State v. . JohnsonState v. . Johnson
The witness Swink testified to the prisoner getting in the automobile with Preddy the day before, as testified to by Moreland, and that when he left, after some conversation with the deceased, he said to the deceased: “I will see you again.” There was evidence that the prisoner borrowed the pistol from the witness Mitchell about noon on the day before, and that on that afternoon the prisoner showed the witness (923) Flintom a pistol like the one with which the killing was done and a pair of knucks; and that in conversation he said that Preddy had moved the girl to the other end of the room out of spite, and threatened that if Preddy should discharge him he would “fix him,” showing him the knucks and pistol. At that time he had not been discharged. The witness advised the prisoner to talk the matter over with Miss Clowers and that she would not give him any bad advice. The same witness says that next morning he saw the prisoner, who then mentioned having lost his job, and said that he would ask the deceased for his job back, and if he did not give it to him he would “fix him,” and the prisoner further said the witness might tell the deputy sheriff he “need not look for him, for he would come back and give himself up.” The prisoner also asked the witness to write a letter to his brother and to tell him he had “lost his job and was in trouble and to get some money from his father and come up there that night.” A few minutes after this the witness heard that Preddy had been killed. Another witness, Hilton, testified to a similar conversation about the same time, in which the prisoner made threats against the deceased, and that when the prisoner went out he went towards the mill, and in about five minutes he heard that Preddy was killed.
The two deputy sheriffs, Hobbs and Clark, testified that they arrested the prisoner half a mile from the mill; that he had the pistol in his hand, with three empty cylinders, and they also took from him some knucks and a bottle of whiskey.
Dr. J. W. Meadows testified that he saw Preddy at his office in the mills and found two bullet wounds, one in the right thigh and the other in the abdomen, and the latter caused his death.
The first exception is because the witness Flintom was allowed to testify that at the prisoner‘s dictation he wrote his brother that he “had lost his job and was in trouble; to see his father and get some money and come up there that night.” This was competent in corroboration of the other evidence of intent, premeditation, and preparation. 6 Enc. Ev., 632; 21 Cyc., 923, 925, 930. Premeditation and deliberation may be
The second exception is because the judge refused to charge the jury, as requested, that if they should “find from the evidence that the (924) prisoner, after the shooting and his arrest, when he was told by the officer Clark that Preddy was dead, the prisoner said, `He is not dead; you are trying to scare me,\’ that such expression on his part should raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the prisoner at the time he fired the shot which killed Preddy had the malicious, premeditated intent to kill; and they should not find him guilty of murder in the first degree.” This would have been an expression upon the facts, and is prohibited by Revisal, 535; S. v. Davis, 136 N.C. 568; S. v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437.
Exception 3 is for the refusal of the court to charge the jury that upon certain stated aspects of the case the jury could not find the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree; and Exception 8 was because the court refused to charge, “Unless all the evidence in this case the jury should not return a verdict of murder in the first degree.” The use of a deadly weapon when the slaying is proven or admitted, as in this case, raises the presumption of malice and of murder in the second degree. But when there is evidence, as in the case, tending to show preparation, it is for the jury to determine where the act was committed with deliberation and premeditation; and if the accused previously procured a weapon for the purpose of using it, and does use it, the offense is ordinarily murder. S. v. Miller, 112 N.C. 885; S. v. Hensley, 94 N.C. 1021; S. v. Gooch, ib., 1014.
The deceased was not armed, but there is evidence that there was taken from his pocket, undrawn, after his death, a blackjack. The court charged fully as to murder in the second degree and self-defense, based upon the defendant‘s own testimony that he fired because he feared the deceased would use the blackjack, and had reached his hand toward his pocket, evidence which was contradicted by Morehead. The court also charged that if the prisoner, without any previous intention to use his weapon, burst into a sudden excess of rage on seeing the deceased, and slew him without premeditation, he would not be guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury did not take the prisoner‘s version of the homicide.
In the Miller case, supra, the Court held that when the prisoner went into the fight with no weapon but his pocket-knife, this alone was not
Exceptions 4, 5, 6, and 7 were from the refusal of the court to give certain prayers for instruction which omitted consideration of the circumstances showing that the prisoner had prepared himself with a deadly weapon and had made threats tending to show that the expected a difficulty, and went to see Preddy ready for it. In Ruffin v. R. R., 142 N.C. 120, the Court said: “This form of instruction, unless (925) all the material elements of the case be included, is objectionable because it excludes from the jury the duty of drawing such reasonable inference as the testimony would justify.”
Exceptions 9 and 10 are to those parts of the charge which stated the contentions of the parties. If there had been any mistake or error in this respect it was the duty of counsel to have called attention to the matter then and there. S. v. Cameron, 166 N.C. 384; S. v. Blackwell, 162 N.C. 672; Jeffress v. R. R., 158 N.C. 215; S. v. Cox, 153 N.C. 638.
We have carefully considered the argument of the learned counsel for the prisoner, but we find no error of which the prisoner can complain. The evidence, if believed, showed malice, premeditation, deliberation, the procuring of a weapon, and threats to kill for a grievance, either fancied or real; it does not matter which. The jury believed the evidence, and in the conduct of the trial by the court we find
No error.
Cited: S. v. Little, 174 N.C. 801 (6cc); Muse v. Motor Co., 175 N.C. 471 (6c); Mfg. Co. v. Building Co., 177 N.C. 106 (6c); Bradley v. Mfg. Co., 177 N.C. 155 (6c); S. v. Love, 187 N.C. 39 (6c); S. v. Galloway, 188 N.C. 417 (6c); Proctor v. Fertlizer Co., 189 N.C. 247 (6c); S. v. Steele, 190 N.C. 926 (6c); S. v. Burney, 215 N.C. 613 (4c).