Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State v. Jones
,
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
Case Nos. 10CA75, 10CA76, and 10CA77 O P I N I O N CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Richland County Court of Common Pleas,
Case Nos. 04CR207, 04CR267, and 04CR881
JUDGMENT: 10CA75 - Reversed and Remanded
10CA76 - Reversed and Remanded 10CA77 - Reversed and Remanded DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 11, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant JAMES J. MAYER, JR. CHRISTOPHER MONTEZ JONES,PRO SE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY c/o Richland Correctional Institution RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO Inmate No. 554-805
P.O. Box 8107 By: KIRSTEN L. PSCHOLKA-GARTNER Mansfield, Ohio 44901-8107 Assistant Richland County Prosecutor
38 South Park Street
Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Hoffman, P.J. Defendant-appellant Christopher Montez Jones appeals his conviction and
sentence entered by the Richland County Court of Common Pleas in three separate case numbers: 2004CR0207, 2004CR0267, and 2004CR0881. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant was convicted in three separate case numbers in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas after entering pleas of guilty to the charges therein. In Case No. 2004CR0207, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of forgery, a fifth degree felony, in violation of R.C. Section 2913.31(A)(3). In Case No. 2004CR0267, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); one count of forgery, a fourth degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(2); and one count of identity fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.49(B)(2). In Case No. 2004CR0881, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of theft by deception, a fifth degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3). Upon journalization of Appellant’s sentences in the above cases, the trial
court failed to properly memorialize the manner of conviction, that being Appellant’s entering a plea of guilty to the charges. On May 21, 2010, Appellant moved the trial court to revise/correct his
sentencing entries to comply with Criminal Rule 32(C) and State v. Baker, (2008), 119
Ohio St.3d 197,
{¶5} On June 2, 2010, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion and issued amended sentencing entries to comply with Criminal Rule 32(C) and the Supreme Court’s holding in Baker .
{¶6} On June 17, 2010, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the June 2, 2010 resentencing entries, assigning as error: “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DID NOT INFORM MR. JONES AT ALL OF POST-RELEASE CONTROL DURING THE PLEA HEARING PRIOR TO ACCEPTING HIS PLEAS, THEREBY FAILING TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH THE MAXIMUM PENALTY-COMPONENT OF CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(A). “II. MR. JONES WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
I. As set forth in the Statement of the Case, above, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion to revise/correct the sentencing entries finding the trial court’s previous sentencing entries did not comply with Criminal Rule 32(C) and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Baker (2008), 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio- 3330. The Court in Baker held in the syllabus, “A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02
when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court. (Crim.R.32(C), explained.)”
{¶11} Accordingly, Appellant’s sentencing entries were not final and appealable until June 2, 2010 when the trial court corrected the entries to comply with Criminal Rule 32. Therefore, Appellant’s direct appeal is timely and properly before this Court.
{¶12}
In his first assignment of error, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in
failing to inform him of a term of post-release control during the plea hearing prior to
accepting his plea; thereby, failing to comply with Criminal Rule 11 (C)(2).
In State v. Sarkozy, (2008),
held, “Accordingly, we hold that if a trial court fails during a plea colloquy to
advise a defendant that the sentence will include a mandatory term of postrelease
control, the defendant may dispute the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the
plea either by filing a motion to withdraw the plea or upon direct appeal. Further, we
hold that if the trial court fails during the plea colloquy to advise a defendant that the
sentence will include a mandatory term of postrelease control, the court fails to comply
with Crim.R. 11 and the reviewing court must vacate the plea and remand the cause.”
In State v. Holmes , Licking App. No. 09 CA 70,
appellant's plea, that he would be placed on three years of PRC was insufficient in light
of State v. Sarkozy,
address the defendant personally and to convey certain information to such defendant,
and makes clear that the trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without
performing these duties. As such, the PRC notification must be made prior to the court's
acceptance of the plea. See Sarkozy at ¶ 11, ¶ 25,
to the court's acceptance of the plea, [footnote omitted] we find a lack of substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) and a demonstration of prejudicial error under Sarkozy and its progeny.” In the case sub judice, the trial court was required to inform Appellant of
the possibility of any mandatory or discretionary terms of post-release control as part of
the maximum penalty involved in order to satisfy Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a). Therefore,
in order for Appellant to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter a plea, the trial
court was required to inform Appellant a post-release control sanction was a possibility
for the offenses to which he was pleading before the trial court accepted his plea. State
v. Douglas
control prior to accepting his plea; therefore, Appellant’s plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Appellant’s assigned error is sustained. Appellant’s convictions and
sentences are reversed and the cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law and this opinion.
II. In the second assignment of error, Appellant asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as his trial counsel failed to ensure he was aware of and understood the maximum penalty also included post-release control prior to his entering his pleas. Based upon our analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first assignment of
error, we find Appellant’s second assignment of error moot.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Edwards, J. and
Delaney, J. concur
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________ s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________ HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO :
: :
: : JUDGMENT ENTRY
: :
: : Case Nos. 10CA75
For the reason stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law and this opinion. Costs to Appellee.
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________ s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________ HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO :
: :
: : JUDGMENT ENTRY
: :
: : Case Nos. 10CA76
For the reason stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law and this opinion. Costs to Appellee.
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________ s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________ HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO :
: :
: : JUDGMENT ENTRY
: :
: : Case Nos. 10CA77
For the reason stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law and this opinion. Costs to Appellee.
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________ s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________ HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
Notes
[1] A rendition of the facts is unnecessary for our resolution of these appeals.