STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Robert JOHNSON, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
*867 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Bartow and Karal B. Rushing, Asst. Public Defender, St. Petersburg, fоr appellee.
HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
The State of Florida appeals from an order granting Robert Johnsоn's motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
Johnson was charged by information with bаttery of a law enforcement officer in viоlation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1978). He filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that there exist no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Thе trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
Johnson contends that the lower court properly granted the motion to dismiss, as Officer Brubaker was not "engaged in the lawful performance of his duties," an еssential requirement of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes. He bases this contention on the fact that Brubaker did not have a misdemeanor warrant to аrrest him[1] and that none of the provisions of Seсtion 901.15, Florida Statutes, which would make the arrest lаwful, were applicable. We do not agree.
In Meeks v. State,
[J]ust as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sеctions 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977).
Id. at 110. In Meeks the court cites Lowrey v. State,
In Lowrey, the court stated that Sections 776.051 and 843.01 must be read together. The court held that the use of force in resisting аn arrest by a person reasonably known to bе a law enforcement officer is unlawful "notwithstanding the technical illegality of the arrest." Id. at 1326.
We agree with the holdings in Meeks and Lowrey. The triаl court committed error in granting Johnson's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the triаl court dismissing the information and remand with directions tо reinstate the information *868 and for further proсeedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Johnson was charged with a violation of § 562.12(1), Fla. Stat., a second-degree misdemeanor.
[2] Section 843.01 refers to the officer as being "in the lawful execution of any legal duty."
