*1 DAVIDSON, Before GARFF and ORME, JJ.
OPINION GARFF, Judge: Defendant, Johnson, ap- Karen Marie peals the trial court’s denial of her motion and her posses- conviction for sion of a controlled substance.1 We affirm. On Deputy November Sheriff stopped having faulty light. brake pas- Defendant was a senger in suppression that vehicle. At the hearing, Stroud testified that stopping he ran a check plate license obtained name of the registered approached owner. He then stopped vehicle and asked driver her license. The name on the license was the name of the owner. trial, 1. At a bench suppress. was convicted on on defendant's motion to stipulated previous hearing to at a *2 requested registration put her in the and front seat of sher- When Stroud certificate, pro- unable to bag was her possession iff’s car. She at it. Stroud then asked defendant duce gave this time. stated that she Defendant identification, reasoning that there was a and birthdate because she possibility the car was stolen because required so, to do was and did believe registration present. was no and no owner could that she leave. initially any denying After that she had (1) The issues are: whether her defendant told Stroud may raise, for the first time on and birthdate. name argument appeal, the that state law and Stating right that he and would be back article section of the Utah Constitution expecting the driver to re- and defendant greater protection provide than the fourth main, his and Stroud returned to amendment of United States Constitu- two, determining checks on ran license tion unreasonable search and sei- driving that the driver was on a zure; (2) defendant, passenger whether out- license and that defendant had several vehicle, in a motor was seized within the not, however, standing warrants. He did amendment; and inquire as to whether the car was it was any reports he know of of stolen nor did reasonable. matching description. He car’s considering court’s action in the trial and then wrote a citation on the driver denying motion to defendant’s backup requested officer. we will not its factual evaluation disturb informed that she When was clearly unless its erroneous. outstanding being arrested war- Walker, (Utah rants, holding a she exited the posi is in the best backpack which the name “Karen” credibility accuracy tion to assess and Defendant it. denied divergent of the witnesses’ testimonies. belonged her, backpack later admit- Arroyo, 154-156, ted that it was hers. Incident to her ar- Sierra, (Utah Ct.App.1989); rest, bag and was found searched (Utah Ct.App.1988). P.2d How amphetamines, drug parapherna- to contain ever, assessing legal court’s lia and defendant’s Utah identification. findings, conclusions based its factual sequence Defendant’s version of the apply it no a “cor we afford deference but varies from events Stroud’s. She v. Cha standard. Oates of error” rection li- that after Stroud received driver’s vez, (Utah 1988). cense, any he asked defendant if she had identification. She said that she did not.
He told them to
that he would be
ISSUE
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL
back,
right
and returned to his vehicle
that her detention
claims
minutes, long enough
five or ten
for her to
of the Unit
violated the fourth amendment
cigarette
he re-
smoke
or two. When
1, section
article
ed States Constitution
turned,
he asked for
certif-
She also ar
14 of the Utah Constitution.
produced,
icate. When it could not be
legislative
gues that the
intent behind Utah
Stroud asked defendant
to return to
provide
Ann. 77-7-15
Code
him, where,
§
request, she
vehicle with
at his
protection against unreasonable
greater
gave him her name
He then
and birthdate.
provided by
searches and seizures than
sent her back
the other car. Fifteen
amendment,
that her
later,
car,
the fourth
sei
minutes
he came
to their
back
provisions of
citation,
zure violated the
both constit
gave the driver a
took defendant
her,
car,
However,
failed to
handcuffed
utions.2
out of the
frisked and
1988). However,
any
be-
in a footnote com-
2. Utah has never drawn
distinctions
ment,
"always
provisions
it has not ruled
these two
the court indicated that
tween
making
protections
to be
out
such
distinction
considered
afforded
one
Watts,
same." State
P.2d
in a future case.
Id. at n. 8.
was, therefore,
argue
brief or
issues at the trial level dant
these
seized when Stroud
statutory argument
her
and first raised
expected
took her name and
birthdate
Nominally alluding
brief.
her to
while he
wait
ran a warrants check.
guarantees
such different constitutional
Under the
analysis
without
before the
court
reasonably justified
defendant was
in her
sufficiently
per-
does
raise the
issue
go.
belief that she was not
free
mit consideration
court on
Now, the concern is whether the
Preston,
James v.
*3
permissible
was reasonable and
un
Ct.App.1987).
a defendant fails
“[W]here
der the fourth
ground
amendment.
particular
suppress-
to assert a
Deitman,
(Utah 1987)
ing
(per
the tri-
unlawfully obtained evidence in
curiam),
court,
Supreme
adopted
al
the Utah
Court
an
court will not consid-
Merritt,
reasoning
in
United States v.
ground
appeal....
er
to
the
that
on
[M]otions
223,
Cir.1984),
supported
(5th
by precise
be
736 F.2d
should
wherein
conclusory allegations....”
averments,
specified
the
Fifth Circuit
three constitu
Carter,
State v.
656,
tionally
permissible
stops:
660-61
levels of
Lee,
Also,
in
may approach
an officer
a citizen at
(Utah 1981),
supreme
the
court stated:
anytime
pose
questions
long
so
[sic]
nothing
There
in
is
the record to indicate
as the
is
citizen
urged
point
now
this
will; (2)
person
an officer may seize a
or
unavailable
unknown to defen-
suspicion”
the officer has an “articulable
dant at the time he filed his
to
motion
person
that
the
or
committed
is
to
point
entertain the
now
crime; however,
about to commit a
the
practice
would be to sanction the
of with-
temporary
“detention must be
and last
holding positions
properly
that should
be
no
than is
to
necessary
effectuate
presented to
trial court
which
the
but
purpose
the
of
stop”;
an officer
may
purpose
be
for the
seek-
withheld
of
may
suspect
arrest a
if the officer has
reversal
a new
probable cause to believe an offense has
or dismissal.
being
been committed or is
committed.
We, therefore,
to
ar-
decline
consider this
Deitman,
believed that fendant’s conviction. the owner was absent because was stolen registration. He knew no and there was owner, not the DAVIDSON, J., concurs. to ask that it was reasonable determined ORME, (dissenting): Judge to determine if it cor- the owner’s name he
responded with Although legal analysis applicable stopping the The vehicle. learned ably majority’s case out in the is set to do a chose fact that Stroud I opinion, agree cannot with their ultimate instead of a check stolen warrants arresting conclusion officer had an great significance because check is of suspicion that the automobile reported immediate- not all stolen had been much less in the way participated stated that there theft. ly. where stop, the driver has a legitimate only The relied on the officer license, way “no *4 name was not the were the driver’s is and telling the owner who name of owner driv- permission drive it they have er was not to locate the able present,” a rea- owner is because the just as certificate. These facts are consist- inquire regarding the would sonable officer likely ent with the more scenario that the In weighing rightful passenger. from its identity of driver borrowed the car this is all the justified in find- owner. Absent more—and testimony, the court was pointed simply officer to—there of time amount law, suspicion, as a matter though passenger, required to even stolen. car had been and did not take a normal than accordingly I would reverse. was substantial evidence Although a to find as it did. the trial court occurred, it conformed to constitu- requirements that Officer Stroud
tional
had a reasonable stolen, and defen- car could have been for an unreasonable
dant was