State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Harbison
OPINION
HARBISON, Justice.
This сase presents the question of whether a juvenile, in appealing to the circuit court from a finding of delinquency pursuant to
After careful consideration of the contentions of the parties, we affirm thе decision of the Court of Appeals.
A finding of delinquency is not equivalent, in legal theory, to conviction of a crime, “and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a сonviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service applicatiоn or appointment.”
Further, persons found to be delinquent are not subject to the laws аpplicable to infamous crimes and are not to be rendered infamous by the judgment оf the juvenile court in which they are tried.
One of the stated purposes of the statutes creating the juvenile court system is:
“Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequencеs of criminal behavior and to substitute therefor a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation; . . .”T.C.A. § 37-201(2) .
*741 Despite this stated purpose and the theory underlying the juvenile court system, however, courts in recent years have emphasized that in practical effect persons involved in juvenile proceedings may be deprived of their liberty. Increasingly, cоncepts of the criminal law, and in particular constitutional principles designed tо protect the rights of individuals charged with crime, have been deemed to be applicable to proceedings involving juvenile offenders.
In the leading case of Arwood v. State, 62 Tenn.App. 453, 463 S.W.2d 943 (1970), the Court of Appeals held that a juvenile defendant charged with an offense which would be classified as a felony under the penal code was entitled to a jury trial on his appeal to the circuit court. In the present case the State makes no issue on that point.
In State v. Jackson, 503 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.1973), this Court held that stаtutes purporting to permit the State an appeal from the acquittal of an аccused juvenile were invalid on principles of double jeopardy, under both the fеderal and the state constitutions.
In the foregoing cases, the courts cited and discussed recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court which made applicablе to proceedings involving juvenile offenders many of the safeguards surrounding adult criminal trials.
In the instant proceeding, respondent was accused of an offense which, in the case of an adult, would have amounted to a charge of the felony of arson.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals that error was committed. Although juvenile proceedings do, in many ways, partake of civil rather than criminal proceedings, the juvenile has a right to counsel, confrоntation and cross-examination of witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination and thе right to have guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
It is settled law that an adult criminal defendant facing a felony charge may waive a jury trial pursuant to
We are of the opinion that similar procedure should be followеd when a juvenile, charged with an offense which would constitute a felony under the penal code, appeals to the circuit court for trial de novo under
The judgment оf the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial, at the cost of the State.
HENRY, C. J., and COOPER, FONES and BROCK, JJ., concur.