is manifest that
Because a person convicted of a class A felony such as rape must be sentenced to a twenty-year indeterminate term under
A mandatory minimum sentence imposed as a result of a conviction is not another “offense.” ...
... The mandatory sentence, although allowed to be imposed with the indeterminate term, does not exceed that term, but only directs how a certain period of the indeterminate term is to be served, in this case, mandating that Defendant be imprisoned for a least three years out of the indeterminate term....
Hence, Defendant is not punished twice for the same act; he is punished once, the mandatory minimum indicating how he must serve the initial part of his sentence. In effect, the mandatory minimum, then, is a restriction on the parole board‘s discretion on setting the mandatory minimum sentence a convicted person must serve. SeeHRS § 706-656 (1993 & Supp.2004.)
Feliciano, 107 Hawai`i at 503, 115 P.3d at 682 (Acoba, J., dissenting).[17]
This is also reflected in the effect the sentences would have on the availability of parole.
“the seriousness of class A felonies ... merits mandatory imprisonment. This bill effects this purpose by denying suspension of sentence and probation as sentencing options in class A convictions, but retains, through indeterminate sentence, the option of parole by the paroling authority in order *734 that unusual extenuating circumstances can be given due consideration.”
Commentary on
Additionally, reading the statutes to allow the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum sentences in conjunction with mandatory minimum sentences would comport with the legislative intent. For example, if a defendant were sentenced to consecutive five-year mandatory minimum terms on six Class A felony counts, the combined mandatory minimum term would be thirty years. However, the indeterminate maximum term for each individual Class A felony would be twenty years. Thus, if the indeterminate maximums were served concurrently, they would be shorter than the combined mandatory minimum terms. Contrastingly, reading
Under the reading espoused by Justice Levinson‘s dissent, there is no relationship between the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment and the correlative indeterminate maximum sentences. This is inconsistent with the dissent‘s own rationale, which relies on the premise that minimum and maximum terms are defined by their relation to one another. See Levinson, J., dissenting at ___, 188 P.3d at 751 (agreeing “that a mandatory minimum prison term is subsumed within an indeterminate maximum prison term” (citations omitted)). Such an interpretation of
Moreover, Justice Levinson‘s solution to the hypothetical problem of consecutive mandatory minimum terms that would run longer than the concurrent indeterminate maximum terms, i.e., releasing the defendant at the expiration of the latter, see Levinson, J., dissenting at ___ _ ___, n. 3, 188 P.3d at 752, n. 3, is incompatible with the purposes of the penal code. The purpose of mandatory minimum terms in the case of multiple offenses is to guarantee that a defendant is punished more severely if he or she demonstrates repeated inability to abide by the law. See State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 131, 706 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1985) (“What is quite evident from the history is a growing legislative concern with the problem of recidivism in crime.“) Releasing a defendant “early” because the concurrent indeterminate maximum terms expired, as the dissent suggests, but whose criminal activity warranted more severe punishment, undermines the legislative intent of allowing sentencing courts to impose mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment consecutively under
Pursuant to
The disposition suggested herein draws the parameters for imposing consecutive mandatory minimum sentences. By statute, the sentencing courts and the HPA retain broad discretion to set sentences that are appropriate under the given circumstances of each case on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Sinagoga, 81 Hawai`i 421, 427, 918 P.2d 228, 234 (App.1996) (affirming the imposition of consecutive indeterminate terms pursuant to
At oral argument, Petitioner referred to Keawe v. State, 79 Hawai`i 281, 282, 901 P.2d 481, 482 (1995), in which the defendant was charged with fourteen Class C felony counts. Petitioner hypothesized that, had the sentencing court imposed consecutive mandatory minimum terms and hence, resulting consecutive indeterminate maximum terms on all fourteen counts, the result would have been an indeterminate maximum term of seventy years and a mandatory minimum term of forty-two years. MP3: Oral Argument, Hawai`i Supreme Court, at 9:05 to 10:11 (June 5, 2008) available at http://www. state.hi.us/jud/oa/08/SCOA_ XXXXXX_XXXXX. mp3/2-line.mp3 However, this arguably excessive hypothetical sentence, as are all sentences, would be subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. Putnam, 93 Hawai`i 362, 372, 3 P.3d 1239, 1249 (2000) (“The applicable standard of review in sentencing matters is whether the court committed a plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its decision.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also People v. Alexander, 234 Mich.App. 665, 599 N.W.2d 749, 756 (1999) (“An abuse of discretion may be found where a sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)). Although the discretion of the sentencing court and the HPA is broad, it is not unlimited, and the appellate courts retain the authority to review extraordinary sentences for an abuse of that discretion on a case-by-case basis.
Manifestly, the sentencing court‘s discretion includes the discretion to run some mandatory minimum sentences consecutively and others concurrently under
Because it appears that Justice Levinson‘s argument does not comport with the statutes involved, it follows that the call to overrule State v. Saufua, 67 Haw. 616, 699 P.2d 988 (1985), is incorrect. Applicable to this case, Saufua implicitly held that, under
On appeal, this court considered the question of “whether the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of [HRS]
In answering the question on appeal, the Saufua court said that
[t]he mandatory minimum sentencing provisions are intended to apply to sentences imposed for the underlying subsequent conviction which triggered application of the statute. Logically, the required period of unparoled imprisonment is subsumed within the maximum sentence imposed for that offense. This is in harmony with the statutory scheme. The consecutive sentencing language ofHRS § 706-606.5 necessarily must be read to allow the sentence on the underlying offense to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the prior offense or offenses.
Id. at 619, 699 P.2d at 991 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). Thus, in Saufua, this court had already determined that where mandatory minimum sentences were involved, the maximum punishment available was the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum terms. If the sentencing court increased the severity of the punishment by imposing a mandatory minimum term, it had to be done in a way that would not exceed the consecutive indeterminate sentences. In that regard, this court indicated that if lengthier sentences were sought to be imposed, the sentencing court would have to resort to the enhanced sentencing statutes,
Justice Levinson “do[es] not ... agree with the Saufua court‘s conclusion that
C.
Somewhat analogously,[19] this court recently held that the “notwithstanding ... any other law to the contrary” clause in
contended that the circuit court should have sentenced her to a five-year term of probation pursuant toHRS § 706-622.5 ,... arguing that, as evidenced by the statute‘s plain language and the legislative history,HRS § 706-622.5 overrides the repeat offender statute, as set forth inHRS § 706-606.5 . Smith further asserted that any ambiguity with respect to the application ofHRS §§ 706-622.5 and -606.5 should be resolved in favor of lenity.
Id. at 232, 81 P.3d at 412 (emphasis added). However, the circuit court concluded that “when the legislature provided for treatment for first-time drug offenders, [it] did not mean to preclude the application of repeat offender sentencing.” Id.
On appeal, to reiterate, this court affirmed that
In the present matter,HRS § 706-606.5(1) states that the repeat offender statute applies “notwithstanding ... any other law to the contrary....” ... AlthoughHRS § 706-622.5 does contain a similar phrase, the language of the first-time drug offender statute, as compared to the foregoing wording of the repeat offender statute, is markedly narrower in scope: “Notwithstanding any penalty or sentencing provision under part IV of chapter 712....” ... Thus, inasmuch as the plain and unambiguous language ofHRS § 706-606.5 requires application of the repeat offender statute over “any other law to the contrary,” we hold that the circuit court did not err in sentencing Smith as a repeat offender pursuant toHRS § 706-606.5 . Furthermore, we hold that, in all cases in whichHRS § 706-606.5 is applicable, ... the circuit courts must sentence defendants pursuant to the provisions ofHRS § 706-606.5 .
Id. (brackets omitted) (emphases added).[20] The case now before us falls squarely within the category of cases in which
Hence, to repeat, by virtue of the directive “notwithstanding ... any other law” present in
VI.
Chief Justice Moon‘s dissent disagrees with the conclusion that “under [HRS]
Initially, it must be noted that Petitioner did not raise this issue to this court or to the ICA. Thus, it may only be considered under the doctrine of plain error.[21]See Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40.1 (providing that, when an issue is not presented in accordance with the appellate rules, this court, “at its option, may notice a plain error not presented“); see also Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(b) (2007) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.“).
However, the Chief Justice has not offered any basis for taking notice under the plain error rule. Moreover, because none of the parties raised plain error here or below there is no discernible argument on this point for this court to review. See Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Bartolome, 94 Hawai`i 422, 435, 16 P.3d 827, 840 (App.2000) (concluding that appellants made no discernible argument because “[t]hey cite[d] no apposite authority and [made] no coherent argument on the issue from cognizable precedent” (citing HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) (1999))). But, to the extent that this proposition is raised, it must be respectfully disagreed that Tavares[22] prohibits *740 the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum terms of imprisonment.
VII.
A.
The defendant in Tavares had been previously charged with two counts of burglary in a single indictment (the 1975 burglaries). 63 Haw. at 510, 630 P.2d at 634-35. He pled guilty and judgment was entered on both counts in 1975. Id. at 510, 630 P.2d at 635. Subsequently, the defendant was charged with a single count of burglary (1979 burglary) and convicted. Id. at 510, 630 P.2d at 634. At defendant‘s sentencing for the 1979 burglary, the sentencing court determined that the defendant had two prior convictions, i.e., the two 1975 burglaries. Id. at 510, 630 P.2d at 635. The sentencing court then decided that the 1979 burglary conviction was the defendant‘s third conviction, such that, under
On appeal, the defendant argued that the two counts from the 1975 burglary should have been considered a single conviction for purposes of
Thus, the issue before the Tavares court was “whether a conviction on the second count of a two-count indictment constitutes a separate conviction under Hawaii‘s repeat offender *741 statute[.]” Id. at 509, 630 P.2d at 634. Ultimately, this court agreed with that position and held “that convictions on several counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purposes of [HRS § ] 706-606.5(1).” Id. at 515, 630 P.2d at 637.
B.
The Chief Justice maintains that pursuant to Tavares, Counts VI, IX, and XI in the instant case constitute a single conviction for purposes of
VIII.
A.
As to item (1), because Petitioner was charged with the pertinent two counts of rape and single count of sodomy in the same indictment, his convictions on those three counts would constitute a single conviction for purposes of the repeat offender statute under Tavares. See Tavares, 63 Haw. at 515, 630 P.2d at 637. Petitioner had one prior felony conviction (the firearm conviction) and therefore, for purposes of determining the applicable mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to
However, that is not what happened in this case. Consistent with Tavares, Petitioner was, in fact, sentenced to five-year mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for the crimes consistent with a second conviction (taking all three counts as comprising one conviction). The court did not impose any ten-year mandatory minimum terms, which could only be imposed upon a third conviction as defined by Tavares. Thus, Petitioner‘s sentence did not violate the rule set forth in Tavares.
Manifestly, Tavares did not expressly consider the treatment of individual sentences for each count in a multicount indictment. In that case, because the defendant‘s second conviction was comprised of only a single count of burglary, he was subject to only one mandatory term of imprisonment. Thus, the Tavares court did not have occasion to address whether a defendant whose second or third felony conviction arose from a multicount indictment would be subject to multiple mandatory minimum terms pursuant to
Nevertheless, the dissent contends that because, “in the present case, [C]ounts [VI], [IX], and [XI] constitute one conviction,” Petitioner was subject only “to a single five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment....” Moon, C.J., dissenting at ___, 188 P.3d at 747 (first emphasis in original) (second emphasis added). Insofar as this implies that the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment does not apply to each count comprising a second or third felony conviction under
*742 Consequently, when a repeat offender is convicted of multiple offenses enumerated in the same charging document, he or she is subject to distinct sentences addressed to each count. If the defendant was a repeat offender under
B.
As additional support for the argument that indeterminate maximum terms for individual counts of a single conviction cannot be run consecutively to each other, the Chief Justice relies on Cornelio. Respectfully, this reliance on Cornelio is misplaced.
The question presented in Cornelio was “whether ... the sentencing court properly ran [Cornelio‘s] mandatory minimum sentences imposed under
But significantly, the version of
In Cornelio, this court explained the implications of the prior version of
IX.
As to item (2), the Chief Justice‘s dissent disregards the explicit provision in
X.
As to item (3), the mandatory minimum terms imposed pursuant to
XI.
A.
Finally, the Chief Justice dissents from the conclusion that Petitioner‘s mandatory minimum terms for Counts VI, IX, and XI could be run consecutively to each other. Moon, C.J., dissenting at ___, 188 P.3d at 747. The Chief Justice argues that
mandatory minimums for multiple counts in one indictment like indeterminate maximum terms must also be served concurrently under the holding in Tavares. Stated differently, the mandatory minimums underHRS § 706-606.5 can run consecutive[ly] to only the sentence for the prior [conviction] under Tavares’ definition of conviction. Thus, applying Tavares to the present case, Counts [VI], [IX], and [XI] constitute one conviction, thereby subjecting [Petitioner] to a single five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment (as a second time offender underHRS § 706-606.5(1)(a) , the first [conviction] being his prior firearms conviction).
Id. at ___, 188 P.3d at 748.
With all due respect, this position suffers from the same defects as that dissent‘s arguments related to the manner in which Petitioner‘s indeterminate maximum terms must be served. First, it extends the holding of Tavares to an issue not addressed by that opinion. The Tavares court‘s inquiry was limited to the appropriate method of calculating the number of convictions a particular defendant had for purposes of determining whether that defendant should be sentenced as a second time offender or a third time offender under the repeat offender statute. Thus, the holding in Tavares is not related to the issue of how mandatory minimum terms imposed pursuant to the repeat offender statute should be served.
B.
Second, this position flies in the face of the plain language of
XII.
As to the second question, Petitioner reiterates that “application of [the court‘s] incorrect construction requires that
violated the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the *745 United States Constitution as a retroactive expansion of the scope of [Petitioner‘s] criminal liability in violation of the ex post facto clause under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 10, [c]lause 1, ... [inasmuch as t]he ex post facto clause “is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir.2002).
(Brackets omitted.) He asserts that “the statute in effect at the time of the offenses allowed only concurrent maximum terms, and disallowed consecutive terms except those committed while incarcerated. Thus the ... [statutory] construction that allowed consecutive sentencing increased the punishment retroactively[.]” Petitioner maintains that “[u]nder the law in place at the time of his offenses, he could not be re-sentenced to consecutive maximum terms of 20 years each for his 3 Class A ... convictions[,] ... his sentence must be vacated and the [c]ourt ordered to resentence [Petitioner] to concurrent 20-year terms as to Counts 6, 9, and 11.” This argument, of course, rests on the premise that
Based on the foregoing, the ICA‘s January 3, 2008 judgment is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion by MOON, C.J.
I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that, (1) under Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS)
Preliminarily, I note my agreement with Justice Levinson that, based on its plain language, ”
I believe this court‘s holding in State v. Tavares, 63 Haw. 509, 630 P.2d 633 (1981), underscores the correctness of Justice Levinson‘s position. In Tavares, this court was confronted with “whether a conviction on the second count of a two-count indictment constitute[d] a separate conviction” under
*746 Althoughsection 706-606.5(1) is explicit in delineating terms of imprisonment, the statute is ambiguous as to whether one conviction can be considered to have occurred “after” another conviction where both have been rendered simultaneously in the same trial. One possible interpretation is that the legislature intended that each felony offense be committed after conviction for the preceding felony to warrant increased criminal penalties. Under this interpretation, convictions on several counts of an indictment which occur during the same trial would not be totalled [sic] up, but treated as “one” prior conviction. Another possible interpretation of the language of the statute is that a conviction on each count of an indictment represents a separate conviction for the purposes of adding up the number of convictions for sentencing. Under this interpretation, each conviction on a separate count would result in an enhanced criminal sentence.
Id. at 511-12, 630 P.2d at 635. The Tavares court ultimately held that “convictions on several counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purposes of
I am cognizant that this court subsequently criticized the Tavares court‘s reasoning in State v. Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i 476, 935 P.2d 1021 (1997). I emphasize, however, that it did not overrule Tavares. In Cornelio, this court pointed out that:
Notwithstanding its attractiveness as a policy matter, the Tavares analysis disregarded the very rules of statutory construction that it purported to apply. In particular, the Tavares court was able to perceive ambiguity in the plain meaning ofHRS § 706-606.5 only by pointedly ignoring the statute‘s proviso that “the sentencing court may impose the mandatory minimum prison sentences prescribed therein consecutive to any other sentence then imposed on the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) In the face of the proviso, the only “possible interpretation” of the repeat offender statute was that “a conviction on each count of an indictment represents a separate conviction for the purposes of adding up the number of convictions for sentencing,” such that “each conviction on a separate count could result in an enhanced criminal sentence.” See Tavares, 63 Haw. at 512, 630 P.2d at 635. Had it therefore adhered to the “basic tenet of statutory interpretation” that “where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, construction by the court is inappropriate, and the court is bound to give effect to the law, according to its plain and obvious meaning,” see id. at 511, 630 P.2d at 635, the Tavares court could not have “looked beyond the express language of the statute to the case law of other jurisdictions,” as “extrinsic aids to its construction,” for the purpose of holding that “convictions on several counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purposes ofsection 706-606.5(1) .” See id. at 511-12, 515, 630 P.2d at 635-37.
84 Hawai`i at 491, 935 P.2d at 1036 (original brackets, ellipses, and footnotes omitted) (emphases in original). In not expressly overruling Tavares, the Cornelio court observed that the legislature, in 1986, had amended
In my view, the holding in Tavares that multiple counts in one indictment constitute a single conviction was consistent with
In light of the holding in Tavares concerning multiple counts/one conviction, I depart from the majority‘s and Justice Levinson‘s apparent belief that Kamanao‘s five-year mandatory minimum term for each of the three counts could be run consecutively. The majority suggests that
Lastly, I depart from Justice Levinson‘s dissent with regard to State v. Saufua, 67 Haw. 616, 699 P.2d 988 (1985), inasmuch as I believe it is inapplicable to the instant case. In Saufua, the circuit court, after revoking probation, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of twenty and ten years for the prior offenses and imposed the statutory maximum ten-year sentence for the subsequent underlying offense to be served consecutively. 67 Haw. at 617, 699 P.2d at 989. The circuit court also sentenced the defendant to a three year mandatory minimum term under the repeat offender statute to run consecutively with the subsequent offense sentence. Id. Thus, the sole inquiry before the Saufua court was “whether the mandatory minimum term may be tacked as a consecutive sentence to that imposed for the underlying subsequent offense.” Id. at 617, 699 P.2d at 990. The court answered in the negative, reasoning that, to permit the mandatory minimum term to be tacked as a consecutive sentence, “[t]he court in effect extended the maximum sentence by three years without compliance with the extended term provisions.” Id. at 619, 699 P.2d at 991. This court further reasoned that:
The mandatory minimum sentencing provisions are intended to apply to sentences imposed for the underlying subsequent conviction which triggered application of the statute. Logically, the required period of unparoled imprisonment is subsumed within the maximum sentence imposed for that offense. This is in harmony with the statutory scheme. The consecutive sentence language ofHRS § 706-606.5 necessarily must be read to allow the sentence on the underlying offense to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the prior offense or offenses.
Id. at 619-20, 699 P.2d at 991 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). Justice Levinson, however, believes, based upon the above statements particularly, the underscored sentence, that this court declared that:
[T]he circuit court had the authority, pursuant toHRS § 706-606.5(3) , particularly the statute‘s “consecutive sentencing language,” to set the indeterminate maximum... sentence [for] the underlying offense[ ] to run consecutively with the indeterminate maximum ... sentence ... for the prior ... offenses[ ]. It would follow from the logic of Saufua, then, that, in the present matter,HRS § 706-606.5(3) likewise authorized the circuit court to set Kamanao‘s indeterminate maximum sentence for his sodomy conviction to run consecutively with his indeterminate maximum sentences for rape[.]
Dissenting Op. at ___, 188 P.3d at 751 (citation omitted). Likewise, the majority contends that, “in Saufua, this court has already determined that[,] where mandatory minimum sentences were involved, the maximum punishment available was the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum terms.” Majority Op. at ___, 188 P.3d at 736. I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s and Justice Levinson‘s reading of Saufua. In my view, the above underscored statement made in Saufua clearly relates to sentences imposed for the underlying offense (that caused the probation to be revoked) and the prior offense. In other words, the Saufua court believed that
In this case, Kamanao‘s sodomy and rape convictions were part of his underlying offenses; *749 his prior offense concerned felony firearms violation, which according to defense counsel at oral argument was sentenced separate from and prior to the sentencing for the underlying offenses. Unlike Saufua, the issue in Kamanao‘s case involved solely the sentencing of the underlying offenses (not the sentencing of both the underlying and the prior offenses). I, therefore, believe that Saufua is distinguishable from, and inapplicable to, the instant case.
Based upon the foregoing, I join Justice Levinson‘s dissent to the extent that it concludes the circuit court erred in imposing consecutive indeterminate maximum terms of imprisonment. Further, to the extent that the majority and Justice Levinson appear to approve consecutive mandatory minimum sentencing for multiple counts arising from a single indictment, I disagree. Accordingly, I would vacate the ICA‘s January 3, 2008 judgment and the circuit court‘s October 16, 2006 amended judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for re-sentencing.
Dissenting Opinion by LEVINSON, J.
I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the circuit court correctly ordered the defendant-appellant-petitioner Andrew Kamana`o to serve the indeterminate maximum terms of his first degree rape and sodomy sentences consecutively, because, in my view, Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS)
The circuit court did not, however, run all of the sentences concurrently. Instead, it ordered that the two rape sentences run concurrently with each other, but consecutively with the sodomy sentence. The majority accepts the position advanced by the plaintiff-appellee-respondent State of Hawai`i [hereinafter, “the prosecution“] that the circuit court had the authority to impose indeterminate maximum sentences consecutively pursuant to the plain language of
(1) Notwithstanding [HRS § ]706-669 and any other law to the contrary, any person convicted under ... [HRS § ]707-730 relating to rape[ or HRS § ]707-733 relating to sodomy in the first degree ..., who has a prior conviction for any of the above enumerated offenses ..., within the time of the maximum sentence of the prior conviction, shall be sentenced for each conviction after the first conviction to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without the possibility of parole during such period as follows:
(a) Second conviction-5 years;
....
(3) The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any *750 other sentence then ... imposed on the defendant....
The majority essentially contends that the “sentences” referenced in paragraph (3) included the indeterminate maximum terms corresponding to each mandatory minimum. See majority opinion at ___ _ ___, 188 P.3d at 730-33.[1] However, this court has construed the “above sentences” as those located textually above paragraph (3), including the sentence set forth in paragraph (1), which called for “a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without the possibility of parole,” as well as the sentence prescribed by
Nevertheless, the majority asserts that
The majority is correct that this court‘s three-and-a-half page decision in State v. Saufua, 67 Haw. 616, 699 P.2d 988 (1985), supports its interpretation of
The mandatory minimum sentencing provisions are intended to apply to sentences imposed for the underlying subsequent conviction which triggered application of the statute. Logically, the required period of unparoled imprisonment is subsumed within the maximum sentence imposed for that offense.... The consecutive sentencing language ofHRS § 706-606.5 necessarily must be read to allow the sentence on the underlying offense to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the prior offense or offenses.
Id. Accordingly, this court concluded that the circuit court had the authority, pursuant to
I do not, however, agree with the Saufua court‘s conclusion that
The plain and unambiguous language of
To be sure, as the majority observes, paragraph (a) of
Unlike Smith, the issue in this case is not whether the
NOTES
[1] The SDO was issued by Presiding Judge Corinne K.A. Watanabe and Associate Judges Daniel R. Foley and Craig H. Nakamura.
[2] The Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presided.
[3] All three terms were to run concurrently with any terms of imprisonment imposed in Cr. No. 52291.
[4] See infra note 7.
[5] See infra note 9.
Notes
[6]
Sentence of imprisonment for class A felony. Notwithstanding
(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.) The current statute is substantially the same as it was in 1993 except that
to allow the court to make an exception for a person convicted of a class A felony defined in chapter 712, part IV, [offenses related to drug and intoxicating compounds,] from the mandatory sentence of an indeterminate term of imprisonment without the possibility of suspension of sentence or probation[ ] . . . allowing judges some discretion in evaluating all appropriate sentencing and treatment alternatives available for drug offenders.
Commentary on
[7] Pertinent to this case,
Sentencing of repeat offenders. (1) Notwithstanding section 706-669 and any other law to the contrary, any person convicted under section. . . 707-730 relating to rape in the first degree, 707-733 relating to sodomy in the first degree,. . . [or] 708-810 relating to burglary in the first degree . . ., who has a prior conviction for any of the above enumerated offenses or of any of those enumerated in subsection (2) in this or another jurisdiction, within the time of the maximum sentence of the prior conviction, shall be sentenced for each conviction after the first conviction to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without possibility of parole during such period as follows:
(a) Second conviction 5 years;
(b) Third conviction 10 years.
(2) ... Section ... 134-9 relating to permits to carry....
(3) The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any other sentence then or previously imposed on the defendant or may impose a lesser mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of parole than that mandated by this section where the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action. . . .
(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.) During Petitioner‘s January 4, 1984 sentencing hearing, the court took judicial notice that Petitioner had been previously convicted for “[c]arrying a [f]irearm on [p]erson [w]ithout [p]ermit or [l]icense pursuant to [s]ection 134-9” and Petitioner did not object. Amendments were made to the statute in 1986 “so that mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment are increased as the severity of the repeat offense increases. Thus the mandatory minimum term for a class A repeat offender is greater than that term for a class B repeat offender.” Commentary on
[8] The judgment filed on October 6, 2006 was amended on October 16, 2006. The October 6, 2006 judgment referred to Counts 1, 2, and 3 for the various police report numbers in the box entitled “REPORT NUMBER(S).” The October 16, 2006 amended judgment corrected those counts to Counts 6, 9, and 11.
[9] With respect to concurrent sentences,
Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall be served concurrently.
(2) If a person who is imprisoned in a correctional institution is convicted of a crime committed while he is imprisoned or during an escape from imprisonment, the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the crime committed during imprisonment or during an escape from imprisonment may be added to the portion of the term which remained unserved at the time of the commission of the crime. For purposes of this section, escape is a crime committed during imprisonment.
(Boldfaced font in original.) (Emphases added.)
[10]
Applicability to offenses committed before the effective date. (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), this Code does not apply to offenses committed before its effective date. Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date are governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Code were not in force. For purposes of this section, an offense is committed before the effective date if any of the elements of the offense occurred before that date.
(2) In any case pending on or commenced after the effective date of this Code, involving an offense committed before that date:
(a) Upon the request of the defendant a defense or mitigation under this Code, whether specifically provided for herein or based upon the failure of the Code to define an applicable offense, shall apply; and
(b) Upon the request of the defendant and the approval of the court:
(i) Procedural provisions of this Code shall apply insofar as they are justly applicable; and
(ii) The court may impose a sentence or suspend imposition of a sentence under the provisions of this Code applicable to the offense and the offender.
(3) Provisions of this Code governing the release or discharge of prisoners, probationers, and parolees shall apply to persons under sentence for offenses committed before the effective date of this Code, except that the minimum or maximum period of their detention or supervision shall in no case be increased, nor shall the provisions of this Code affect the substantive or procedural validity of any judgment of conviction entered before the effective date of this Code, regardless of the fact that appeal time has not run or that an appeal is pending.
(Boldfaced font in original.)
In his Application Petitioner does not state to which particular provision he refers.
[11]
[12] See supra note 7.
[13] Justice Levinson‘s dissent argues that, with this proposition, we “essentially contend[] that the `sentences’ referenced in paragraph (3) included the indeterminate maximum terms corresponding to each mandatory minimum.” Levinson, J., dissenting at ___, 188 P.3d at 750. Relatedly, that dissent opines that “the language of
However, the construction of
[14] Additionally, assuming, arguendo, that
[15] Justice Levinson‘s dissent maintains that
Because we conclude that a mandatory minimum term is inherently part of the indeterminate maximum term of which it is a part, the two cannot be separated, and both of the two components must be served as part of one sentence. Inasmuch as
[16] Justice Levinson‘s dissent takes issue with this portion of our analysis, positing that we hold “that
[17] Respectfully, to hold that mandatory minimum sentences exist independent of the maximum indeterminate sentence imposed, as Petitioner suggests, would be legally incorrect. See State v. Gomes, 117 Hawai`i 218, 232, 177 P.3d 928, 942 (2008) (interpreting
Relatedly, as discussed previously, the mandatory minimum sentence sets how the first part of the defendant‘s indeterminate sentence is to be served. See Feliciano, 107 Hawai`i at 503, 115 P.3d at 682 (Acoba, J., dissenting). Essentially, the mandatory minimum term prohibits the HPA from exercising its discretion to release the defendant on parole for a set period of time. See id. (citing
[18] The Chief Justice‘s dissent also criticizes reliance on Saufua. See Moon, C.J., dissenting at ___ _ ___, 188 P.3d at 747-48. According to him, “the Saufua court believed that
Relative to this matter, Saufua is cited because it implicitly approved of the imposition of consecutive indeterminate maximum sentences. To repeat, that court explained that, with respect to mandatory minimum sentences, “the required period of unparoled imprisonment[, i.e., the mandatory minimum term,] is subsumed within the maximum sentence[]” Saufua, 67 Haw. at 619, 699 P.2d at 991 (emphasis added). This supports the conclusion that mandatory minimum sentences cannot be severed from the indeterminate maximum sentences of which they are a part. The Saufua court went on to hold that the sentence imposed for the subsequent conviction could be run consecutively to the sentence imposed for the prior conviction under
Thus, Saufua had determined that the mandatory minimum and indeterminate maximum components of a sentence could not be separated. Under Saufua, the mandatory minimum sentence for the subsequent conviction can be run consecutively to the sentence for the prior conviction. Because that mandatory minimum is part of an indeterminate maximum sentence, the indeterminate maximum must be served in the same manner as the mandatory minimum. Thus, under Saufua, when the mandatory minimum sentence imposed for the subsequent conviction is ordered to be run consecutively to the sentence imposed for the prior conviction, it follows that the indeterminate maximum component of the sentence for the subsequent conviction would also run consecutively to the sentence for the prior conviction.
This court, via Saufua then, had previous to the instant case, affirmed that the indeterminate maximum sentences for separate convictions could run consecutively inasmuch as the mandatory minimums could not be treated as sentences separate from the indeterminate maximums to which they related. Because the mandatory minimums and indeterminate maximums imposed for individual counts comprising a subsequent conviction are similarly inseparable, it follows that indeterminate maximum sentences for the individual counts comprised in a single conviction must be imposed consecutively to each other where the corresponding mandatory minimums are also imposed consecutively to each other. In that way, Saufua, although not directly on point, is analogous and applicable to the instant case.
[19] Justice Levinson criticizes this reliance on Smith. Levinson, J., dissenting at ___ _ ___, 188 P.3d at 753. Respectfully, this misapprehends the importance attributed to that case, which we view as being analogous to the instant case. The gist of the dissent‘s criticism appears to be that Smith and its progeny did not address the precise question raised herein, i.e., whether
Justice Levinson attempts to further distinguish these cases as “stand[ing] for the self-evident proposition that a defendant cannot be sentenced to probation and a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment at the same time,” Levinson, J., dissenting at ___, n. 4, 188 P.3d at 753, n. 4, such that Smith and its progeny are not analogous to the instant case in any “meaningful way[,]” id. However, this argument is not persuasive inasmuch as it does not address the fact that, as in this case, this court in Smith and its progeny considered the role of
[20]
[21] The Chief Justice maintains that “resort to plain error is wholly unnecessary” because “[t]he question [of] whether [Petitioner‘s] consecutive indeterminate maximum terms was lawful is the precise issue before this court[.]” Moon, C.J., dissenting at ___ n. 4, 188 P.3d at 747 n. 4. Respectfully, the Chief Justice‘s dissent raises a theory of error not advanced by the parties. Specifically, his dissent maintains that the multiple counts/one conviction rule embodied in Tavares required that the indeterminate maximum sentences be run concurrently. As noted in the discussion supra, the parties did not argue that Petitioner‘s sentence violated Tavares. Thus, any violation of Tavares would have to be treated as plain error. However, as discussed infra, the sentences did not, in fact, violate Tavares insofar as Petitioner‘s convictions on all three counts were treated as his second conviction for purposes of repeat offender sentencing, i.e., the convictions on all three counts were treated as a single conviction.
[22] In their submissions to the ICA and to this court, the parties discuss Tavares for the proposition that conviction on a multicount indictment constitutes only a single “conviction” under
On the other hand, Respondent argued that this court later corrected itself, “not[ing] that the correct `interpretation of the language of the statute is that a conviction on each count of an indictment represents a separate conviction for the purposes of adding up the number of convictions for sentencing.‘” (Quoting Dudoit, 90 Hawai`i at 271-73, 978 P.2d at 709-11.) Thus, according to Respondent and contrary to Chief Justice Moon‘s position, the court was authorized to impose mandatory minimum sentences for each of the felony counts of which Petitioner was convicted.
However, in this context, Respondent‘s reliance on Dudoit is misplaced. Dudoit is distinguishable in that it interpreted a repeat offender statute,
In any event, it is evident that, at the time Petitioner committed the subsequent offenses, Tavares was precedent. However, as discussed herein, its application is more limited than the Chief Justice would hold. For purposes of calculating whether the subsequent conviction constituted Petitioner‘s second or third conviction for purposes of
The Chief Justice also quotes a lengthy passage from Cornelio in which the Tavares court is criticized for ignoring the plain and unambiguous language of the statute in “holding that convictions on several counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purposes of [HRS § ] 706-606.5(1).” Moon, C.J., dissenting at ___, 188 P.3d at 746 (quoting Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i at 491, 935 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Tavares, 63 Haw. at 511-12, 515, 630 P.2d at 635-37)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, he concedes that Cornelio did not expressly overrule Tavares because “the legislature, in 1986, had amended
[23] See e.g., Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai`i 20, 24, 979 P.2d 1046, 1050 (1999) (defendant was charged in a forty-count indictment, and pursuant to a plea agreement was ”sentenced in Counts 1, 19, 21, 36, and 40 to five years in imprisonment... [a]nd on Counts 2, 9, 12, 16, 18, 25, 28, 31, 34 and 39, ... to ... life imprisonment” (emphases added)); State v. Opupele, 88 Hawai`i 433, 437, 967 P.2d 265, 269 (1998) (defendant was charged with two counts in a single indictment, found guilty of both, and ”sentenced to twenty years incarceration on count one and five years on count two” (emphases added)); State v. Edwards, 81 Hawai`i 293, 296, 916 P.2d 703, 706 (1996) (defendant was charged in a six-count indictment, found guilty on all counts, and “sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty years on count one ... and to separate terms of life imprisonment for counts two through six” (emphases added)); State v. Yamada, 116 Hawai`i 422, 431, 173 P.3d 569, 578 (App.2007) (after defendant was convicted on a three-count indictment, the court ”sentenced [him] to two twenty-year terms for Counts One and Three, and a ten-year term for Count Two” (emphases added)); State v. Fagaragan, 115 Hawai`i 364, 365, 167 P.3d 739, 740 (App.2007) (defendant was charged with three offenses in a single document, found guilty and sentenced to “two terms of twenty years (Counts One and Two), and one term of five years (Count Three)” (emphases added)); State v. Steger, 114 Hawai`i 162, 164, 158 P.3d 280, 282 (App.2006) (defendant “was charged by indictment with numerous drug and drug paraphernalia offenses[,]” found guilty, and was ”sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment on Count 1, with a mandatory minimum term of five years; ten years’ imprisonment on Count 3; five years’ imprisonment on each of Counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8” (emphases added)); State v. Keaweehu, 110 Hawai`i 129, 131, 129 P.3d 1157, 1159 (App. 2006) (defendant “was charged in an eleven-count indictment[,]” convicted of four offenses, and ”sentenced on each of Counts 1 and 10 to a ten-year term of imprisonment ... [and] on Counts 2 and 11 to five-year terms of imprisonment” (emphases added)); State v. Martin, 103 Hawai`i 68, 70, 79 P.3d 686, 688 (App.2003) (after defendant was convicted on a two-count indictment, he was sentenced “to imprisonment for ten years on each count” (emphasis added)); State v. Mara, 102 Hawai`i 346, 348, 76 P.3d 589, 591 (App.2003) (after defendant pled guilty to all the charges contained in a three-count indictment, he was sentenced to “ten years’ incarceration on Counts I and II and twenty years’ incarceration on Count III” (emphases added)); State v. Vinuya, 96 Hawai`i 472, 476, 478, 32 P.3d 116, 120, 122 (App.2001) (defendant was charged in a multicount complaint, found guilty on five counts, and sentenced “to an extended indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten years on count one, a twenty-year indeterminate term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of six years and eight months on count two, a ten-year indeterminate term of imprisonment on each of counts three and four, and a five-year indeterminate term of imprisonment on count five” (emphases added)); State v. Palabay, 9 Haw.App. 414, 420, 844 P.2d 1, 5 (1992) (defendant was charged in a seven-count indictment, convicted of all counts and ”sentenced to prison for a term of twenty (20) years for Count 1, five (5) years each for Counts 2, 3, and 4, and thirty (30) days each for Counts 5, 6, and 7” (emphases added)).
[24] The version of the repeat offender sentencing statute construed in Cornelio provided, in pertinent part, that “[t]he sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any sentence imposed on the defendant for a prior conviction, but such sentence shall be imposed concurrent to the sentence imposed for the instant conviction ....” (Emphases added.)
[25] As noted previously, the 1986 revisions codified the holding in Tavares, see Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i at 492, 935 P.2d at 1037 (citing State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 149, 890 P.2d 1167, 1189 (1995)), “that convictions on several counts of an indictment are to be treated as only one conviction for the purposes of
[1] The 1980 version of
(1) Notwithstanding ... any other law to the contrary, any person convicted under section... 707-730 relating to rape in the first degree, 707-733 relating to sodomy in the first degree,... who has a prior conviction for any of the above enumerated offenses or of any one of those enumerated in subsection (2) [ ] in this or another jurisdiction, within the time of the maximum sentence of the prior conviction, shall be sentenced for each conviction after the first conviction to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without possibility of parole during such period as follows:
(a) Second conviction-5 years;
(b) Third conviction -10 years.
....
(3) The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any other sentence then or previously imposed on the defendant or may impose a lesser mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of parole than that mandated by this section where the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action.
(Emphases added.)
[2] Moreover, as previously quoted, subsection 706-606.5(3) provided in pertinent part that:
The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any other sentence then or previously imposed on the defendant or may impose a lesser mandatory minimum sentence without possibility of parole than that mandated by this section where the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant such action.
The legislature, however, renumbered subsection (3) of
The sentencing court may impose the above sentences consecutive to any sentence imposed on the defendant for a prior conviction, but such sentence shall be imposed concurrent to the sentence imposed for the instant conviction.
[3] Cornelio involved, inter alia, the question “whether the sentencing court properly ran [the defendant‘s] mandatory minimum sentences imposed under
[4] The majority criticizes my conclusion that the holding in Tavares was consistent with
Initially, it must be noted that [Kamana`o] did not raise this issue to this court or to the ICA. Thus, it may only be considered under the doctrine of plain error.
However, the Chief Justice has not offered any basis for taking notice under the plain error rule. Moreover, because none of the parties raised plain error here or below[,] there is no discernible argument on this point for this court to review.
Majority Op. at ___ _ ___, 188 P.3d at 733-34 (citations and footnote omitted). The majority, however, misses the point. As stated previously, my discussion of Tavares is based upon my belief that its multiple counts/one conviction holding “underscores the correctness of Justice Levinson‘s position,” Moon Dissenting Op. at ___, 188 P.3d at 734, and provides analogous support of my view that Kamanao‘s three indeterminate maximum twenty-year-imprisonment sentences should have been ordered to run concurrently. The question whether Kamanao‘s consecutive indeterminate maximum terms was lawful is the precise issue before this court and, therefore, resort to plain error is wholly unnecessary.
[5] To support its position that
if a defendant were sentenced to consecutive five year mandatory minimum terms on six Class A felony counts, the combined mandatory minimum term would be thirty years. However, the indeterminate maximum term for each individual Class A felony would be twenty years. Thus, if the indeterminate maximums were served concurrently, they would be shorter than the combined mandatory minimum terms.
Majority Op. at ___, 188 P.3d at 734. However, as discussed infra, the untenable result engendered by the above hypothetical would be avoided under the holding in Tavares and the plain reading of
[1] The majority claims that it does not construe “the above sentences” language in
[2] When I posed a hypothetical at oral argument, the deputy prosecuting attorney stated that
[3] Unlike the majority, I do not find it absurd to conclude that a statute that expressly authorizes the circuit court to impose consecutive mandatory minimum terms and that makes no mention of indeterminate maximum terms, see
[4] The same distinction can be drawn between this case and Reis and State v. Walker, 106 Hawai`i 1, 100 P.3d 595 (2004), both of which are cited by the majority, see majority opinion at ___, 188 P.3d at 738. In those cases, this court held that
The “gist” of my criticism of the majority‘s reliance on Smith and its progeny is not simply that ”Smith and its progeny did not address the precise question raised herein,” majority opinion at ___ n. 19, 188 P.3d at 737 n. 19, but also that Smith and its progeny stand for the self-evident proposition that a defendant cannot be sentenced to probation and a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment at the same time, see Reis, 115 Hawai`i at 98, 165 P.3d at 999; Walker, 106 Hawai`i at 9-10, 100 P.3d at 603-04; Smith, 103 Hawai`i at 235, 81 P.3d at 414. Accordingly, in no meaningful way are Smith and its progeny “analogous” to the case at hand. See majority opinion at ___ n. 19, 188 P.3d at 737 n. 19.