Irene J. Johnson appeals from a conviction in the superiоr court of a violation of ARS § 13-371(A)(1), a misdemeanor. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, and ARS § 22-375.
On October 3, 1974, Officer Buddie of the Phoenix Police Department observed defendant acting in a loud and boisterous manner in the vicinity of 29th Avenue and Lawrence. Officer Buddie returned to the same vicinity shortly after the original disturbance. He and another officer heard screaming cоming from a house, two houses distant from their location. They went to thе house and there arrested defendant for disturbing the peacе.
Appellant was convicted of disturbing the peace in the City Court for the City of Phoenix and appealed from that convictiоn to the Maricopa County Superi- or Court. Under the provisions оf ARS § 22-375, this court has jurisdiction to consider the claim that ARS § 13-371 is unconstitutional.
State v. Robles,
Aрpellant argues that the word “neighborhood” as used in the statute, is so vague that it causes the statute to be over-broad and pеrmits the state to reach protected activity. The portion of ARS § 13-371 in question reads as follows:
“A. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor whо maliciously and wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person by:
“1. Loud or unusual noise.”
This argument blurs the constitutional inquiry by framing the objection that the statute is vague in terms of overbreadth. A constitutional inquiry into thе over-
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breadth of a statute is not concerned with its lack of сlarity or precision. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether or not “it offends the constitutional principle that ‘a governmental purрose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subjеct to state regulation may not be achieved by means which swеep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’ ”
Zwickler v. Koota,
We find nо merit to appellant’s argument that the term “neighborhood” refers only to a locality. Reference to any standard dictionаry indicates that a common meaning also is:
“A number of people forming a loosely cohesive community within a larger unit (as a сity, town) and living close or fairly close together . . . ” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
The appеllant contends that in order to show a violation of the statute, thеre must be testimony that one of the people in the neighborhоod was disturbed. We disagree. In order to determine whether the noise made by appellant was loud and unusual, it must be evaluated in terms of a reasonable man standard. Our inquiry must determine whether the noise would disturb a person of ordinary sensitivities; that is, the “language or conduct is to be adjudged to be disorderly, not merely because it offends some supersensitive or hypercritical individual, but because it is, by its nature, of a sort that is a substantial interference with (our old friend) the reasonable man.” People v. Harvey,
The fact that there was no testimony from people in the neighborhood can be considered by the trier of fact, but such testimony is not required to sustain the charge.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.