Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} At trial, the City argued that Appellant, after arguing with a girlfriend, crashed his car into a parked vehicle on East Fourth Street, and left the scene of the accident. Appellant stipulated that his driver's license was suspended at the time of the accident.
{¶ 4} Amanda Blevins, Appellant's friend, testified that on the night of the accident she did not argue with Appellant, but with another man. She also testified that she drove Appellant's vehicle on the night of the accident. According to Blevins, two other men, including Travis Downing, were in the car with her and Appellant. After they arrived at her home on East Fourth Street, she went into her home. One of the men with her and Appellant asked her for her keys. While inside her home, she heard the car start and went outside, where she observed the car driving away. Blevins admitted that she could not see who was driving the car.
{¶ 5} Blevins testified that she spoke with Sgt. Cunningham that evening, but claimed she never told him she argued with Appellant that evening. She also stated that she never told Sgt. Cunningham that Appellant threw her out of the vehicle and drove away. Blevins did admit that Appellant is her friend. The City never moved the trial court to declare Blevins a hostile witness.
{¶ 6} Anthony Scott, a resident of East Fourth Street, testified that he witnessed the accident. According to Scott, he heard a couple, unrelated to this case, arguing outside. He went to his second-floor window to observe the argument and saw a car stop and drop someone off. However, throughout his testimony, Scott never conclusively stated whether the car dropped off one person or several people, or whether the person exiting the vehicle was a man or a woman. He used the terms "her," "him," and "they" interchangeably when describing the drop-off.
{¶ 7} After one or more people exited the car, the driver pulled away, but then came back to East Fourth Street. The car stopped in between his home and his neighbor's home. The car then reversed and hit his neighbor's car. Scott ran outside of his home to catch the driver, but the car drove away before he came outside. From his window, he observed only one person in the car. Scott claimed that he saw the impact of the accident and described the car. On cross-examination, Scott testified that he did not remember telling a police officer that he heard a "loud bang" and then looked out his window. Instead, Scott said he was already at his window to get some fresh air when the accident occurred.
{¶ 8} Rebecca Jenkins, the owner of the vehicle damaged in the accident, testified that she parked her car in front of her home on the evening of the accident. Jenkins stated that her car was undamaged when she left it. The damage to the vehicle was on the left quarter panel, fender, and headlights. She did not observe the accident, but Scott informed her of it. Finally, Jenkins testified that she lived in the same duplex as Scott and admitted that the second-floor window in that home provides a good observational standpoint for the street below.
{¶ 9} Officer Randy Pratt testified that he investigated the accident. Officer Pratt testified that he spoke with Anthony Scott during his investigation. On cross-examination, he stated that Scott told him that he heard a loud bang and then looked out his window and saw a green car parked against a parked vehicle. Scott told him he observed only one person in the vehicle. Officer Pratt admitted that his accident report described the street conditions as dark and without lights. He then testified that despite the darkness, a witness could observe the color and location of the vehicle from Scott's second-floor window. However, Officer Pratt admitted that he never went into Scott's home to look out from the window.
{¶ 10} Officer Pratt also testified that he obtained the vehicles license plate number from Scott. However, he later testified that he could not remember if he obtained the license number from Scott or Jenkins, or from another officer who spoke with Blevins.
{¶ 11} Finally, Officer Pratt testified to his interview with Appellant. The interview took place approximately two days after the accident. Appellant told him that he was out with Blevins on the night in question, but maintained that he never drove his vehicle. Appellant admitted that he argued with Blevins on East Fourth Street and wanted to leave. He saw a friend from West Virginia, James Rose, walking on East Fourth Street. Appellant asked Rose if he had a driver's license. After verifying that Rose had a license, Appellant asked him to drive him home. They left East Fourth Street, with Rose driving. Appellant denied being involved in an accident when Rose drove him home. Finally, Appellant told Officer Pratt that he did not know how to contact Rose to verify his version of events.
{¶ 12} Christopher A. Clark, a road deputy with the Ross County Sheriff's Department, also testified. Clark assisted in the investigation by making contact with Appellant on the night of the accident. He went to Appellant's residence and observed damage to Appellant's vehicle. He knocked on Appellant's door several times, but nobody answered. Clark then looked through a window and observed Appellant lying on the bathroom floor. Eventually, Appellant answered the door.
{¶ 13} Clark testified that Appellant appeared intoxicated and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from Appellant's person. Clark also testified that Appellant was the only person in the residence, which was small. However, on cross, Clark admitted that he did not check the entire residence.
{¶ 14} Travis Downing testified for the defense. Downing stated that he was with Appellant and Amanda Blevins on the night of the accident. Earlier in the evening, Amanda drove them, in Appellant's car, to her friend's home on East Fourth Street. They stayed at the friend's home for approximately three hours. As they left the home, they saw James Rose get out of a red truck. Rose then drove them away from East Fourth Street. Downing testified that he never saw Appellant drive the vehicle that evening.
{¶ 15} At the close of all evidence, Appellant made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal. The trial court denied the motion and the case went to the jury, which returned with a guilty verdict.
{¶ 16} Appellant appeals and asserts the following assignments of error:
{¶ 17} "I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 29."
{¶ 18} "II. THE JURY'S VERDICTS WERE IMPROPER AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶ 20} Chillicothe Revised Ordinance Section
{¶ 21} Chillicothe Revised Ordinance Section
{¶ 23} Crim.R. 29(A) provides that a trial court "shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses."
{¶ 24} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks
(1991),
{¶ 25} Circumstantial and direct evidence possess the same probative value and are subject to the same standard of proof.State v. Jenks (1991),
{¶ 26} Here, the City failed to provide any direct evidence that Appellant operated the motor vehicle involved in the accident. Instead, it attempted to prove its case through circumstantial evidence by showing that: (1) Appellant owned the motor vehicle and (2) a witness saw only one person driving the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. However, Appellant's ownership, alone, fails to prove that he operated the motor vehicle. The witness, Anthony Scott, could not testify that he saw Appellant actually operating the vehicle. Instead, he testified that he saw only one person in the vehicle and the City used this testimony to create a presumption that the driver must have been the vehicle's owner. This inference is improper. The primary operators of motor vehicles are often not the actual owners. For example, a wife may actually own a vehicle that her husband primarily operates.
{¶ 27} While it was within the jury's province to find Appellant's statements to Officer Pratt non-credible, those statements cannot overcome the City's failure to proffer actual evidence that Appellant operated the motor vehicle. In short, to sustain a conviction, the City was required to produce some evidence that Appellant operated the vehicle. See, generally,City of Cleveland v. Coleman (1955),
{¶ 28} Without any proof that Appellant operated the motor vehicle involved in the accident, the City failed to proffer sufficient evidence to convince the average mind of Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal, and we sustain the first assignment of error.
{¶ 30} Therefore, we reluctantly find the evidence admitted at trial would not convince the average mind of this defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause with instructions to discharge this defendant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 37} The appellant admitted being in the vehicle after his companions went into the house on Fourth Street. An eyewitness indicated the car had one person in it when the accident occurred. Viewed with the other evidence and the logical inferences arising from it, the state's case meets both of appellant's challenges. Thus, I would affirm his conviction.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Chillicothe Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.