State v. . Jones
59 S.E. 353
N.C.
1907
Check Treatment
*470 Walker,, J.,

after stating tbe case: T'be charge of the Court to which exception has been taken by the defendant conforms to the rule of law which we have repeatedly laid down as applicable to cases of this kind. It was full and explicit, and there was evidence to sustain it. Indeed, the proof tended to show, not only premeditation and deliberation, but that the defendant committed a cruel murder, in cold blood, upon his weak and defenseless wife. The language used by us in State v. Daniel, 139 N. C., at page 553, is appropriate to the facts as they appear in the record: “When we consider these facts in connection with the utter and cold indifference of the defendant after the shooting, what more deliberate act, upon previous reflection and meditation, we may well ask, could be imagined than this one ? The evidence was quite as strong as it was in State v. Hunt, 134 N. C., 684; State v. Teachey, 138 N. C., 587; State v. Exum, ib., 599; State v. Conly, 130 N. C., 683; State v. Lipscomb and State v. McCormac, supra., in which convictions for the capital felony were sustained. Indeed, the defendant’s intent to kill was more calmly and deliberately conceived and executed than was the intent of any one of the defendants in the cases -above cited. There was some ground to argue in those cases that the slayer might have committed the act in a transport of passion, but there is no evidence in this case to indicate anything but coolness of design and a deliberate purpose recklessly and wantonly to take human life, all of which was prompted by a bad heart, desperately wicked and fatally bent upon mischief. The mere fact that the defendant accomplished his purpose within a comparatively short space of time can make no difference.” The cases therein collected, and State v. Banks, 143 N. C., 652, fully sustain the charge. In the case last cited Justice Hoke says: “In this charge, as to murder in the first degree, the Court excludes all idea of a killing simultaneous with the conception of the homicidal purpose, and directs the jury, in effect, that, before they can convict of the higher crime, the *471 killing must be from a fixed determination; previously formed, after weighing the matter. The charge, we think, gives the prisoner the full benefit of the principle contended for by him, and is fully sustained by authority,” referring to numerous cases. We have examined the entire charge carefully, and have failed to discern any error therein. The evidence tends to show that'the defendant made up his mind as to what he would do, or, in- other words, premeditated the killing, when he left the house in which his Thanksgiving dinner was being prepared, and that he executed his purpose deliberately and with heartless brutality. The manner of the killing tends to show that he had fully determined to do his innobent victim to death. His wife’s slight retaliation when he threw the meat at her was not sufficient legal provocation under the circumstances of the case; and if, after so slight a provocation— if provocation it was, in law — he slew upon a principle of revenge, after sufficient time had elapsed thereafter, in which he premeditated and deliberated upon his act, he is as guilty as if there had been no such alleged provocation. Foster, in his Crown Law, p. 296, says: “For, let it be observed that, in all possible cases, deliberate homicide upon a principle of revenge is murder. No man, under the protection of the law, is to be the avenger of his own wrongs. If they are of such a nature as for which the laws of society will give him an adequate remedy, thither he ought to resort; but be they of what nature soever, he ought to bear his lot with patience.”

The confession made to the policeman was competent, it appearing that no threat was made to extort it, and that there was no promise to induce the defendant to make it. There is nothing to indicate that it was not voluntary. The fact that the defendant was in the custody of an officer when the confession was made does not of itself render it incompetent. The question is, was it voluntary? State v. Bohannon, 142 N. C., 695; State v. Conly, 130 N. C., 683; State v. Flemming, ib., 688; State v. Edwards, 126 N. C., 1051; State v. *472 Smith, 138 N. C., 700. There was no promise held out, and no influence exerted, which would be calculated, under the circumstances, to induce a confession, irrespective of its truth or falsity. Wigmore on Ev., sec. 831.

Upon a review of the record and case on appeal, we find no error in the proceedings below.

No Error.