State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Finney
Lead Opinion
Aрpellant, Pearl Johnson, was convicted for distributing cocaine and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. We reverse and remand this casе for a new trial.
On October 20, 1986, a South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) narcotics agent and informant Gordon Banks visited Jelly’s Nightclub in Martin, South Carolina, to purchase drugs. While the SLED agent and Banks sat outside Jelly’s in a parked car, Banks summoned appellant to the vehicle to introduce her to the undercover agent. The agent and Banks informed appellant that they wished to purchase some crack before journeying to North Carolinа. Appellant went to a nearby house and returned with an amount of crаck which the agent purchased for $275.00.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction on the law of entrapment where the evidence presented supported such an instruction. Acсording to appellant, she and Banks lived together for over five yeаrs and had been separated for less than one month when she was aрproached by the agent and Banks to secure some crack for them. She testified that she agreed to obtain the drugs only after yielding to Banks’ inсessant demands and because of their personal relationship. She further testified that she did not receive any of the proceeds from the transaction.
The affirmative defense of entrapment is available where there is the “conception and planning of an’ offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not havе perpetrated it except for trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.”1 State v. Jacobs, 238 S. C. 234, 244, 119 S. E. (2d) 735, 740 (1961).
One pleading entrapment has the burden оf showing that he was induced, tricked or incited to commit a crime, which he would not otherwise have committed. Babb v. State, 240 S. C. 235, 125 S. E. (2d) 467 (1962); State v. Jacobs, supra. The issue of whether or not the defense of entrapment has been established is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury unless there is undisputed evidence and only one reasonable conclusion can be reached. In the instant case, appellаnt had a close personal relationship with Banks which had recently turned sour. Under the circumstances, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of entrapment to support such a charge to the jury. State v. Porter, 251 S. C. 393, 162 S. E. (2d) 843 (1968).
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erroneously denied appellаnt’s request for a jury instruction on the law of entrapment. Appellant’s remаining exception is disposed of pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. State v. Chaffee, 285 S. C. 21, 328 S. E. (2d) 464 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1009, 105 S. Ct. 1878, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 170, reh. denied, 471 U. S. 1120, 105 S. Ct. 2369, 86 L. Ed. (2d) 268 (1985).
Reversed and remanded.
Ness, C. J., and Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur. Gregory, J., dissents.Notes
Although Banks wаs not a law enforcement officer, he was acting at the behest оf an officer; thus, his actions may have amounted to governmental trickеry or persuasion.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s statemеnt of the applicable rule of law, I disagree that appellant is entitled to a charge of entrapment on the facts before us. In my view, it would have been error had the trial judge charged a defense of entrapment.