State v. Johnson, 07 Ma 8 (3-6-2008)State v. Johnson, 07 Ma 8 (3-6-2008)
{¶ 2} In this case, the trial court fully complied with
Facts
{¶ 3} Johnson was indicted for murder by the Mahoning County Grand Jury on December 2, 2005, for causing the death of Regina Miller. After initially pleading not guilty, Johnson was appointed counsel. However, that counsel was eventually allowed to withdraw from representation due to irreconcilable differences between he and Johnson. Johnson was appointed new counsel and the matter was scheduled for trial on September 20, 2006. On September 19, 2006, Johnson entered into a plea agreement with the State, wherein he agreed to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter, a first degree felony, rather than face the murder charge at trial. The trial court accepted Johnson‘s plea that day.
{¶ 4} After Johnson pleaded guilty, he mailed three letters to the trial court expressing his desire to withdraw that plea. The first of these letters was dated September 25, 2006, seven days after Johnson entered his plea. Subsequently, Johnson‘s counsel formally moved to withdraw Johnson‘s plea on November 14, 2006.
Guilty Plea
{¶ 5} Johnson raises three assignments of error on appeal, but we will address his second assignment of error first, which argues:
{¶ 6} “The trial court failed to strictly and substantially comply with
{¶ 7} Johnson contends the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 8} The due process clause in both the United States and Ohio Constitutions require pleas of guilty or no contest be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Parke v. Raley (1992), 506 U.S. 20, 28-30; State v. Buchanan (1974), 43 Ohio App.2d 93, 96. When determining the voluntariness of a plea, courts must consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. State v. Trubee, 3d Dist. No. 9-03-65, 2005-Ohio-0552, at ¶ 8, citing Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742. If the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is void. State v. Martinez, 7th Dist. No. 03-MA-196, 2004-Ohio-6806, at ¶ 11, citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} “(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
{¶ 11} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 12} “(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”
{¶ 13} When reviewing whether a trial court‘s decision to accept a defendant‘s guilty plea violates that defendant‘s constitutional rights, an appellate court must affirm the trial court‘s decision if it engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the defendant which, in substance, explained the pertinent constitutional rights “in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.” State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, paragraph two of the syllabus. Failure to use the exact language in
{¶ 14} Johnson argues that the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 15} In this case, Johnson was initially charged with murder and pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. When pleading guilty, Johnson signed a document wherein he stated that his “[c]ounsel has advised me and I fully understand the nature of the
{¶ 16} Johnson next argues that the trial court did not comply with
{¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court did not find that this was reversible error. “A defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
{¶ 18} In this case, Johnson did not make an Alford plea. He did not make any indication that he was innocent of the charged offense when he was pleading guilty. Accordingly, we must presume that Johnson understood that he was admitting his guilt when he pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Accordingly, Johnson‘s arguments about the trial court‘s compliance with
{¶ 19} Finally, Johnson claims that the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 20} “The Court: Do you understand if you plead guilty, you‘re waiving and rejecting all of your trial and appellate rights?
{¶ 21} “The Defendant: Yes, sir.
{¶ 22} “The Court: At trial, you have the right to require the State to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the offense charged against you, and they would try to meet that burden by bringing in witnesses and other evidence before the judge and jury, and you would have the right to challenge and confront the witnesses and evidence they produce * * * If you plead guilty, though, you‘re waiving and rejecting all of those trial rights. Do you understand that?
{¶ 23} “The Defendant: Yes, sir.”
{¶ 24} The trial court‘s colloquy with Johnson clearly indicated that he had the right to have a jury hear the evidence and that his guilty plea would waive that right. Johnson‘s argument that the trial court did not inform him of this is meritless.
{¶ 25} In conclusion, each of Johnson‘s challenges to the voluntariness of his plea are meritless. Accordingly, his second assignment of error as a whole is meritless.
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
{¶ 26} In his first assignment of error, Johnson argues:
{¶ 27} “The trial court erred in overruling the Appellant‘s presentence motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.”
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} We have previously said that “the factors that are weighed in considering a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea include the following: (1) whether the state will be prejudiced by withdrawal, (2) the representation afforded to the defendant by counsel,
{¶ 30} “The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. The trial court abuses that discretion when its ruling is “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable,” which is “more than an error of judgment.” Id. at 527.
{¶ 31} In this case, the trial court found that the State would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea “only to the extent that it adds a case” back to the active case list. This is not a relevant fact since it will exist any time a trial court grants a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Moreover, we have repeatedly found that the State would suffer no prejudice if the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was granted without something more. Cuthbertson at 899; State v. O‘Neill, 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 188, 2004-Ohio-6805, at ¶ 32; State v. Leasure, 7th Dist. No. 01 BA 42, 2002-Ohio-5019, at ¶ 19. Thus, the trial court‘s findings do not show that the State would be prejudiced by granting the motion to withdraw.
{¶ 32} Furthermore, there is no indication that any of the State‘s witnesses will be reluctant to testify. Before Johnson‘s trial was originally scheduled to go forward, his father, who was a key witness, was reluctant to testify and the State had to issue a material witness warrant for his arrest. However, the trial court was informed at Johnson‘s hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that Johnson‘s father was no longer a reluctant witness. Therefore, the State would not have been prejudiced by
{¶ 33} Johnson‘s troubles with his defense counsel also support granting his motion. Johnson‘s initial counsel withdrew from representation because of “irreconcilable differences,” which appear to have been mostly over whether Johnson should plead guilty. Of course, Johnson eventually pleaded guilty on the advice of his second counsel. However, these facts help demonstrate Johnson‘s reluctance to plead guilty and support granting his motion.
{¶ 34} Finally, Johnson first informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea only seven days after he entered into that plea. In Cuthbertson, we found that the defendant filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea when he informed the trial court of that desire by letter a week after pleading guilty. Id. at 899. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.
{¶ 35} While we have repeatedly stated that a mere change of heart is an insufficient basis for withdrawing a guilty plea, State v. Johnston, 7th Dist. No. 06CO64, 2007-Ohio-4620, at ¶ 32; State v. Kramer, 7th Dist. No. 01 CA 107, 2002-Ohio-4176, at ¶ 50, a trial court should grant a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea liberally. In this case, there was no good reason for not granting Johnson‘s motion. We can think of few situations more appropriate for granting such a motion than one like this, where the defendant moved to withdraw his plea only days after it was entered and the State would suffer no prejudice if the motion were granted. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Johnson‘s motion. Johnson‘s first assignment of error is meritorious.
Sentencing
{¶ 36} In his third and final assignment of error, Johnson argues:
{¶ 37} “The trial court‘s sentence of ten years was contrary to law and/or constituted an abuse of discretion.”
{¶ 38} Since we are reversing the trial court‘s decision denying Johnson‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this assignment of error has been rendered moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying Johnson‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.