Case Information
*1 No. 90-302
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 9 0
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
RICHARD DUKE JUNGERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
. -.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial ~istrsik, 3 7 3 lL P [0] In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, E & The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presidigzu 0 - 7C. COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Randi Hood, Public Defender, Helena, Montana For Respondent:
Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Jennifer Anders, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana
Mike McGrath, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Leo J. Gallagher, Deputy County Atty., Helena, Montana
submitted on Briefs: November 1, 1990 Decided: December 11, 1990 Filed: [0]
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Richard Duke Jungers appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony theft. The District Court of the First Judicial
District, Lewis and Clark County sentenced Jungers to ten years for
the felony theft and an additional twenty years with twelve years
suspended as a persistent felony offender. Jungers was designated
dangerous for purposes of parole. We affirm.
The issues presented for review are:
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Jungers'
conviction for felony theft;
2. Whether Jungers was afforded effective assistance of
counsel.
In the weeks preceding Thanksgiving of 1989, Richard Duke Jungers stayed at an apartment rented by Debbie and Ron Newbreast,
which was located in Helena, Montana. His stay at the apartment
was intermittent because at times he stayed with his girlfriend,
or was out of town. However, when he did stay at the apartment he
slept on a couch which was in the front room. The Newbreasts
occupied the bedroom, which apparently was the only other room in
the apartment.
During this same period of time a number of burglaries occurred in the Helena area. On Thanksgiving day Virginia Pruett
observed a man running across her neighbor's back yard carrying a
long object wrapped in a rug or blanket. The man ran to a blue and
white jeep which was waiting in an alley. The man threw the
wrapped object into the back, climbed into the passenger side of
the vehicle which then drove off. The man Ms. Pruett saw running
across the yard had dark tousled hair and was not Richard Jungers.
She could not identify the driver of the vehicle.
Gwen Smith, the owner of the house was out of town for the Thanksgiving holiday. Upon returning home, she found out that her
house had been ransacked. She prepared a list of missing personal
property which included several pieces of jewelry. She estimated
the total value of her missing property at $4,300.00.
Shortly after the reported burglary, police found a Jeep Cherokee matching Ms. Pruett's description parked in an apartment
complex across the street from the Helena Police Department. The
police took a photograph of the vehicle and showed it to Ms.
Pruett, who stated that it was similar to the vehicle she had seen
in the alley Thanksgiving day. Upon further investigation, the
police discovered that the vehicle belonged to Richard Jungers, who
as stated earlier, had been staying with Debbie and Ronald
Newbreast at their home in the apartment complex.
On December 1, 1989, Helena police, pursuant to a search warrant entered and searched the Newbreast residence. An arrest
warrant was also issued for Richard Jungers and while the officer
searched the home, Jungers was arrested. Recovered during the
search were several items taken from area homes and offices during
recent burglaries. These items included a .22 rifle which belonged
to Henry Smith and a bronze statue and a notary seal taken from the
Morrison-Meloy Law Office during a burglary which occurred shortly
after the Thanksgiving holiday. Also found were several articles
of jewelry taken from the Gwen Smith residence.
Jungers was charged with four counts of burglary in violation of 9 45-6-204, MCA, and felony theft (common scheme) as defined in
9 9 45-6-301 and 45-2-lOl(7). After Jungers entered his plea of not
guilty, the State moved to dismiss the four counts of burglary.
The District Court granted this motion and ordered trial to proceed
on the charges of felony theft.
Following trial, a jury found Jungers guilty of felony theft as defined by § 45-6-301 (1) (c) , MCA. The District Court sentenced
Jungers as heretofore stated. This appeal followed.
Jungers argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony theft. As stated earlier, he was
convicted of felony theft because the jury found he received stolen
property. This offense is defined in 9 45-6-301(3), MCA, which
states in pertinent part:
(3) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely or knowingly obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen by another and:
(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property ;
(b) purposely or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.
Section 45-6-301(6), MCA, provides that the line of demarcation between felony and misdemeanor theft as to the value
of the property stolen is $300.00. Taking these two sections
together, it is apparent that in order to support Jungers'
conviction the evidence must support the conclusion that:
1. Jungers had control over
2. stolen property
3. whose value exceeded $300.00, 4. with the intent to deprive its owner of such property.
During trial, four items seized during the search of the Newbreast home were entered into evidence. The value of these
items, as estimated and testified to by their owners was:
.22 rifle $225.00 $5-$10.00
items of jewelry
notary seal X $27.00
bronze statu e $50.00
The total value of this property approximated $307-$312.00. This
evidence as a whole is sufficient to meet the value requirement of
felony theft.
However, Jungers strongly argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that he purposely or knowingly had control
over the stolen property. The .22 rifle, in particular, was found
in a closet in the Newbreasts' bedroom. According to testimony of
Debbie and Ronald Newbreast the rifle was sold to them by another
friend, Freddy Gaither. Jungers maintains that there is no
evidence he had access to the closet or the rifle and therefore his
control over it cannot be established. Since the State cannot
prove he had control of the rifle, his conviction for felony theft
is unsupported because the only items proven to be in his control .- were worth at the most, $87.00, which is less than the
,"
required for a felony conviction. We disagree with Jungersl argument. We begin by noting that the testimony of Ronald Newbreast is far from convincing. It is
riddled with inconsistencies and suspect explanations. Following
his arrest Newbreast told police that the .22 rifle was brought
into the apartment by Richard Jungers. By the time he was called
to testify, however, Newbreast changed his story to incriminate
Freddy Gaither, who apparently had fallen from Newbreastts favor
because he suspected him of Ifratting them out." Newbreast
attempted to account for this inconsistency through various
explanations including his insistence that he was high at the time
of the police interview or, in the alternative, that he lied to get
out of jail.
We further note that testimony established, contrary to Jungerst argument, that Jungers had full access to the Newbreast
apartment. Testimony established that Jungers and the Newbreasts
were very generous towards one another and shared all of their
belongings. This generosity towards Jungers apparently included
permission to enter the Newbreasts1 room and access to their
personal belongings.
Given this testimony, we hold that the evidence meets the requirement of control. The standard of review employed by this
Court when reviewing jury verdicts in criminal matters is
necessarily very limited. This standard dictates that:
[A] conviction may not be overturned when the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would permit a rationale [sic] trier of fact to find the essential elements necessary to establish the offense. State v. Holman (1990), 241 Mont. 238, 241, 786 P.2d 667, 669.
The above evidence would permit a jury to find such essential
elements.
Next Jungers argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. In making this argument
Jungers maintains that through his failure to rebut the value of
the stolen property seized by police, his attorney failed to
adequately represent him. As stated earlier, only four items
seized at trial were appraised by their owners. The value of these
items totaled between $307-$312.00. Jungers argues that his
counsel should have attacked the values placed on these items in
an effort to establish a total value less than $300.00, which would
have led to a conviction for the lesser crime of misdemeanor theft.
In asserting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jungers must establish two elements. First he must prove that his
lawyer's performance fell below the range of competence reasonably
demanded of attorneys by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Second, he must demonstrate that the deficiency was
so prejudicial that he was denied a fair trial. State v. Senn
After careful review of the record, it is apparent that Jungersl counsel performed adequately and competently. It is
obvious that he decided, as a matter of tactic, to confront
Jungers' guilt head on in an effort to establish complete
innocence. Perhaps he utilized this tactic in an effort to prevent
Jungers, who was on parole, from being sent back to prison. At any
rate, we refuse here to second guess counsells tactical decisions.
Accordingly, we hold that Richard Duke Jungers was not denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counse. The jury's
verdict is affirmed. Justice /
,22&5~A hief Justice