STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Casey L. JONES, Respondent.
No. S-486.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Sept. 20, 1985.
706 P.2d 317
We therefore hold that the equitable defense of laches is a bar to Breck‘s claims for injunctive relief against petitioners.
REVERSED.
BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ., dissenting.
BURKE, Justice, with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the holding that Breck‘s action is barred by laches.
The trial court found that Breck gave ample notice of her opposition to the project and the reasons for it, and did not, under the circumstances, unreasonably delay in bringing suit. The court found also that the alleged injury to petitioners was not caused by Breck‘s delay, but rather by their own haste in proceeding with the project despite the serious questions raised concerning the legality of the bidding procedures. In reaching its decision, the trial court gave careful consideration to the evidence before it, and I am unable to say that the court‘s findings were clearly erroneous. In light of these findings, I do not see how into a partially completed job; and (8) legal fees. Gerken adds the following to the list: (9) cost increases due to climatic factors, (10) limited liability of second contractor for errors in work already performed, and (11) damage to the people and industry of Juneau due to the continuation of the downtown parking problem. Breck, on the other hand, contends that rebidding in the proper manner will result in a substantial savings for the City and Borough. However, petitioners’ evidence concerning cost increases was not contested by Breck.
I would affirm the judgment. Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976).
No specific time must elapse before the defense of laches can be raised because the propriety of refusing to hear a claim turns as much upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the length of a plaintiff‘s delay.
In our decisions we have noted the interdependence between the elements of delay and prejudice. See Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 767 (Alaska 1977); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 15-16 (Alaska 1976). In Pavlik v. State, 637 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Alaska 1981) we said: “Thus, where there is a long delay, a lesser degree of prejudice will be required.” (footnote omitted).
Fleur Roberts, Law Offices of Dick L. Madson, for respondent.
Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
OPINION
MOORE, Justice.
Casey Jones was convicted of possession of cocaine,
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Based on information obtained from a juvenile that defendant Casey Jones was selling cocaine, the Fairbanks police applied for a warrant to search Jones’ apartment. The affidavit supporting the warrant application contained the following statement:
- That your affiant is a detective with the City of Fairbanks Police Department.
- That B.V., a juvenile, whose name may be obtained through proper motion to the court, told your affiant that on June 12, 1982, B.V. went with
another individual to Casey Jones’ apartment located in Story Apartments at 119 Bridget Street in Fairbanks where B.V.‘s companion purchased one half gram of cocaine. - B.V. stated to your affiant that he has been to Jones’ apartment ten to fifteen times when he or his companions have purchased cocaine from Jones in the past few months.
- That B.V. pointed out the entrance to Jones’ apartment as the door on the northwest corner of the building at 119 Bridget Street, a multi-unit apartment building, said door leading down to Jones’ apartment. The name Story Apartments appears on the front of the building. B.V. stated that Jones has a set of triple-beam scales that he uses for measuring cocaine in the apartment.
- Officer Frank Colletta of the Metro Unit in Fairbanks told your affiant today that the entrance as described by B.V. is the entrance to Casey L. Jones’ apartment.
- That in my experience with the Metro Unit in Fairbanks, records of drug transactions, substantial U.S. currency and drug paraphernalia are often present in the residences of persons who sell cocaine.
- Your affiant has eighteen months experience investigating drug cases with Metro Team, Fairbanks.
After the execution of this search warrant, Jones was indicted for possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine and tampering with physical evidence. He was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine and tampering with physical evidence. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, because it believed that the affidavit provided insufficient information “to enable a magistrate to independently determine probable cause under either current federal law, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), or former law as enunciated in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).” Jones at 365.
II. THE GATES TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the magistrate issued a search warrant based on the following affidavit:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other narcotic and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.
Id. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511, 12 L.Ed.2d at 725. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant‘s conviction because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. The Court required that:
The magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was “credible” or his information “reliable“.
Id. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1513-14, 12 L.Ed.2d at 729. Therefore, the two-pronged test required that the affidavit establish (1) the informant‘s basis of knowledge, and (2) the informant‘s credibility or the reliability of his information.
The U.S. Supreme Court modified the Aguilar test in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). For the first prong requiring basis of knowledge, the Court allowed some detailed tips from informants to be self-verifying.
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused‘s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual‘s general reputation.
Id. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed.2d at 644. In addition, independent police corroboration of details in the informant‘s tip could establish the informant‘s credibility or the reliability of his information under the second prong. Id. at 417, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed.2d at 644.
In construing provisions of the Alaska Constitution similar to the United States Constitution, we give careful consideration to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, although we are not bound by them. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 1978). Thus, we have followed the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis in cases involving both the Fourth Amendment and
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in favor of a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Under this approach,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548. The sole task of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. The state asks us to apply the Gates test under the state as well as the federal constitution to uphold the search warrant in this case. We decline this request. As the Washington Supreme Court stated regarding the Gates test:
Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal constitutional provisions [does] not preclude us from taking a more expansive view of [the state constitution] where the United States Supreme Court determines to further limit federal guaranties in a manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements.
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984).2 Similarly, we may construe Alaska‘s constitutional provisions such as
The Supreme Court offered several reasons for abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court asserted (1) that probable cause is a fluid concept involving an assess-
These propositions do not persuade us that we should abandon the Aguilar-Spinelli test under
Aguilar and Spinelli require the police to provide magistrates with certain crucial information. They also provide structure for magistrates’ probable cause inquiries. In so doing, Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magis-
trates as independent arbiters of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the substantive value of precluding findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything less than information from an honest or credible person who has acquired his information in a reliable way.
Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
We have also emphasized the independent role of a magistrate in the determination of probable cause. Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 281 (Alaska 1978). When an affidavit relies upon the assertion of a confidential informant to establish probable cause, the affiant must set forth sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to assess the informant‘s probable credibility. “Only if this requirement is met can a reviewing court be certain that the magistrate has fulfilled his constitutional duty to render an independent determination that probable cause exists.” Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1216.
As for proposition (2), a strong showing on one prong should not overcome a deficiency in the other prong. For example, we have held that a sufficiently detailed tip could support an inference of an informant‘s personal knowledge under the “basis of knowledge” prong. Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1972), rev‘d on other grounds, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). However, a detailed description by itself sheds no light on an informant‘s veracity. “If the informant were concocting a story out of whole cloth, he could fabricate in fine detail as easily as with rough brush strokes.” Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (1974).
Conversely, a strong showing of the informant‘s veracity does not compensate for a failure to explain how the informant reached his conclusions. “Truthful persons
In proposition (3), the Supreme Court notes that nonlawyers often draft affidavits in the haste of criminal investigation. In Keller, we stated:
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent the police from hasty, ill-advised, or unreasonable actions in “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
Id. at 1219 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)). “Because nonlawyers are so often involved in the initial probable cause determination, there is a need for a test that provides more guidance than a totality of circumstances approach.”4 As Justice White states in his concurring opinion, it will often be a difficult question whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis for issuing a warrant. However, rather than “totally abdicating our responsibility in this area,” we should “attempt to provide more precise guidance” for the police and magistrates. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2350, 76 L.Ed.2d at 571 (White, J., concurring).5
Proposition (4) states that a court should not undertake a de novo review of the sufficiency of the warrant. Under Alaska law, a magistrate‘s initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference. The resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference accorded to warrants. Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979). Therefore, proposition (4) merely reiterates the present state of the law in Alaska.
We find proposition (5) equally unpersuasive. Under Alaska law, there has been a strong preference for the warrant process. We have previously stated:
the principle of antecedent justification is so central to the Fourth Amendment that subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)). See also Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1219-20; Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 735 (Alaska 1979) (expressing strong preference for the warrant process under the state constitution).
Finally, in proposition (6), the Gates majority asserted that rigid application of the two-pronged test could seriously impede law enforcement by diminishing the value of anonymous tips in police work. In part, the United States Supreme Court was probably influenced by the Illinois court‘s appli-
In contrast, however, Alaska case law reflects a flexible application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. For example, in Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565 (Alaska 1980), police corroboration of details provided by a confidential informant sufficiently established probable cause. We rejected the defendant‘s argument that police should verify an incriminating fact before corroboration could be used to demonstrate an informant‘s credibility, because this “would severely limit the use of informants to provide probable cause.” Id. at 577. See also Kralick v. State, 647 P.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Alaska App.1982) (magistrate could conclude that informant‘s tip was based on his personal observations because the tip‘s information was sufficiently detailed to support an inference of personal knowledge. Additionally, the informant‘s credibility was demonstrated by police observations). Under Alaska law, the anonymous tip continues to play an important role in police work.6
III. ANALYSIS OF AFFIDAVITS UNDER THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION
After carefully reviewing the majority‘s reasoning in Gates, we conclude that the
Gates totality of the circumstances approach does not provide the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures required by
When a search warrant is based on the hearsay statement of a confidential informant, the affiant must establish the informant‘s basis of knowledge and veracity. To establish the informant‘s basis of knowledge, the information must be based on the informant‘s personal observations, not his suspicions or beliefs. Davis v. State, 499 P.2d at 1029. If the affidavit lacks an affirmative allegation of the informant‘s personal knowledge, “the facts supplied must be so detailed as to support an inference of personal knowledge.” Id.; see Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1217.
Additionally, the affiant must inform the magistrate or judge of some of the underlying circumstances that led the affiant to conclude that the informant was
We now proceed to test the affidavit in this case to assess whether it properly established the confidential informant‘s basis of knowledge and veracity. To satisfy the first prong, the affidavit states that the informant B.V. had personal knowledge of Jones’ drug dealing through his own purchases. We conclude that the basis of knowledge prong was adequately demonstrated. Morris v. State, 473 P.2d 603, 605 (Alaska 1970).
However, the affidavit does not satisfy the second prong of the test because it does not properly establish the informant‘s veracity. The affiant does not contend that B.V. provided reliable information in the past. Nor does the affidavit state that the police conducted an independent investigation to corroborate the accuracy of B.V.‘s contention that Jones was a cocaine dealer. A mere confirmation that Jones actually lived in the apartment indicated by B.V. does not qualify as independent corroboration by the police. See Clark v. State, 704 P.2d at 804. B.V.‘s tip, standing alone, could not establish probable cause. However, the police could have used the tip to further their investigation into Jones’ activities.11
On the issue of statements against penal interest, the court of appeals did not regard B.V.‘s statements as inherently credible. First, the court noted that it is not a crime to be present when someone else is purchasing cocaine. Second, vague admissions about past purchases of cocaine would not support a criminal prosecution absent evidence of a specific purchase. The court also stated:
More significantly, the affidavit does not explain the circumstances under which B.V.‘s statements were made. If B.V. was being prosecuted by juvenile authorities for drug transactions unrelated to Casey Jones, he would hardly view his statement that he had purchased cocaine in the past from Jones as increasing his exposure to criminal sanctions.
Jones v. State, 681 P.2d at 365.
We require that the police provide full disclosure of all relevant circumstances so that a magistrate can independently as-
The affidavit provided the only evidence for the magistrate to determine probable cause in this case. In determining the validity of a search warrant, a reviewing court may consider only information brought to the issuing magistrate‘s attention. Morris v. State, 473 P.2d at 605. It is imperative under the Alaska Constitution that the magistrate be presented with adequate supporting facts so that he can independently test the confidential informant‘s basis of knowledge and veracity.13 Only if these requirements are met “can a reviewing court be certain that the magistrate has fulfilled his constitutional duty to render an independent determination that probable cause exists.” Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1216.
In this case, the magistrate did not have sufficient information in the affidavit to make a reasoned decision to issue the search warrant. Consequently, the warrant was improperly issued and the fruits of the search must be suppressed.
The decision of the court of appeals reversing the superior court is hereby AFFIRMED on the basis of the Alaska Constitution.
MATTHEWS, Justice, dissenting.
I.
This case is a good illustration of why the so-called two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) has been abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. There is no reason to doubt that B.V.‘s story as related in the affidavit of officer Fitzgerald was true. It was based on the personal
It is well to remember that the framers of the Alaska Constitution only required that probable cause be present before a search warrant could be issued.
Probable cause to search exists if the man of ordinary caution would be justified in believing that what is sought will be found in the place to be searched ... and that what is sought, if not contraband or fruits or implements of crime, will “aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.”
State v. Doe, 115 N.H. 682, 371 A.2d 167 (1975), quoted with approval in 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1, at 442 n. 21 (1978).
This test, or tests of similar generality, having as a common element the reason-
able man or the person of ordinary caution who must conclude from all the facts and circumstances that the thing sought is probably present in the place to be searched, was the generally understood test for probable cause to search when our constitution was adopted in 1956. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441, 45 S.Ct. 546, 548, 69 L.Ed. 1032, 1036 (1925); United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (E.D.Tenn.1956); United States v. Evans, 97 F.Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.Tenn.1951); Tischler v. State, 206 Md. 386, 111 A.2d 655, 657 (1955). Since the language used by the framers of our constitution was the same as that of the federal constitution, and of many states, there is every reason to suppose that a meaning similar to that prevailing elsewhere was intended.1 To the extent that the Aguilar test may serve as a guide in determining the question of probable cause it can be used. However, when it requires a result at odds with the meaning of probable cause, it is Aguilar and not the meaning of probable cause that should give way.
The premise of the “veracity prong” of the Aguilar test is that all informants are unworthy of belief until proven otherwise. I question whether this premise is warranted by actual experience. Certainly the assumption of our evidence rules is that witnesses may be believed without first proving their credibility, as evidence of a witnesses good character, or a specific instance of his truthfulness, is not even admissible unless the witnesses credibility has first been attacked. Ev.R. 608(a) and (b). Thus, B.V.‘s testimony would be admissible at trial and could serve as a basis for convicting Jones. Since the standard of proof required to convict is much stricter than that needed to obtain a warrant, it is an anomaly that his statement has been ruled insufficient as a basis for a warrant.
II.
Not only does the majority err by clinging to the Aguilar test, it compounds the error by misapplying it. It is clear that an informant‘s veracity for the purposes of Aguilar may be established when he makes statements against his penal interest. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). In this case, the majority concludes that B.V.‘s statement did not qualify as a statement against penal interest because B.V.‘s admission would not subject him to criminal liability unless evidence of the corpus
delicti for a specific purchase were present. This restrictive and technical interpretation of “against penal interest” is in conflict with the Harris opinion.
B.V.‘s statement is nearly parallel to that of the informant in Harris, who told the affiant that he had bought illicit liquor at the defendant‘s residence “for a period of two years and most recently within the past two weeks.” 403 U.S. at 575, 91 S.Ct. at 2078, 29 L.Ed.2d at 729. Like this case, the affidavit in Harris said nothing about whether evidence of the corpus delicti of the informant‘s admitted crimes was available. Even so, the Supreme Court had little trouble in finding that the unsupported admissions were sufficient to satisfy the veracity requirement.
Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. That the informant may be paid or promised a “break” does not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of having admitting criminal conduct. Concededly admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another. But here the informant‘s admission that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit liquor on certain premises itself and without more, implicated that property and furnished probable cause to search.
403 U.S. at 583-84, 91 S.Ct. at 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d at 734.
Since B.V.‘s statement cannot be distinguished from that presented in Harris in any principled way, B.V.‘s statement should be regarded as sufficiently adverse to his penal interest to satisfy the veracity requirement of the Aguilar test.2 Thus,
tion concerning the circumstances under which the statement was made. Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir.1974) (statement that informant had purchased marijuana from defendant on several occasions sufficient); and State v. Archuleta, 85 N.M. 146, 509 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App.1973), cert. den. 85 N.M. 145, 509 P.2d 1340 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 876, 94 S.Ct. 85, 38 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973) (statement that informant had made approximately ten purchases of heroin at a specified residence sufficient without additional facts).
Notes
Searches and Seizures. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Right of Privacy. The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.
See State v. Wassillie, 606 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Alaska 1980) where in denying bail to a convict awaiting sentencing we said:
If a result at variance with the historic experience of our sister states were intended, the framers would have found the words to ex-
press it. Far from doing so, they chose largely customary phraseology.... It is plain to us that the framers of our constitution intended the same result.
This reasoning is most appropriate in our interpretation of the meaning of probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court decided that the test for determining probable cause should be stricter under article 24 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the court concluded:
We reject the “totality of the circumstances” test now espoused by a majority of the United States Supreme Court [in Gates]. That standard is flexible, but it is also “unacceptably shapeless and permissive.” ... The Federal test lacks the precision we believe can and should be articulated in stating a test for determining probable cause.
Id. at 556 (citation omitted). The court reasoned that the principles developed under Aguilar and Spinelli, “if not applied hypertechnically, provide a more appropriate structure for probable cause inquiries” under the Massachusetts Constitution. Id.
See also People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d 870, 206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634, 638-39 (1984) (court follows Aguilar‘s two-pronged test under California Constitution).
Other authorities have found that an informant‘s veracity was sufficiently established for the purposes of Aguilar by a statement against penal interest which does not contain informa-In a cogent criticism of proposition (3) of the Gates majority, Professor LaFave wrote:
The now abandoned Aguilar formula provided direction and thus afforded some assurance of rational decision making.... The Court‘s prior cases, by stressing the independent importance of both the veracity and the basis of knowledge inquiries and by identifying various ways in which each requirement could be met, provided a most useful framework within which both police and magistrates could meaningfully operate. By comparison, the Gates approach, consisting largely of an exhortation to use common sense, does not afford guidance to police and magistrates. It thus enhances the risk that probable cause determinations will be grounded more upon the predilictions of the decisionmaker and less upon established rules of law....
LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. of Crim.L. & Criminology 1171, 1189-90 (1983).
Regarding the proper function of the anonymous tip in police work, Professor LaFave noted:
Certainly, as Justice Brennan pointed out, there “is no basis for treating anonymous informants as presumptively reliable” nor “for assuming that the information provided by an anonymous informant has been obtained in a reliable way.” [Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2356, 76 L.Ed. at 578] But an anonymous tip can prompt a police investigation by which the necessary facts could be developed, as the Gates case itself illustrates.... [I]f the police had heeded the [anonymous] letter writer‘s promise [in Gates] that “if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch,” other facts would doubtless have come to light adding up to the pre-Gates quantum of probable cause. That is the proper place of informants in the probable cause equation.
LaFave, supra note 5, at 1192 (footnotes omitted); see also Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1220 (commending police work in verification of details in informant‘s statement).
See 1 W. LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3 at 499. As Justice Harlan pointed out in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 599, 91 S.Ct. at 2089, 29 L.Ed.2d at 743:
the ordinary citizen who has never before reported a crime to the police may, in fact, be more reliable than one who supplies information on a regular basis. “The latter is likely to be someone who is himself involved in criminal activity or is, at least, someone who enjoys the confidence of criminals.”
In Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d at 394-95, we stated:
In order to prevent groundless searches based on wholly unreliable information from being inflicted on citizens of this State, we shall continue to insist that the circumstances that would justify a magistrate in crediting an informant‘s statements shall be set out with specificity in the affidavit.