State v. JonesState v. Jones
Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle at a traffic stop. Held:
This court declined to address the defendant‘s claim that the trial court erred in failing to suppress certain physical evidence on the ground that it was the result of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration, as the defendant failed to adequately brief the threshold issue of whether the traffic stop was measurably extended beyond its initial purpose.
The trial court‘s finding that the defendant‘s consent to search was voluntary was not clearly erroneous, as the court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in making its determination.
The trial court did not err in concluding that the search did not exceed the scope of the defendant‘s consent, as, by its terms, the defendant‘s consent was broad and unqualified, without any express limitation on the areas to be searched.
This court declined to review the defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during the traffic stop and search, as the defendant did not preserve his claim before the trial court and did not adequately brief it on appeal.
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of illegal possession of a controlled substance and one count each of the crimes of possession with intent to sell more than one ounce of methamphetamine, use of drug paraphernalia, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, and illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection, brought to the Superior Court
Opinion
CLARK, J. Following a conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. “On February 11, 2019, [police officers with the New Haven Police Department (department), Endri] Dragoi and his partner, [Eric] Eisenhard, conducted traffic enforcement in a marked cruiser. Dragoi drove the cruiser and Eisenhard sat in the front passenger seat.
“At approximately 4:54 p.m., Dragoi observed a dark grey Mazda coupe with very dark tinted windows turn left from Garden Street onto Elm Street. The defendant was the operator and sole occupant of the Mazda.
“While Dragoi drove the cruiser behind the defendant‘s vehicle, Eisenhard conducted a registration check on it. The inquiry produced a response of ‘no record found,’ which indicated that the car was not registered to the marker plate affixed to it. Based on the response and the tint violation, Dragoi and Eisenhard initiated a motor vehicle stop on Elm Street by activating the cruiser‘s overhead lights. The defendant complied and stopped his vehicle.
“Dragoi approached the driver‘s side of the defendant‘s vehicle while Eisenhard approached the passenger side. As Dragoi and Eisenhard reached the defendant‘s car, they could smell a strong, fresh odor of marijuana coming from the car. Dragoi and Eisenhard also observed small particles of marijuana on the center console and on the defendant‘s shirt.
“When Dragoi made contact with the defendant, Dragoi spoke with him through the open driver‘s side window. The defendant complied with Dragoi‘s request to roll down his passenger side window.
“Dragoi asked for the defendant‘s license, registration, and insurance. The defendant complied. While examining the defendant‘s license and registration, Dragoi explained to him that the plates on the defendant‘s car
“Based on the strong odor of marijuana and his visual observation of marijuana particles inside the car, Dragoi then asked the defendant whether there was ‘any weed in the car?’ The following colloquy occurred:
“‘The Defendant: Weed?
“‘Dragoi: Do you have any weed on you?
“‘The Defendant: No, why do you say that?
“‘Dragoi: Because I [smelled] it. I know you cleaned it up but the smell of it, the aroma of it, is still in the car.
“‘The Defendant: There ain‘t no weed in here. This is cigarettes.’
“The defendant showed his ashtray to Dragoi.
“The defendant then began speaking with a representative of Jazzy Auto on his cell phone. Dragoi told Eisenhard to stand by the car and that they had to ‘44 it’ [which Dragoi later explained means to search the car]. While the defendant was on the phone with Jazzy Auto, Dragoi returned to his cruiser. Dragoi‘s initial interaction with the defendant lasted about three minutes.
“While inside his cruiser, Dragoi ran a VIN check of the defendant‘s vehicle through the COLLECT system.2 The check revealed that the defendant‘s car was registered. Dragoi then conducted another registration check,
“After spending approximately five minutes in his cruiser—and having not yet received the result of the warrants check—Dragoi returned to the defendant‘s car to speak with him. Dragoi asked the defendant what the dealership had said. Dragoi then explained to the defendant that the VIN came back to the plates, which meant that either the dealership or the Department of Motor Vehicles had made a mistake because the plates did not appear to have been registered. Dragoi reiterated that when he ran the plates, they came back with no record. He explained that this was a problem for the defendant because his tints were so dark that he would be stopped by the police, and officers conducting the stop would be informed that the plates came back with no record. The following colloquy occurred:
“‘Dragoi: Now that you‘ve had time to think, how much weed do you have on you?
“‘The Defendant: I ain‘t got no weed or nothing.
“‘Dragoi: I asked you if you have weed because I smell it.
“‘The Defendant: Ain‘t no weed in the car. You can check the car. You can do whatever you want.’
“Dragoi instructed the defendant to step out of the car, and the defendant complied. Upon the defendant‘s
“After the defendant exited his car, Dragoi patted him down. While being searched, the defendant jokingly said, ‘I can pull my pants down and do anything for you. I ain‘t got nothing.’ Dragoi laughed and responded, ‘Nah, we don‘t need that.’
“During the search of the defendant‘s person, Dragoi found a bag of pills in the defendant‘s front pants pocket. Based on his training and experience, Dragoi believed the pills to be ecstasy. Dragoi instructed the defendant to put his hands behind his back and then asked whether the pills were ecstasy. As the defendant was being handcuffed, he admitted that the pills were ecstasy. He claimed that he had forgotten that he had them on him and that they were for his personal use. In response to Dragoi‘s question, the defendant denied that he had ‘anything else’ on him. He also repeatedly stated, ‘I fucked up,’ and asked if he could call his wife. Dragoi walked the defendant to his cruiser and placed him in the backseat. At the cruiser, Dragoi told the defendant that the officers would let him call his wife and Eisenhard went to the defendant‘s car to retrieve the defendant‘s phone for the defendant to use. Approximately two and one-half minutes after the officers placed handcuffs on the defendant, the records division informed Dragoi that the warrants check had come back negative.
“Dragoi then searched the defendant‘s car. Dragoi first saw particles of marijuana on the center console. Inside a plastic bag on the backseat, Dragoi located containers which contained particles of marijuana and emitted the strong odor of marijuana. Inside a backseat compartment, Dragoi located, among other things, a digital scale that had marijuana particles on it, a mason jar that contained particles of marijuana, a second mason jar that Dragoi suspected contained [phencyclidine (PCP)], and a black crossbody bag. Based on how heavy the bag felt,
The defendant was arrested and charged with various narcotics and weapons offenses, as well as illegal operation of a motor vehicle without a window tint inspection in violation of
On July 19, 2024, the defendant appeared before the court, Calistro, J. The court found, pursuant to
Before addressing the defendant‘s claims, we begin by setting forth the standard of review governing the denial of a motion to suppress. “When reviewing the trial court‘s denial of a motion to suppress, the standard of
I
We first address the defendant‘s claim that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress the physical evidence seized during the searches of his person and his vehicle.3 The defendant argues that Dragoi and Eisenhard unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and that, therefore, the physical evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration. He also argues that his consent to search was invalid because it was not voluntary and, in the alternative, that the searches of his person and of the backseat compartment exceeded the scope of his consent. We conclude that the defendant did not adequately brief his claim that the physical evidence was the fruit of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration. We further conclude that the court properly determined that the defendant consented to the searches of his person
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In his posthearing brief, the defendant argued that the physical evidence found during the search of his person and his vehicle should be suppressed because Dragoi and Eisenhard unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without probable cause. He argued that, because possession of small amounts of marijuana had been decriminalized by the time of the incident, “[t]he odor of raw marijuana inside a vehicle was insufficient to justify the continued questioning of the defendant [or] a search of the vehicle” and that, “[o]nce the motor vehicle issues were resolved, the defendant should have been free to depart.” He also argued that his consent to search was not voluntary because the officers “bombarded [him] with questions about marijuana, despite the stop allegedly being about tinted windows,” and “continued badgering [him] with questions about marijuana” even after “[t]he registration issue had been sorted out . . . .” Finally, he argued that, even if his consent was voluntary, “the scope of the . . . search far exceeded any reasonable interpretation of that consent.”
In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the searches of the defendant‘s vehicle and his person did not violate the fourth amendment because the defendant had voluntarily consented to those searches. The court noted that the determination of whether a consent to search is voluntary requires an evaluation of
The court also concluded that the scope of the search did not exceed the defendant‘s consent. The court noted that, when Dragoi told the defendant he smelled marijuana, the defendant stated, “You can check the car. You can do whatever you want.” The court found that,
Finally, the court rejected the defendant‘s contention that his consent was invalid because Dragoi and Eisenhard unlawfully prolonged the stop. Quoting from our Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 236, 3 A.3d 806 (2010), the court noted that “‘inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
A
The defendant claims that the court erred in failing to suppress the physical evidence because it was the fruit of a traffic stop that exceeded its lawful duration. The state argues that we should decline to address this claim because, although the defendant‘s brief analyzes the question of whether the officers had probable cause to extend the duration of the stop, he “fail[ed] to address the threshold issue of whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged in the first place.” We agree with the state.
“As the United States Supreme Court has observed, [a]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brito, 170 Conn. App. 269, 309, 154 A.3d 535, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 925, 155 A.3d 755 (2017). “An officer‘s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. . . . [Q]uestions permissible . . . during a routine traffic stop include inquiries about whether the car or driver are carrying contraband, as well as concomitant requests for consent to search the vehicle. . . . These inquiries are permissible even if they are irrelevant to the initial purpose of the stop, namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not measurably extend the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the investigation of the traffic violation and issue a citation or warning. Consideration of that time period necessarily includes the completion of tasks attendant to the traffic stop, including a check of the driver‘s license, vehicle registration, and criminal history, and the writing of the citation or warning, as well as background questions about the destination and purpose of the driver‘s trip.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 236–37.
As explained previously, the trial court concluded that the traffic stop was not measurably extended beyond the time necessary to complete the traffic stop because, at the time the defendant provided consent to search, the officers had not yet issued the defendant a citation for his illegally tinted windows, they were still waiting for the results of the warrants check, and only ten minutes had passed since the stop was initiated. In the alternative, the court concluded that any extension of the traffic stop was permissible because the officers’ observations indicated that the defendant likely was in possession of marijuana, which was sufficient to provide them “reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a separate violation of the law.” Although the defendant argues that “[t]he traffic stop was unreasonably
“We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than [mere] abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App. 21, 31, 223 A.3d 75 (2019). Because the defendant did not adequately brief the threshold issue of whether the traffic stop was measurably extended beyond its initial purpose, we decline to address his claim that the court erred in failing to suppress the physical evidence on the basis that it was the result of an investigative detention that exceeded its lawful duration.
B
We next address the defendant‘s claim that the court erred in concluding that his consent to search was voluntary. “The police ordinarily may not conduct a search and make a seizure unless a neutral and detached magistrate first issues a warrant based on probable cause. . . . [A] warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions. . . . These exceptions have been jealously and carefully drawn . . . and
“A warrantless search is not unreasonable under . . . the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United States . . . if a person with authority to do so has freely consented to the search. . . . The state bears the burden of proving that the consent was free and voluntary and that the person who purported to consent had the authority to do so. . . . The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state‘s burden. . . . The question whether consent to a search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied . . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. . . . As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. . . . We may reverse [the trial court‘s factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. . . .
“[T]he state had the burden of proving the voluntariness of the consent to the search by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . In determining whether a defendant‘s will was overborne in a particular case, the [c]ourt has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. . . . [T]he test is fact specific, so that, ultimately, the determination of whether the consent was voluntary rests on a careful consideration of the totality of the relevant circumstances.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 129 Conn. App. 552, 558–59, 19 A.3d 1282, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 914, 27 A.3d 372 (2011). “Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused . . . his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights . . . the length of detention . . .
In the present case, the court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in determining that the defendant‘s consent to search was voluntary, and the court‘s finding in that regard was not clearly erroneous. The court found, on the basis of its review of the testimony and the body camera recordings, that Dragoi and Eisenhard were cordial and nonthreatening in their interactions with the defendant and that they did not attempt to coerce him into consenting to the search. In fact, as the court found, “the defendant provided his consent spontaneously and not in response to a request from the officers” when he stated, in response to Dragoi‘s statement that he smelled marijuana, that: “You can check the car. You can do whatever you want.” The court also found that the defendant appeared to be “of at least average intelligence,” that he “had no problem responding appropriately to the officers’ questions, following their instructions, and asking relevant questions of his own,” and that he “did not hesitate to push back against the officers when he believed that something they had said was incorrect . . . .” Finally, the court determined that the defendant‘s will was not overborne by the length of the detention or the extent of the officers’ questioning, finding that the defendant had been detained for only about ten minutes at the time he provided consent
In claiming that the court improperly determined that his consent to search was voluntary, the defendant does not challenge any of the court‘s underlying factual findings or point to any evidence in the record that the court overlooked in reaching its ultimate determination that he voluntarily consented. Rather, the defendant primarily argues that his consent was involuntary because it “came after he was seized, was not free to leave, and the officers had determined they would conduct a search.” It is well established, however, that the fact “[t]hat consent to search is given while a [person] is being detained does not render it involuntary per se, as the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 129 Conn. App. 560. Thus, the fact that a defendant was detained at the time he provided consent to search is one factor to consider in assessing whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant‘s will was overborne. See id., 561 (“[w]hile we recognize that being handcuffed can be a factor in determining if consent was voluntary . . . this court previously has concluded that a defendant‘s consent to a search of his car was voluntary where he was arrested, handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser despite not having been read his Miranda rights” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424–25, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976) (defendant‘s consent to search vehicle, given while he was detained, was voluntary where “[t]here were no promises made to him and no indication of more subtle forms of coercion . . . [he was] on a public street, not in the confines of the police station . . . [and] [t]here [was] no indication . . . that [he] was a newcomer to the law, mentally deficient, or unable in the face of a custodial arrest to exercise a free choice” (footnote omitted)); State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 252 (consent to search given while defendant was detained was not involuntary where “[t]here is no evidence that the length of the stop
C
The defendant also claims that the search exceeded the scope of his consent because his consent “did not extend to his body [or] to locked areas of the car.” “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect‘s consent under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? . . . The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. . . . Although objective reasonableness is a question of law [over which our review is plenary], the factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what a reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vaught, 157 Conn. App. 101, 118, 115 A.3d 64 (2015).
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the court properly determined that, in light of the context in which they were made, the defendant‘s statements that Dragoi could “check the car” and “do whatever you want” reasonably could have been understood as granting permission to search his person and
Moreover, the defendant‘s words and conduct once Dragoi commenced the search further support the conclusion that the defendant consented to the search of his person and the backseat compartment of his vehicle. When Dragoi started searching the defendant after he exited from the vehicle, the defendant did not voice any objection or otherwise indicate that the search was outside the scope of his intended consent. On the contrary, the defendant spontaneously stated to Dragoi, “I can pull my pants down and do anything for you. I don‘t have nothing.” Similarly, the body camera footage shows that, while the defendant was seated in the cruiser accompanied by Eisenhard, Dragoi returned to the cruiser and asked the defendant if there was a key for the compartment in the backseat, to which the defendant responded that he “never had a key” for the compartment
The defendant argues, however, that his consent did not extend to the compartment in the backseat because the evidence demonstrated that the compartment was locked and that “[t]he court made a clearly erroneous factual finding that the rear compartment of the motor vehicle was not locked.” We disagree.
The evidence supports the court‘s finding that the backseat compartment was not locked and that Dragoi did not have to break the compartment to access it. Dragoi testified that he initially could not figure out how to open the backseat compartment and that he eventually walked back to the cruiser to ask the defendant if there was a key for the compartment. When the defendant responded that he did not have any such key, Dragoi returned to the defendant‘s vehicle. Dragoi testified that he “could tell that the compartment folds down” and “had some type of a button on the top” and that, “once [he] was able to figure out how to pull [the compartment] down, then it just opened up.” He further testified that the compartment was not locked and that he did not have to break it open to access it. The trial court was entitled to credit Dragoi‘s testimony, and the defendant has not identified any evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that the court‘s finding was clearly erroneous.8 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in concluding that the search did not exceed the
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly denied the motion to suppress certain statements he made during the traffic stop and search. He claims that the statements should be suppressed pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because the officers questioned him without providing the warnings required by Miranda.9 Although the defendant concedes that he did not expressly raise a Miranda claim before the trial court, he argues that he nevertheless preserved such a claim when he argued that his statements should be suppressed under the fourth amendment. In the alternative, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).10 The state argues, inter alia, that the record is
At the outset, we disagree with the defendant‘s contention that he preserved his Miranda claim. On the contrary, our review of the record reveals that the defendant never cited Miranda as a basis for suppressing his statements and never raised any argument that reasonably could be construed as raising a Miranda claim. In his initial motion to suppress, the defendant sought to suppress only the “items seized” during the search, not any statements he made during the traffic stop or the search. Although defense counsel stated during the March 7, 2024 hearing that the defendant was seeking to suppress “any and all physical evidence and any and all statements,” counsel did not argue at any point during the hearing that the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. Moreover, although the court instructed the defendant that his posthearing brief should identify the statements he was seeking to suppress and the legal basis for suppressing them, the defendant did not raise a Miranda claim in his posthearing brief. Rather, the defendant argued only that, “[i]f the court finds that the officers illegally prolonged the motor vehicle stop, any evidence seized after that is fruit of the poisonous tree, including postarrest statements made by the defendant.” In its memorandum of decision, the trial court expressly declined to address whether any of the defendant‘s statements should be suppressed under Miranda, noting that “[t]he defendant‘s posthearing memorandum does not argue that any of his statements were the product of a
“Generally, this court is not required to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice Book § 60-5. It is well established, however, that an unpreserved claim is reviewable under Golding when (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cane, 193 Conn. App. 95, 115–16, 218 A.3d 1073, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019). Although our Supreme Court held in State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014), that a party need not “affirmatively request [Golding] review“; id., 754; the court “did not eliminate the important requirement that all claims of error be adequately briefed on the merits.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas, 151 Conn. App. 790, 801 n.6, 96 A.3d 624 (2014). As the court explained in Elson, “[i]f the defendant‘s brief fails to identify the relevant record sections, identify the governing constitutional principles, or apply law to fact in demonstrating the existence of a constitutional violation requiring reversal, then the claim likely will be deemed inadequately briefed and will fail on that ground anyway, regardless of some threshold invocation of Golding review prior to the briefing of the merits.” State v. Elson, supra, 750.
In the present case, we cannot review the defendant‘s claim because his brief does not identify the statements he claims should have been suppressed and lacks any substantive legal analysis to support his claim. To establish that a Miranda violation occurred, the defendant had the burden to establish both that any statements he seeks to suppress were made while he was in custody and that he
Moreover, as the state argues, the defendant‘s brief does not identify with any particularity the statements he claims should have been suppressed. Rather, the two paragraphs that the defendant devotes to his Miranda claim consist of little more than a general overview of some of the questions he was asked after Dragoi placed him under arrest. Although the defendant provides citations to the body camera footage for some of those questions, for others he includes only a general description of the subject matter of the questioning without providing any citation to the record. Specifically, the defendant states that “the questions did not stop during the pendency of the search of the motor vehicle, including questions about whether the liquid in the car was lemonade, and whether there was an additional key to the locked compartment in the rear of the vehicle,” but he does not identify what statements he made in response to such questions or provide any analysis of whether any such statements were made in response to questions that constituted interrogation under Miranda. In addition, although it is not entirely clear from his brief, the
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.