State v. JonesState v. Jones
Michael J. Trapp, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Latonya Jones appeals the trial court‘s imposition of a prison sentence for the conviction of a single count of failure to stop or to exchange information after an accident, punishable as a fifth-degree felony. See
{¶2} Jones was indicted for failure to stop and to exchange information after the accident, and for tampering with evidence, punishable as a third-degree felony. In exchange for her plea of guilty to the failure-to-stop offense, the state dismissed the other charge. At the plea hearing, neither Jones nor the state chose to add additional facts to those alleged in the indictment. The trial court accepted Jones’ plea, and continued the matter for the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
{¶3} At the sentencing hearing, Jones stated that she had fled from the scene of the accident because she did not have a valid driver‘s license and lacked insurance. She apologized for her actions. The trial court stated that “after working in the courthouse for 30 years and being a judge for 15 years, [the court knew] a lot of people leave the scene of an accident because they‘re on drugs or they‘re under the influence of alcohol.” Because Jones was not apprehended until long after the accident, there was no evidence that she had been impaired at the time of the collision.
{¶5} In her sole assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial court erred by imposing a prison term for the commission of a nonviolent fifth-degree felony. Jones argues that the record does not support the trial court‘s basis for imposing a prison term: that she had caused physical harm to her victim “while committing” the failure-to-stop offense.
{¶6} We review Jones’ sentence under the standard of review set forth in
{¶7} Under
{¶8} Generally, a driver who violates this section is guilty of committing a first-degree misdemeanor. When, as here, however, ”the accident or collision results in serious physical harm” to the victim, the offense is punishable as a fifth-degree felony. (Emphasis added.)
{¶9}
{¶10} The presumption of a community-control sanction, however, is subject to the exceptions listed in
{¶11} Jones contends that her sentence was contrary to law because the record before the trial court failed to demonstrate that Jones had caused any physical harm, beyond the injuries inflicted in the actual collision, while committing the punished offense of failure to stop or to exchange information. Jones argues that the victim‘s serious injuries were inflicted by the collision itself, and that there was no evidence in the record that anything she did or failed to do after the accident caused physical harm to the victim.
{¶12} The state asserts that every moment that Jones’ victim lay on the street caused more and more physical harm to the victim. While that might be true, the record here is devoid of any testimony supporting that inference. Jones’ plea was accepted on very limited facts. In the victim statement, prepared as part of the presentence investigation, the victim recounted the devastating impact of the collision. He described the horrific injuries resulting from the accident. He further told of the demoralizing impact of the lengthy rehabilitation on him and his family. There was no testimony from a bystander, emergency personnel, or hospital staff on the state of the victim‘s injuries, or on the impact that delaying treatment might have had.
{¶13} Only when the victim stated that he could not forgive Jones for leaving “not knowing if [he was] dead or dying,” does the record come close to describing a harmful impact “caused” by Jones “while” failing to stop and exchange information. The undoubted psychological terror experienced by the victim, however, does not satisfy the definition of “physical harm” provided by the General Assembly and employed in
{¶14} In this case, the requirements of
{¶15} Because the trial court imposed a prison term in contravention of
Judgment accordingly.
FISCHER, J., concurs.
HENDON, J., concurs in judgment only.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.