STATE OF OHIO v. KARLTON STEPHONE JONES
Appellate Case No. 29214
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
September 9, 2022
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-3162.]
Triаl Court Case No. 2020-CR-3501 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074332, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
LUCAS W. WILDER, Atty. Reg. No. 0074057, P.O. Box 574, Dayton, Ohio 45409 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
{¶ 1} Karlton Stephone Jones appeals from his conviction following a jury trial on one count of murder with a firearm specification.1
{¶ 2} Jones advances four assignments of error. He contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on Ohio‘s “castle” doctrine. He claims the prosecutor improperly cross-exаmined him about illegally possessing a handgun. He also challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to convict him. Finally, he asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on Ohio‘s “stand-your-ground” law.
{¶ 4} The trial court‘s judgment will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for further procеedings.
I. Background
{¶ 5} The present appeal stems from a shooting at the Eagle Ridge apartment complex on the afternoon of March 2, 2020. On that date, Jones fatally shot Chendo Buford in a parking lot. Jones does not dispute killing Buford. The only real issue at trial was whether Jones acted in self-defense.
{¶ 6} The record reflects that several friends were socializing in the parking lot shortly before the shooting. They included Buford and Eagle Ridge residents Mike Brown, Garry Wills, and Shandra Bevins. At some point, a female identified as “Casey” approached the group and inquired about buying marijuana. Brown and Buford saw Jones walking in the рarking lot and called him over. Jones sold Casey a small amount of marijuana. Following the sale, Jones shook hands with Brown and Buford. What happened next was disputed at trial.
{¶ 7} Brown testified that Buford and Jones were friends and that Buford gave Jones a non-aggressive “bear hug” after the handshake. According to Brown, Jones responded by pulling a handgun from his side and brandishing it. This surprised Brown because it was apparent to him that Buford‘s hug was playful. Brown explained that Buford became upset and confronted Jones about pulling the weapon. Jones responded that he did not “feel like playing.” He then walked to the passenger‘s side of a car occupied by Wills. Jones entered the car and requested a ride. Brown testified that Buford followed Jones, opened the car door, and said, “Don‘t you ever pull your gun on me, bro.” While speaking, Buford pointed a finger toward Jones but did not hit or threaten to hit him. Brown testified that Jones responded by shooting Buford in the chest, face, and arm before fleeing on foot.
{¶ 8} Wills testified that Jones was friends with the group members. He described the relationship between Jones and Buford as being “cool” in a positive way. While Wills was in the car with his window down, he saw and heard Jones and Buford “playing.” Aсcording to Wills, Buford grabbed Jones and hugged him. Jones responded by pulling out the handgun, which angered Buford. Wills testified that Jones displayed the gun but did not point it toward anyone. Jones then walked quickly to the passenger‘s side of the car, got in, and asked for a ride. Wills had not offered a ride and did not expect Jones to enter the car. At that point, Buford put his hand in Jones’ face and said something like, “[D]on‘t ever point your gun at me ever again.” Buford made a similar remark three times before Jones shot him. Wills never saw a gun in Buford‘s possession and never saw Buford try to assault Jones in any way.
{¶ 9} Bevins testified that after Jones joined the group, she briefly went into her own apartment. When she came back outside, she saw Jones in the passenger‘s seat of the car being operated by Wills. Bevins heard Jones and Buford “low key arguing” and heard Buford tell Jones never to point a gun at him again. Bevins testified that the passenger-side door opened and she heard gunshots. She observed Jones with a handgun when he exited the car following the shots. Jones fled on foot, and Bevins attempted to assist Buford. Bevins did not
{¶ 10} Buford‘s mother, Elisha Burress, also testified for the prosecutiоn. She was walking back from a store when she saw Buford near the car Wills was driving. She heard Buford say something like, “I thought we were better than that.” Burress then heard gunshots and saw her son fall. Wills ran past her and, using nicknames for Jones and Buford, said, “Byrd just shot B.J.”
{¶ 11} Jones testified in his own defense at trial. He explained that after selling the marijuana, he shook hands with Brown and Buford. He then walked over to the car and asked Wills for a ride. Wills declined the request. At that point, Buford approached Jones and threatened to “beat [his] ass.” In an apparent reference to Jones’ handgun, which was in his pants, Buford also said, “I‘ll take your shit and pоp you with it.” Jones testified that he tried to walk away, but Buford grabbed him from behind and pinned him against the trunk of Wills’ car. As Jones struggled to free himself, he felt the firearm sliding down in his pants. Jones grabbed the weapon and felt Buford‘s hand on it. Jones was able to remove the handgun from his pants and hold it away from Buford. He freed himself from Buford‘s grasp and secured the weapon in his pocket. He then opened Wills’ car door and got into the passenger‘s seat. Jones begged Wills to drive away. Wills refused to move but did not order Jones out of the car. Jones testified that he observed a firearm in Wills’ lap. At that point, the passenger‘s door opened and Buford leaned into the car. According to Jones, Buford poked him in the eye and reached for the firearm in Jones’ pocket. Jones responded by drawing the weapon, pointing it at Buford, and firing multiple times. He then fled on foot. Police arrested him weeks later after he was found hiding under a bed in an apartment in Columbus.
{¶ 12} Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court granted Jones’ request for a self-defense instruction. The trial court refused, however, to instruct the jury on the castle doctrine with regard to Jones’ occupation of Wills’ vehicle. The trial court аlso refused to instruct the jury on Ohio‘s stand-your-ground law.
{¶ 13} The jury found Jones guilty on two counts of murder as a proximate result of committing felonious assault (serious physical harm and deadly weapon) with firearm specifications. It also found him guilty on two counts of felonious assault (serious physical harm and deadly weapon) with firearm specifications. The trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life in prison for murder as a proximate result committing felonious assault (deadly weapon), with a consecutive three years on the accompanying firearm specification. The trial cоurt merged all other counts and specifications as allied offenses of similar import.
II. Analysis
{¶ 14} Jones advances the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the Castle Doctrine.
II. The trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to cross examine Jones on the illegality of the gun.
III. The jury‘s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
IV. The trial court erred in not applying Ohio‘s “Stand Your Ground” law.
{¶ 15} We begin our analysis with Jones’ first and fourth assignments of
{¶ 16} With regard to self-defense, a person generally had a duty to retreat before using deadly force at the time of the incident in question.2 State v. Lovett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29240, 2022-Ohio-1693, ¶ 43, citing State v. Willford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 250, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990) and State v. Dale, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2012-CA-20, 2013-Ohio-2229, ¶ 15. The “castle doctrine” is an exception to this rule. It relates to one component of self-defense, identifying circumstances under which a person need not retreat. State v. Martin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27844, 2018-Ohio-3505, ¶ 20. At the time Jones shot Buford, the castle doctrine had been codified in now-former
{¶ 17} The castle doctrine as set forth in former
{¶ 18} Jones’ appellate argument focuses on a different statute,
{¶ 19} “[T]he effect of the self-defense presumption is to negate the defendant‘s burden to produce evidence that he was not at fault, that he had a reasonable belief of imminent danger and that his only means of escape was the use of force, and that he did not violate a duty to retreat.” State v. Bundy, 2012-Ohio-3934, 974 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 50 (4th Dist.). “If a defendant establishes the self-defense presumption, then he need not present evidence regarding these three elements. Instead, the presumption, by definition, presumes that the defendant was not at fault, that he had a reasonable belief of imminent danger and that the only means of escape was the use of force, and that he did not violate a duty to retreat.” Id.
{¶ 20} Here the trial court held that the presumption did not apply because (1) Jones was not lawfully in Wills’ car and (2) Buford was not attempting to enter the car. Jones challenges both determinations. He asserts that he had a privilege to occupy Wills’ vehicle to avoid being assaulted and potentially shot by Buford. Jones also maintains that Buford‘s act of leaning in and аllegedly reaching for Jones’ handgun constituted an unlawful entry into the vehicle.
{¶ 21} Under Jones’ version of events, we agree that a jury reasonably could have found that he occupied the car lawfully and that Buford unlawfully entered the vehicle by leaning in and reaching for his weapon. With regard to Jones’ occupation of the car, that act would be unlawful if it constituted a trespass. The criminal trespass statute provides that no person, without privilege, shall “[k]nowingly enter * * * on the land or premises of another.”
{¶ 22} Thеre is no question that Jones knowingly entered Wills’ vehicle. The issue is whether he was privileged to do so. “Privilege” is defined as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.”
{¶ 23} At a minimum, a jury reasonably could have found that Jones was privileged to enter the vehicle based on an implied grant of permission arising out of his relationship with Wills. Depending on whose testimony is believed, Jones and Wills were friends, acquaintances, or something in between. Their relationship indisputably was non-adversarial, and Jones testified that he had been in Wills’ vehicle two or three times before. We note too that Wills declined Jones’ request for a ride but did not ask him to exit the car.
{¶ 24} With regard to Buford‘s allegedly reaching into the car to grab Jones’ handgun, a jury reasonably could have found that this act constituted an unlawful “entry” into the vehicle. Although the words “entered” and “entering” are not defined in
{¶ 25} In a criminal-trespass case, this court held that an unlawful entry occurred when part of the defendant‘s body “broke the plane of the structure” involved. State v. Kelly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011-CA-37, 2012-Ohio-1095, ¶ 47. Other courts similarly have found an unlawful entry when any part of
{¶ 26} Although Buford and Wills were friends, a jury also reasonably could have concluded that Buford‘s entry into the vehicle was unlawful. Buford ordinarily might have had an implied right to enter Wills’ car based on the relationship between the two men. But Buford‘s alleged entry into the vehicle was not for a lawful purpose. Based on Jones’ testimony, a jury could have concluded that Buford entered the car in an attempt to commit a crime by assaulting Jones, trying to steal his firearm, and potentially shooting him. An entry to facilitate one of these offenses would be unlawful and without privilege.
{¶ 27} Finally, we note that the trial court expressed reluctance “to go down the slippery slope and allow that people can simply enter into someone‘s car and then shoot and kill someone simply and use the [c]astle [d]octrine as the basis for that.” In response to this concern, we make two observations. First,
{¶ 28} Based on the reasоning set forth above, Jones was entitled to have the jury instructed on a presumption of self-defense under
{¶ 29} We recognize that the trial court‘s failure to give the requested instruction is potentially subject to harmless-error analysis. State v. West, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1556, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 23, citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15. But “[u]nder that standard, the state ‘bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.‘” Id. “An appellate court is required to reverse the conviction when the state is unable to meet its burden.” Id.; see also State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021-Ohio-4060, 179 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 40 (observing that the State bears the burden to demonstrate harmless error); Perry at ¶ 15 (“An appellate court must reverse a conviction if the government does not satisfy this burden; * * *
{¶ 30} On appeal, the State does not even suggest the existence of harmless error. It argues only that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the presumption of self-defense. That being so, the State has not met its burden to demonstrate harmless error. State v. Pitts, 2020-Ohio-5494, 163 N.E.3d 1169, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.) (“[T]he trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with H.B. 228. The state does not argue that the trial court‘s error was harmless, and we decline to conduct a harmless-error analysis of our own volition.“). Even if the State had raised harmless error, we are unconvinced that the absence of an instruction on the presumption of self-defense was harmless. The only real issue in the case was whether Jones acted in self-defense, and we see an undeniable benefit to a defendant in having a jury told that he is presumed to have done so.
{¶ 31} We are aware that the trial court ultimately instructed the jury that the State bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones did not act in self-defense. The trial court gave this instruction not because of the statutory presumption but because Jones’ own testimony tended to support the claim.
{¶ 32} Under
{¶ 33} Here Jones’ own testimony constituted evidence tending to support self-defense. Therefore, the trial court placed the burden of proof on the State. It does not follow, however, that Jones was not prejudiced by the absence of an instruction on the statutory presumрtion of self-defense. In every criminal trial, the jury is instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not enough to instruct the jury about the burden of proof alone. In the same way, Jones was entitled to have his jury instructed (1) that he was presumed to have acted in self-defense and (2) that the State bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. The power of the presumption of self-defense cannot be ignored when the instruction is warranted, just as a trial court cannot fail to tell a jury that a
{¶ 34} We turn next to Jones’ fourth assignment of error, which challenges the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury on Ohio‘s “stand-your-ground” law.
{¶ 35} Effective April 6, 2021, while Jones’ case was pending,
(B) For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person‘s residence if that person is in a place in which the рerson lawfully has a right to be.
(C) A trier of fact shall not consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not a person who used force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person‘s residence reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent injury, loss, or risk to life or safety.
{¶ 36} The change to
{¶ 37} In a 2-1 decision, the Eighth District recently held that the stand-your-ground law did not have retroactive application to a defendant who committed his offenses prior to April 6, 2021 and was tried after that date. State v. Hurt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110732, 2022-Ohio-2039. The majority reasoned that it was a “substantive law regarding an individual‘s duty to retreat before using self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 61. Focusing on
{¶ 38} On appeal, Jones makes the same argument as the dissent in Hurt. He reasons that the stand-your-ground law properly has prospective application to trials occurring after its effective date because it refers to what a “trier of fact” may consider.
{¶ 39} Based on our resolution of Jones’ first assignment of error, we need not resolve the foregoing issue. Having determined that the trial court‘s judgment must be reversed due to its failure to instruct
{¶ 40} We note too that the parties’ dispute about whether Jones is entitled to a stand-your-ground instruction negating any duty to retreat appears to be of largely academic interest. It does not appear to us that Jones reasonably could have “retreated” from Wills’ vehicle under either party‘s version of events. The parties agree that Jones was in the passenger‘s seat of Wills’ car. Wills was in the driver‘s seat, and Buford was either standing at the passenger‘s door or actively leaning and reaching into the passenger‘s side of the car. We fail to see how Jones, who was seated between Wills and Buford, reasonably could have retreated to another location. In any event, we overrule Jones’ fourth assignment of error for the reasons explained above.
{¶ 41} In his second assignment of error, Jones contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine him about his illegal possession of a firearm. He argues that evidence about his unlawful possession of the weapon should have been excluded under
{¶ 42} In response, the State claims Jones’ cross-examination testimony was relevant to the self-defense issue and admissible under
{¶ 43} Over Jones’ objection, the trial court allowed the State to elicit testimony about his illegally taking the firearm from another person days earlier and carrying it without a permit. It is unclear to us how these facts were relevant to any material issue in this case or what proper purpose the testimony may have served. On appeal, the State suggests that Jones’ self-defense claim placed at issue how and where he was carrying the firearm. In particular, the State reasons that if Jones had the firearm concealed in his pants, then Buford could not have seen it. The State claims this is relevant because Jones testified that Buford saw his handgun and threatened to shoot him with it.
{¶ 44} At trial, the State did cross-examine Jones about where he was carrying the firearm and whether it was fully or partially conсealed. We agree with the State that this testimony was relevant to Jones’ claim that Buford saw the weapon and threatened to shoot him. But testimony about whether Jones carried the firearm fully or partially concealed is not the same as testimony that he had obtained the weapon unlawfully and was carrying it without a permit. In any event, we need not definitively resolve this issue. Having
{¶ 45} In his third assignment of error, Jones challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Relying on his own testimony, Jones contends the record demonstrates that he acted in self-defense and, therefore, that the jury‘s guilty verdicts were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence.
{¶ 46} Upon review, we note that our resolution of Jones’ first assignment of error renders his manifest-weight argument moot. Having found that the trial court‘s judgment must be reversed due to the absence of a jury instruction on the presumption of self-defense, we need not address whether the weight of the evidence supported Jones’ conviction. State v. Dillon, 2016-Ohio-1561, 63 N.E.3d 712, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). Jones’ argument is not moot, however, insofar as he contends the State presented legally insufficient evidence. If that assertion were correct, he could not be retried. State v. Harr, 158 Ohio App.3d 704, 2004-Ohio-5771, 821 N.E.2d 1058, ¶ 142 (2d Dist.) (recognizing that “a defendant may not be retried after a judgment has been determined to be based on insufficient evidence“). Therefore, we must address the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶ 47} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he is arguing that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d Dist.2000). “An appellatе court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 48} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Jones’ conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The jury‘s guilty verdicts turned on whether it found self-defense applicable. Jones admitted shooting and killing Buford, and there was no other real issue in the case. The State presented evidence that Buford never assaulted or threatened to hit Jones prior to the shooting. According to the State‘s witnesses, Buford approached the passenger‘s side of Wills’ car and told Jones not to pull a gun on him again. Although the State‘s evidence established that Buford was pointing a finger at Jones, none of the State‘s witnesses testified that Buford reached inside the car to grab Jones’ firearm. According to the State‘s witnesses, Jones responded to Buford by shooting him multiple times.
{¶ 49} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found no self-defense and could have found the essential elements of the charges against Jones proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones’ third assignment of error is overruled insofar as he challenges the legal sufficiency of the State‘s evidence. The assignment of error is overruled as moot insofar as it raises a manifest-weight argument.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 50} Having sustained Jones’ first assignment of error, we rеverse the trial
TUCKER, P.J.
DONOVAN, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
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Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Elizabeth A. Ellis
Lucas W. Wilder
Hon. Mary E. Montgomery