State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
Rendered on April 26, 2011
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for appellant.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Paul Skendelаs, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
SADLER, J.
{¶1} Appellant, state of Ohio, filed this appeal seeking reversal of a judgment by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting a petition filed by appellee, Nathaniel K. Johnson, challenging his reclassification as a Tier III sex offender under the Adam Walsh Act. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶3} After the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, appellee was sent a notification by the Attorney General of Ohio informing him that he would now be classified as a Tier III sex offender with new reporting and notification requirements associated with that classification. Appellee filed a petition, pursuant to
{¶4} The trial court held a consolidated hearing on a number of petitions that had been filed, including appellee‘s. The court concluded that the petitions should be granted on the authority of the decisions by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, and Chojnacki v. Cordray, 126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212. The court vacated appellee‘s reclassificatiоn and reinstated the previous classification and registration orders, concluding in its entry that “[t]he requirements imposed upon the Petitioner by the Adam Walsh Act are a nullity.”
{¶5} The state filed this appeal, and asserts three assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RELIEF ON THE BASIS OF A PETITION THAT WAS FILED PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL STATUTORY PROCEEDING THAT HAS NOW BEEN SEVERED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY THE OHIO SUPREME COURT.
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RELIEF BASED ON STATE v. BODYKE IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRIOR JUDICIAL CLASSIFICATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT “THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON THE PETITIONER BY THE ADAM WALSH ACT ARE A NULLITY.”
{¶6} In its first assignment of error, the state argues that in Bodyke and Chojnacki, the Supreme Court of Ohio severed
{¶7} Shortly after Bodyke was decided, the court clarified the scope of the Bodyke remedy in Chojnacki. The issue in Chojnacki was whether the denial of appointed counsel to a party seeking to challenge a reclassification by filing a petition as set forth in
{¶8} In our post-Bodyke and Chojnacki cases, we have consistently rejected the argument posited by the state in its first assignment of error. In doing so, “[w]e have consistently recognized that, notwithstanding the severance of the statutory provisions under which the reclassification petitions were filed, petitioners such as appellee are entitled to orders directing their return to those previous classifications.” Hosom v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-671, 2011-Ohio-1494, ¶8, citing State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-669, 2010-Ohio-4187; State v. Miliner, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-643, 2010-Ohio-6117; State v. Hazlett, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1069, 2010-Ohio-6119; Core v. State, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-192, 2010-Ohio-6292; Cook v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-641, 2011-Ohio-906. See also Robinson v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-647, 2011-Ohio-1600.
{¶9} Given this precedent, the trial court did not err in granting appellee‘s petition challenging his reclassification. Consequently, the state‘s first assignment оf error is overruled.
{¶10} In its second assignment of error, the state argues that appellee was not entitled to relief under Bodyke because his original classification as a sexually oriented оffender arose as a matter of law, rather than as a result of a judicial determination. For its contention that appellee‘s original sex offender classification arose as a matter of law, the state points to State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169.
{¶11} Hayden involved a challenge to the sexual offender registration provisions set forth in
{¶12} The trial court found the defendant in Hayden to be a sexually oriented offender without first hоlding a hearing, and the defendant challenged that conclusion on the grounds that the lack of a hearing violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court found no due process violation because “if a defendant has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense as defined in
{¶13} In this case, the state argues that appellee‘s original classification as a sexually oriented offender arose as а matter of law as a result of the trial court‘s failure to designate him as either a sexual predator or a habitual sex offender. The state argues that because appelleе‘s classification did not involve a judicial determination, Bodyke‘s conclusion that the attorney general‘s act of changing a previously made judicial determination violates the constitutional separation of powers is not implicated in appellee‘s case.
{¶14} Initially, we question the state‘s argument that appellee‘s designation as a sexually oriented offendеr was not the result of a judicial determination. In its sentencing entry, the trial court specifically concluded by clear and convincing evidence that appellee was not a sexuаl predator, but did not specifically conclude that appellee
{¶15} Furthermore, even if appellee‘s classification as a sexually oriented offender did not arise from a specific judicial determination to which Bodyke would apply, we have nevertheless recognized that offenders whose pre-Adam Walsh Act classification arose purely as a matter of law still must receive the benefit of thе Bodyke remedy returning those offenders to their pre-Adam Walsh Act classifications because of Bodyke‘s complete severance of the statutory provisions governing reclassification by the attorney general. See Core (applying Bodyke to a case in which the offender‘s classification resulted from an out-of-state conviction); Hazlett (applying Bodyke to a case in which the offender was never judicially classified and whose classification therefore arose purely as a matter of law).
{¶16} Consequently, the trial court did not err when it rejected the state‘s contention that Bodyke did not apply to aрpellee‘s case because his sex offender classification arose as a matter of law. Therefore, the state‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} In its third assignment of errоr, the state argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the new reporting requirements imposed on appellee by the Adam Walsh Act were a nullity. The state argues that some оf the changes to reporting
{¶18} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently made it clear that Bodyke not only applied to return pre-Adam Walsh Act offenders to their prior classifications, but also returned those offenders to their pre-Adam Walsh Act reporting requirеments. In State v. Gingell, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-1481 (slip opinion), the court considered a case involving a sex offender convicted for violating a reporting requirement imposed by the Adam Walsh Act that required Tier III offenders to verify their addressеs every 90 days. The court considered the application of Bodyke to Gingell‘s case and concluded that “pursuant to Bodyke, Gingell‘s original classification under Megan‘s Law and the associated community-notification and registration order were reinstаted.” Gingell at ¶8.
{¶19} Consequently, Bodyke and Gingell make it clear that none of the Adam Walsh Act provisions, including the new reporting requirements, can be applied to appellee. Thus, the state‘s argument that some new Adam Walsh Aсt reporting requirements apply to appellee is without merit. Therefore, the state‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
BRYANT, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.