State v. Jones

29.65.010(5) contest allows a RCW may be contested. office illegal must be The votes votes." illegal account "[o]n institutions, court, of all Surely the statute. under their by may penalized be persons understand ought merely only illegal, is what is for what government improper. be undesirable or claimed to is for someone who improper clearly It is as well illegal in Gold Bar. See RCW to vote resident of Seattle lifelong clear it is equally it is improper While it 29.85.200. Bar to Gold vote validly for a voter illegal registered of the election it in Gold Bar. At the time in an election ques- being whose residence is now the voters undisputed This voters in Bar. valid validly Gold registered tioned were see changed, registration continues until registration see 29.59. 29.10, RCW properly challenged, or until RCW For this court now occurred in this case. Neither event process and election registration moves the hold otherwise places law and it within the being away governed from held whims, propriety judges. notions of caprices, and I dissent. JJ., concur with Dol- Brachtenbach, Dore,

Utter, LIVER, J. September denied

Reconsideration 9, 1983.] En Banc. June 49016-3. [No. Larry Respondent, v. Washington,

The State Petitioner. Jones, Richard McKay Franco, Asia, Gaitan, & E. Gaitan and Jose Finegold, peti- Bensussen, & for Zulauf, Coe Jon R. tioner. Attorney, Maleng, Prosecuting Lobsenz, E.

Norm James Phillips, Deputy, Special Deputy, and Deborah J. respondent. presents question a of when J. This case Utter, guilty by may plea a of not reason of enter

(NGI) long objection. that, hold over a defendant's We competent trial, a court as the defendant is to stand rarely, duty ever, take that it have a such action but does plea an NGI is intelli- to assure the defendant's waiver of voluntary. present gent the court in the case and Because impose we NGI on a defendant and did prejudicial, for a new find we reverse and remand that error trial. degree Larry charged

Petitioner, Jones, was with second pleaded trial, he with firearm. At assault while armed any sought forgo guilty, claiming self-defense, NGI request, plea. prosecutor's however, Mr. and over At the objections, an NGI entered the trial court Jones' strenuous plea argue appointed him and amicus counsel for jury defense. The returned a verdict finding that Mr. had charged, Jones committed the acts but was insane at the time. The jury also recommended that Mr. Jones undergo less restrictive treatment than commitment to a however, state mental hospital; the court nonetheless ordered commitment because Mr. Jones indicated he would cooperate with less treatment. restrictive alleged assault place midnight took around March University at the when Leif Washington Granrud, plainclothes campus officer, police up drove Mr. Jones an unmarked car. Both Mr. Jones and Officer that, agree Granrud when Officer questioned Granrud Jones, approached Mr. Mr. Jones pistol. They drew a struggled when Officer Granrud grabbed gun and dur- shots ing struggle Help two were fired. arrived before anyone hurt. was outline,

Outside this Mr. Jones' general and Officer Granrud's versions of the incident differ. Mr. Jones testified Granrud, gun only that he drew his because Officer who officer, never identified himself as a police made a motion Granrud, toward gun hip. on his Officer while conceding identify himself, any that he did not denied making motion Further, gun. for his he testified that Mr. Jones threatened that, him to abduct when he asked he how could be loaded, sure gun Mr. Jones threatened him Jones, shoot and cocked the Mr. gun. on the other hand, testified he only intended to hold Officer Gran- rud until him in help only arrived and threatened to shoot stay if he car leg didn't where Mr. Jones had him. placed Mr. Jones also testified that went off gun accidentally.

Because rather story Mr. Jones told a unusual about asylum his life seek fearing planning political Canada, inquiry competency the court ordered an into his to stand psychiatrists, trial. Several one retained including defense, for the Mr. he examined Jones concluded was trial; however, competent to stand all but one also indi- cated to the court that Mr. they para- believed Jones was a the time of the insane at and was schizophrenic noid assault. alleged It to stand trial. Mr. Jones court found

The enter that the court the State's motion then considered hearing After objection. argu- Jones' Mr. plea NGI over motion, only that granted concluding that ment, the court Mr. had a that Jones valid possibility" "strong was a there danger" and that there was "substantial insanity defense asserted. The also be convicted it was not he would to present appointed amicus counsel be that directed Mr. Jones' insanity the court denied Finally, defense. "guilt"1 phase to bifurcate the trial into motion could phase, did rule that the State though it pre- the defense insanity only evidence of after introduce its sented case. and, after the court proceeded

The trial ordered case, sought counsel presented Mr. Jones amicus counsel legally this, he was amicus prove insane. To do two Mr. Jones psychiatrists called who had examined competency, psychiatrist determine his one a state to the lat- psychiatrist. objected one the defense Mr. Jones it was sub- psychiatrist's testimony ground ter on the attorney-client but his ject privilege, objection overruled. and insan- jury was instructed on both self-defense being

ity and verdict described After returned the above. brought committed Mr. Jones Hospital, to Western respects appeal. Appeals affirmed all Court (1982)) (see Jones, Wn. App. State v. 647 P.2d 1039 petitioned and Mr. Jones for review this court. I A as both to enter an NGI can be viewed Refusing accuracy, goes guilt. noted, with technical also 1 The State has phase "guilt" phase to mean that of a bifurcated We term here use the charged has jury has the act whether the defendant done which the decides "noninsanity" defenses. no 740 guilty plea guilty only of a

one-half one is if one —since proscribed mentally responsible does a both act and is at aspect strategy. time—and as an of defense The extent right plead which a defendant to has a to refuse to NGI is any right plead guilty therefore intertwined with he has to control his own defense. and/or Washington, rights

In both such exist. While there is no (North right plead guilty federal constitutional to Carolina 25, 400 Alford, U.S. n.11, 38 L. 162, 27 Ed. 2d 91 S. Ct. (1970)), right 160 such a has been established this state 4.2(a) upon rule. CrR confers informed defendants right plead guilty unhampered by the wishes of the (1980). State v. Martin, State. 614 P.2d 164 addition, right In a defendant has a constitutional to at broadly least control his own In Faretta v. defense. Cali- (1975), 422 806, U.S. fornia, L. 45 Ed. 2d 95 S. Ct. 2525 Supreme States Court held that a defendant right represent has a constitutional himself at trial: "The provide merely Sixth Amendment does not that a defense grants be per- shall made accused; for the it to the accused sonally right to make Faretta, his defense." at 819. right self-representation Moreover, this of does not arise as aspect right "independently of counsel, but is history found in the structure and of the constitutional Faretta, text." at 819 n.15. language reasoning necessarily imply Faretta right personally Singer, control one's own defense. See Imposition Insanity Unwilling on Defense (1980); 41

Defendant, Ohio Chused, St. L.J. Repre Faretta and the Personal The Role Defense: sented Tactics, Trial L. 65 Cal. Rev. Defendant particular, Faretta "the embodies conviction right type a defendant decide, limits, has the within of defense he Laura, wishes to mount." United States v. (3d 1979). 607 F.2d Cir. See North Carolina v. also supra (quoting Tremblay Alford, Overholser, (D.D.C. 1961) Supp. ("[courts] F. should not 'force any particularly case,' defense on a a criminal in disaster. 'end might of the defense

when advancement (D.C. States, 408 A.2d v. United . Frendak . and Faretta is that 1979) underlying (philosophy Alford person freedom as mandates a defendant's "respect for to make fundamental decisions permitted he or she proceedings"). course of the about and control one's own defense plead The rights absolute, exercising right however. A defendant his are by implication and thus a defendant self-representation, defense, own must to control his exercising right relinquish the benefits he intelligently'" and "'knowingly dangers be made of the and dis- and "should aware forgoes Faretta, Similarly, of his at a advantages" decision. 835. may accept plea unless it is intelligent court Alabama, voluntary. 31; Boykin v. U.S. Alford, and at 395 238, (1969). L. 242, 274, 23 2d In addi- Ed. 89 S. Ct. 1709 tion, a competent defendant must be to make these intelli- Sieling and 478 voluntary Eyman, decisions. See v. gent (9th 215, 1973) 221 F.2d plead guilty); Cir. (competency Kolocotronis, v. Wn.2d 436 P.2d (1968) Ed. Arizona, Westbrook L. (citing 384 U.S. curiam) (1966) (competency 2d (per 86 S. Ct. 1320 self)). represent

B particular Courts have two basic to the approaches taken NGI sponte impose a court sua an question of whether Note, Right See plea unwilling an defendant. Impose Insanity Court Responsibility Defense 927, 928- Objection, Over the Minn. L. Rev. Defendant's (1981) (hereinafter Note). taken Minn. The first is (hereinafter Cir D.C. Columbia District of Circuit cuit) recognizes It Appeals. of the States Court of sua NGI in the trial court to enter an broad discretion See justice. necessary pursuit sponte whenever (D.C. Cir.), States, v. United 346 F.2d 818-19 Whalem its discre denied, exercising cert. In 382 U.S. 862 factors, tion, including is to various weigh defense, insanity opposition asserting defendant's of the defendant's quality reasoning, the viability of the defense, the court's personal defendant, observations of the the reasonableness of the defendant's decision. United (D.C. Wright, 1980). States 627 F.2d Cir. for the rule is that society rationale has obligation, "[an] defense, through to withhold punishment of blameworthy." Wright, 1310; Whalem, someone at at This, the D.C. concluded, 818. Circuit has distinguishes Faretta. Wright, See at 1309-10. Alford States, (D.C. 1979) In Frendak v. United 408 A.2d 364 contrast, the District of Appeals Columbia Court of con- cluded and Faretta required reevaluation Alford Circuit Frendak, D.C. rule. at 375. underlying philosophy of and Faretta [T]he Alford

inconsistent with Whalem currently interpreted. as Whalem succeeding substantially cases have laid more emphasis on support- of the evidence strength ing contrast, defense than on the defendant's choice. respect and Faretta reason that for a Alford defendant's or person freedom as a mandates that he she permitted be course fundamental make decisions about proceedings. Frendak, Thus, Appeals the D.C. Court of con- cluded, any competent right defendant has the absolute refuse an plea, NGI as he is to make and long Frendak, does make an and voluntary waiver. at intelligent 378.

The D.C. the Frendak in rejected approach Circuit United States it Wright, supra, questioned whether practice. Wright, would in See at 1311- differ significantly Nonetheless, 12. in approaches we believe that differ First, important solely in Frendak is respects. two focus most, present much, while of on mental condition D.C. Circuit's the defendant's mental condition focus is on Note, 936-38. alleged at the time Minn. at offense. of Second, differ in the which approaches two standard Note, assess the mental Minn. they defendant's condition. Frendak, competency Under the court on at 938-42. focuses while, Circuit approach, to make decisions under the D.C. insanity. legal on the court focuses

C First, we its for several reasons. find favor Frendak We in Faretta accord with more reasoning Alford. cases attempt distinguish involving Circuit's to D.C. A is not unpersuasive. defense is defendant who a insanity is no more blameless than of because guilty defense or acted has a valid alibi who who defendant these impose Yet courts do not legitimate self-defense. Singer, unwilling defendants. other defenses respect that basic in the belief More we concur generally permit requires us to for a individual freedom defendant's Frendak, See plea. himself to determine the defendant Frendak, there exist at 376. As noted the court forgo choose why might defendant numerous reasons a may be a bifurcation, such a choice an NGI Absent plea. conflicts insanity defense where the wise tactical maneuver interpose. some defense the defendant wishes with other institu- in mental may find confinement a The defendant in prison. tion distasteful than confinement more damaging. be more insanity may in some cases stigma rea- may Finally, legitimate philosophical a defendant have view such entry plea. an NGI He for opposing sons wish which he does not guilt admission tacit maintain Alternatively, may admit act but he make. symbolize opposi- it his strong its or intend justifiability com- The forced mental policy of the State. tion to some their countries to discredit in other critics mitment Fireside, H. generally See well documented. dissent (1979); Podrabnik, A. Punitive Psycho-Prisons Soviet Medicine pro- right plead guilty of a state

The existence Frendak adopting rationale independent vides an Martin, supra, approach. Under if he plead right has the absolute voluntarily. intelligently if he does so chooses and necessarily waives both a defendant plea, such a entering right plead not guilty and his right plead reason of insanity. To hold that a defendant has a to waive right both rights together but not to waive them separately strikes us wholly absurd.

Recognition of the standard enunciated Frendak is also consistent with most of our other decisions addressing the rights of criminal defendants to determine their own In pleas. Dodd, State v. 70 Wn.2d 424 P.2d cert. denied, (1967), 387 U.S. rejected wherein we a defend ant's claim that the trial court should have forced him to enter an plea, NGI we enunciated virtually standard identical to that of Frendak.

If a sufficient intelligence defendant has to rationally trial, choose plead whether to stand guilty, or enter plea of mental irresponsibility, choice is his —not that of his attorney constitution him gives the right —for to appear and defend either in person or by counsel. Const. 22. art. §

Dodd, Accord, State v. Johnston, 84 Wn.2d 577, 527 P.2d 1310 approach

While we follow the did D.C. Circuit Smith, (1977), State v. 564 P.2d 1154 we no longer persuasive find that reasoning for the reasons Smith already described.2 prior inconsistent with the analysis Dodd and Johnston as well subsequent as the in Martin. We decision therefore overrule Smith extent it inconsistent today. with our decision

II waiver of all As with waiver rights, NGI plea satisfy must certain conditions in order to be constitution- reiterating reasoning Whalem, 2 In addition of the D.C. Circuit clearly court in Smith further to state that went would be [i]t unconstitutional permit legally a defendant who the conviction of insane at the time of the Smith, authority proposi commission of the crime.” at 643. Yet the cited for this tion, Strasburg, (1910), only State v. 60 Wash. 110 P. 1020 holds that a right defense, defendant has a constitutional to claim as a not that he Strasburg, right. today that, not waive that See at 121. We hold in addition right insanity defense, to the right to assert an criminal defendants also have a waive the defense. capable must the defendant ally particular, valid. and volun- intelligent make an actually and must making Frendak, judge the trial tary requires at 380. This decision. that the defend- inquiry designed to assure "conduct to available, fully the alternatives has been informed of ant to assert the failing comprehends consequences the of or waive the defense, raise freely chooses to [insanity] Khan, Super. N.J. Frendak, 380; v. 175 at defense." (1980). instances, defend- 72, the 82, In some 417 A.2d 585 and vol- intelligent to make ant not be untary decision. how Frendak approach, the

Among adopting the courts ever, between disagreement relationship there is about competency to waive the defense and competency of split arises not from a difference to stand trial. The competency necessary level to opinion regarding the waive the defense but rather from differences to trial. regarding competency necessary the level of stand Khan, itself, v. at In Frendak the court supra See State 82. neces greater degree competency concluded that for insanity defense because the test sary to waive the "is to measure to stand trial intended competency making capable intelligent is also whether the defendant the defense." important relating matters decisions hand, Frendak, Khan, the court In on the other at 379. insan competency the test for waive concluded that trial were competency the test for stand ity defense and require Jersey in New latter does identical because Khan, Peo See also at 82. ability help plan defense. 931, 938, Rptr. 94 Cal. 543 Redmond, App. 16 Cal. 3d v. ple Gauze, (1971), People v. 15 Cal. 3d approved Rptr. P.2d Cal. conclusion, standards competency Frendak's differ, do insanity defense and standing waiver large part It premised shaky foundation. upon rests necessary competency the level of holding on decisions trial, necessary to stand plead than that greater "ability make a reasoned requires an the former because presented". Sieling among choice alternatives (9th 1973), Cir. Frendak, F.2d cited in Eyman, 478 Sieling its progeny have been severely criti- however, cized, represent and do See majority view. ex Heral Franzen, States rel. 667 F.2d 637- 1981) (7th Note, Cir. cases cited therein; Compe- To Plead Guilty tence To Stand Trial: A New Stand- ard When Criminal Counsel, Waives 68 Va. Defendant (1982) (hereinafter Note). L. Rev. 1148-51 Va. We believe the better view is that competency both stand- require should ards an ability necessary to make decisions See, e.g., Note, at trial. To Plead A Competence Guilty: Standard, New Duke L.J. 169-70. event, any the test for competency to stand trial

Washington does rise to level competency to waive the insanity As in Jersey, defense. New a Washington " defendant must capable be in his own assisting] 10.77.010(6), defense". Wicklund, RCW cited in State v. 96 Wn.2d (1982); Frendak, P.2d 1241 at cf. States, (quoting Dusky v. 362 U.S. 4 L. Ed. 2d (1960) curiam) (defendant 80 S. (per Ct. 788 only need ability have "to with his lawyer consult with a reasonable degree understanding")). rational We construe this to ability include the to same understand among and choose alternative which is defenses to and necessary intelligently Note, voluntarily Accord, waive the defense. Va. at 1141.

Thus, only permissible inquiries when defendant seeks to waive his defense he is are whether com- petent to stand trial and whether his is intelligent decision and If court finds voluntary.3 that the defendant is not only by represented 3 We deal here with waiver defendants counsel. Where himself, represents rights a defendant his decisions to waive various be should carefully higher Note, competency applied. scrutinized more and a standard Va. 1151-54; Arizona, at Westbrook v. L. 384 U.S. Ed. 2d S. Ct. cf. (1966) (competency necessary represent greater competency than self necessary trial). distinguishes Kolocotronis, to stand This our in State v. decision (1968) which, despite 436 P.2d the fact that the defendant or trial, stayed be dismissed trial must to stand competent finds that If the court by RCW 10.77.090. required that his decision competent to stand trial but it voluntary, and intelligent plea NGI forgo additional information him with whatever provide should In necessary are to enable such decision. or assurances **4 cases, ever,* impossible it be only the rarest of will voluntary and hence be intelligent make the decision necessary sponte. to enter an NGI sua plea

Ill case, did find Mr. Jones present In the the trial court Nonetheless, entered an NGI trial. it competent stand Mr. had a it believed Jones sponte solely sua because plea likely he was to be insanity defense without which viable Mr. plea objection was over Jones' convicted. entered forgo into whether his desire to NGI inquiry and with no was error all plea intelligent voluntary. was This aspects judgment affected such error must vacated. circumstances, requires the entire these

verdict, finding that Mr. Jones committed the both insane, he finding legally was charged assault Frendak ordered the must be reversed. While the court, the defendant if it determined on remand that insanity defense,5 to her had been waive trial, sponte entry apparently competent approved of an NGI stand we sua competency mental ... to determine "the defendant lacked because Kolocotronis, advisability insanity". submitting the defense private party example, a held that threats of 4 Por some courts have Colson, See, Supp. e.g., plea involuntary. v. F. United States render a 1964). (S.D.N.Y. issue here. We need not decide that 960-61 (1980) appears suggest Khan, Super. that v. 417 A.2d 585 State N.J. prevent might recognize him from he insane refusal that is defendant's reason, Khan, voluntary no making intelligent at 83. We see and decision. See that, understanding however, why competent prevent a from would defendant disbelief, despite jury might find him insane. his own post Frendak, ex determina court for an the court remanded to trial 5 In insanity was intelli- defense decision to waive tion whether the defendant's (Frendak, 381), procedure enter a verdict of át such Frendak, imposition here. In inappropriate the NGI plea did not affect the that jury's finding the defendant had charged committed the acts because the "guilt" and insan- ity Here, phases of trial were separately. tried there was no bifurcation. all argues psychiatric State that evidence prove

introduced to Mr. Jones insane was could have been impeach introduced to even if testimony there had been Thus, no insanity raised. the State argues, trying the insanity "guilt" together issues caused no prejudice.

We We disagree. perceive prejudice several forms of they cannot conclude were harmless. The most obvious was attorneys that was faced with jury two defense arguing conflicting defense theories. While one attorney was arguing that the defendant "a was acting reasonable ordi- (Clerk's narily person" cautious and prudent Papers, at 22 (self-defense instruction)), the other was arguing he under acting paranoid the influence of delusions. presentation of Simultaneous both theories two counsel purportedly both Mr. representing highly Jones was preju- Khan, See supra dicial. State at 83-84. addition, psychiatric much of the evidence introduced

at trial would have been inadmissible there had been no defense raised. While evidence of affecting perceptions witness' is admissible to impeach the witness' (see, Froehlich, testimony e.g., (1981)), 635 P.2d 127 such can evidence also be excluded under prejudicial outweighs ER 403 when its effect its pro- bative When in question value. the witness is the defend- ant, potential prejudice great jury because the might be influenced by impermissible desire to remove insane society from even he did though particular charged. commit offense The trial court Frendak, gent voluntary. See procedure at 381. such a We believe is neither necessary light express finding feasible nor here in of the trial court's defendant was to stand and the other circumstances this case.

749 had within its discretion acting have well thus been would testimony part psychiatric all or it to exclude decided speculate it as impossible While present in the case. done, tentatively have it did exactly what the court would trial, exclude the it would bifurcated the indicate that it phase. psychiatric "guilt" evidence from event, defense had been any if no testimony against entered, the psychiatric at least some of grounds. excluded other could have been have possibly of could testimony psychiatrist The the state against privilege of Mr. Jones' been excluded as violative psychiatrist that of the defense self-incrimination and attorney-cli as protected could have been excluded ent privilege. out testimony psychiatrist of the state arose Testimony at trial competency

court ordered examination. from such an and information drawn about conclusions against generally privilege does violate examination self-incrimination, intelligent and waiver knowing absent Arizona, v. by Miranda 384 U.S. required after warnings 1602, 694, Ct. 10 A.L.R.3d 974 L. Ed. 2d 86 S. 16 (1966). 507, 519, P.2d Holland, v. State Wn.2d 19-20, P.2d (1983); Bonds, however, waived, where the defense privilege 20) (Bonds, hence imposition is raised and him from prevented Mr. Jones insanity defense on present case. claiming any privilege violation of waiver, proper warning While there have been a explore Mr. reason to the issue once Jones had no plea. entered the NGI testimony could not psychiatrist's if the state

Even excluded, could psychiatrist that of the defense have been Bonds, supra, State v. impliedly recognized We have. a defense a defendant that communications between privilege attorney-client protected are psychiatrist 20-22) rule in (see in accord with the Bonds, at and this is See, e.g., United jurisdictions. of other majority the vast (3d 1975); Cir. Alvarez, F.2d 1045-46 States City & San Cy. Court, Francisco v. Superior 37 Cal. 2d (1951); Toste, 231 P.2d 26 State v. 178 Conn. (1979) 424 A.2d 293 therein; cases cited Ballew v. State, (Tex. 1980) 640 S.W.2d 239-40 Crim. App. therein; Annot., cases cited Persons Other Than Client or Attorney Within, or by, Included Attorney-Client Affected (1964) Privilege, 96 A.L.R.2d and cases cited § therein. This privilege also is waived when the defense of raised, insanity Bonds, however. State v. supra at 22. Thus, entry plea prevented Mr. Jones from claiming privilege by which he otherwise could have completely testimony excluded the of psychia the defense trist. trial,

At amicus curiae argued any privilege was waived by disclosure of the defense psychiatrist's report the prosecutor. While it is testimony true that offered at part trial as to of a communication waives the privilege as (Martin Shaen, to the entire communication 22 Wn.2d 505, 513, (1945)), 156 P.2d 681 this rule of waiver does not apply partial Pam, disclosure outside trial. State v. Cf. n.7, (1983) (rule 98 Wn.2d 659 P.2d 454 defendant's statement waives privilege against self-incrim ination related regarding applies only matters where state fact). put ment before trier of This is only because the of such purpose prevent a rule is to clients from advancing to the trier of fact '"a one-sided account of the matters dispute" and hence using the as a sword privilege rather Pam, than a shield. at 764 (quoting n.7 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 2 L. Ed. 2d 78 S. Ct. (1958)). A.L.R.2d 818

In light evidentiary considerations, of these impossi- it is ble for us to conclude that Mr. Jones was not prejudiced by conviction, the trial court's error. His as well com- institution, mitment to a mental must therefore be vacated and the case remanded for new trial. C.J., JJ.,

Williams, Stafford, Dore, Pearson, concur. respectfully dissent. The (dissenting) J. —I Dimmick, court recent, unanimous decision of this on a

court relied (1977)) (State Smith, 564 P.2d reason of guilty by not plea of sponte sua entering and disavows overrules Smith now majority insanity. the issue before have addressed of cases which majority an estab rejection wholesale of with this agree us. I do lished, of law. body useful discretion to a trial court the affording case leading over the reason of of not

enter a States, v. United is Whalem objection (D.C. denied, Cir.), U.S. 862 cert. F.2d 818-19 for its as: explained holding the reason That structure of major foundations for the One responsibility, and law is the concept criminal law otherwise be criminal that one whose acts would is clear incapacity no crime all because has committed he responsible condition is not age due to or mental doing If what he is or can- he does not know those acts. of a product his acts are the his conduct or control defect, morally he is blameless and not mental disease or criminally responsible. society of and the judgment by in case an any in is tested respect given law words, In the sanity of the accused. other inquiry into the in codifi- a criminal case legal definition of society respects of as judgment of the moral cation man's criminal responsibility; and if a man is insane law, eyes society in the of he is blameless eyes of in the criminal courts. subject punishment and is not the individ- confrontations between the courtroom this struc- uphold trial must society judge ual and of the conviction by refusing to allow tural foundation defendant, and when obviously mentally irresponsible mental to a defendant's question there responsibility sufficient crime, time of the issue must at the insist Just as the must part judge of the case. become a defendant who proved be before corpus that the delicti convicted, judge too must may be so has confessed eyes who in the of the law of one forestall the conviction his otherwise criminal mentally responsible for is not that, justice, a pursuit then in the of We believe acts. impose have the discretion must judge trial unwanted defense on a consequent defendant and the additional of proof burden the Government prosecu- tor.

(Footnote omitted.)

Although only a few courts jurisdictions other have considered the issue of a trial judge imposing guilty a not insanity plea, reason most have allowed the trial court Fernald, (Me. this discretion. See State v. 248 A.2d 754 1968) (trial court did abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defendant to withdraw of not by reason insanity); v. State, Walker App. 666, Md. 321 A.2d (where (1974) court has competent, before it uncontra- dicted evidence that the accused was insane at the time of crime, it would manifest injustice permit with- Pautz, drawal insanity plea); 299 Minn. (to (1974) promote law, N.W.2d 190 just determination has judge authority raise an defense affirmatively had pursued). We unequivo- cally in Smith in followed this trend stating judge "the had power impose inherent the insanity sponte defense sua over objection Smith, of defendant and his counsel." 642-43. majority disapproves of Whalem and substitutes

another formula therefor because it believes two United Supreme States require Court decisions such result. Those cases are: North v. Alford, Carolina U.S. (1970) L. Ed. 2d 91 S. Ct. 160 Faretta v. Cali- fornia, 422 U.S. 45 L. 2d S. Ed. 95 Ct. 2525 These cases prior two were decided to our decision allowing to enter judge plea in Smith and are irrelevant. Recently, another court States v. Wright, (D.C. 1980) F.2d 1309-10 Cir. its fully explained rea- sons rejecting very argument majority. made I agree analysis: with that court's government urges reshape this to the Wha- lem light rule North Carolina v. and Cali- Alford insanity issue, v. Faretta. Neither case involved

fornia for reason alone their relevance is de minimus. sanity subject ques- to defendant's a criminal

When tion, to stand only competence on his is cast doubt system to capacity legal our very on the trial but also there suffi- The issue becomes whether blame. assign of the jury consideration question require to cient law and conform to understand ability defendant's is, he can considered to whether his conduct it—that autonomous, blame for choice-making deserving actor an alleged competent granted

wrongdoing. Protection issue, which has on this bearing choice no individual's basically punishment. for justification challenges protect Faretta rights light, In this because Alford have little defendants, appli- their holdings of cation defense, insanity society's obligation, through not blame- punishment withhold of someone ato defendant's worthy. challenge A nonfrivolous plainly inquiry suggests because it responsibility requires mental justice free our criminal presupposed will Thus, protection of system a defendant's ing insanity itself is limited to ability presumed. cannot be Alford's maintain- plead guilty, even while right innocence, similarly his own cannot reserve Moreover, decision to the defendant. Alford permitting the self-claimed innocent's plea. Certainly, enter a no guilty provides entire on the authority entrusting decision insan- ity defense to the defendant. Faretta's to self-

Similarly, explication "right the insanity has no issue. No representation" bearing counsel, defendant, can pro through whether se or acting considering from whether the restrain the court right self-repre- raised. Even the defense should be grant reshape does not license to sentation at trial foundations of our criminal law. very (Footnotes omitted.) reason to our established compelling change

I find no sponte sua a trial court discretion raise affording rule by Judge As stated plea. reason of Frendak in his concurrence the result Gallagher (D.C. 1979), States, A.2d Whalem "seems Frendak, at reasonable, guidance.” there for entirely and is expanding following other cases 384. Whalem and not, contrary implications major- to the Whalem are ity, example, insensitive to the wishes of the defendant. For opinion Robertson, the in States F. Supp. United v. (D.D.C. 1977) sensible, fashioned criteria workable sensitivity which indicate toward a Those defendant. fac- tors are: quality of the evidence supporting insanity the

[T]he defense; the matter; defendant's wish in the quality defense; defendant's decision not to raise the rea- sonableness of in presenta- defendant's motives opposing defense; tion of of the personal Court's observations throughout proceed- the course of the him. ings against

Robertson, at 446. Whalem, Smith,

I permit- believe that and other cases impose ting a trial court over defense objection jurisprudential defendant's better reflect the con- I cerns underlying defense. would hold the trial court not abuse in this did its discretion case. challenges

Petitioner further the trial court's refusal a "guilt" bifurcate the trial into and an phase "insanity" phase. finds in majority prejudice The this refusal. The studiously allowed the prosecution present insanity only presented evidence of after the defense had its case I find properly. of self-defense. the trial court acted To hold result otherwise would an incredible situation. paranoid Petitioner was as a diagnosed schizophre chronic nic, an illness which cause delusions of a persecutory person may nature so that a perceive reality threats or are in dangers actuality which imaginary. suffering Persons from this illness may physically perse assault their fancied Sim, cutor. (1963). M. Guide to Psychiatry 471-72 To pre self-defense, vail on his claim of petitioner had to convince that his jury apprehension danger was reasonable necessary. 9A.16.020; and use force RCW State Wan row, P.2d 548 could jury rationally assess reasonableness of Jones' state mind being without of his apprised possi mental illness and ble paranoid jury delusions. The is entitled to have such States its determination. making

information Cf. (BNA) (11th Feb. Cir. Lindstrom, L. Rep. Crim. 1983). (Court testimony the mental regarding held allowed should have been prosecutor's witness illness of reason, should, jury within cross examination. credibility aid affecting all witness' informed of matters truth.) The claim of self-defense in its determination of the are this case. inseparable mental illness petitioner's a bifurcated trial Thus, grant the trial court's refusal not error. JJ., concur Dolliver, Brachtenbach,

Rosellini, Dimmick, J. with 9, 1983.] En Banc. June 49058-9.

[No. Respondent, Washington, v. Harold The State of Smalls, Petitioner. Respondent, Washington, v. Thomas The State of Lloyd Simcox, Jr., Petitioner.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Jones

Court Name: Washington Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 21, 1983

Citation: 664 P.2d 1216

Docket Number: 49016-3

Court Abbreviation: Wash.