STATE оf Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Juan Luis SANCHEZ-CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 40603-2012.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2014 Term.
Dec. 2, 2014.
339 P.3d 372 | 157 Idaho 647
Eric Fredericksen, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, argued for appellant.
Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, argued for respondent.
EISMANN, Justice.
This is an appeal оut of Ada County in which the defendant contends that his convictions and sentences for both conspiracy to traffic in methamphetаmine and trafficking
I.
Factual Background.
Juan Luis Sanchez-Cаstro (Defendant) was indicted, tried, and convicted of one count of conspiracy to traffic in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of
II.
Analysis.
The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies not only to multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes. State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005). There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determinеd to be a lesser included offense of a charged offense. State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997). One theory is referred to as the statutory theory. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 519, 521 (2011). Under this theory, one offense is not considered a lesser includеd of another unless it is necessarily so under the statutory definition of the crime. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433, 614 P.2d 970, 973 (1980). We apply the Blockburger test, which originated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense under the statutory theory. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521. The other theory is called the pleading theory. Id. at 529, 261 P.3d at 523. This theory holds that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a meаns or element of the commission of the higher offense. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211, 731 P.2d 192, 206 (1986).
In this case, Defendant first relies upon the statutory theory. Traditionally the law has considered conspiracy and the completed substantive offense to be separate crimes. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289, 43 L.Ed.2d 616, 622 (1975). As the Supreme Court еxplained, [T]he conspiracy to commit an offense and the subsequent commission of that crime normally do not merge into a single punishable act. Thus, it is well recognized that in most cases separate sentences can be imposed for the conspiracy to do an act and for the subsequent accomplishment of that end. Id. at 777-78, 95 S.Ct. at 1290, 43 L.Ed.2d at 623.
We have not had occasion to address whether a defendant can be punished for both the conspiracy to commit a crime and the commission of the crime, but our Court of Appeals has acknowledged that [i]t is generally accepted that a conviction and sentence on a count charging conspiracy will not, on the theory of double punishment, prevent conviction and sentence on another count charging the substаntive offense. State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567, 682 P.2d 105, 108 (Ct.App.1984).
Defendant argues that the statutory definitions of the crimes of conspiracy and trafficking alleged in this case show that they are the same offense.
The wording he relies upon states how the crime of conspiracy is punishable. It does not define the crime of conspiracy. The words and is punishable as if he had actually committed such prohibited act in the statute mean that the punishment for the crime of conspiracy under subsеction (b) is the same as the punishment for the substantive crime that the defendant conspired to commit. The fact that the two crimes have the same penalty does not make them the same crime. The penalty for the substantive crime varies depending upon the quantity of drugs involved, and so the punishment for conspiracy depends upon the quantity of drugs that were the subject of the conspiracy.
The Defendant also asserts that the conspiracy and the trafficking charges were the same offense under the pleading theory, although he does not present any argument supporting that assertion other than merely stating, In both Counts I and II, Mr. Sanchez-Castro was alleged to have committed the relevant оffenses by possessing 400 or more grams of methamphetamine or a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. He apparently bases this assertion upon the language in the conspiracy count that Defendant and оthers did willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree to traffic in a controlled substance, by knowingly possessing mеthamphetamine, to wit: in excess of four-hundred (400) grams or more of methamphetamine.
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine is сommitted when a person knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or [] is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more оf methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine.
III.
Conclusion.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, HORTON and Senior Justice Pro Tem WALTERS concur.