250 P. 950 | Wash. | 1926
Appellant was informed against, tried and convicted under the jointist statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., § 7328 [P.C. § 3179h], and has appealed from the judgment.
[1] The first assignment is that the court erred in its instruction to the jury in defining the words "intoxicating liquor," for the alleged reason that there was no evidence in the case justifying the giving of the instruction, and that it was therefore outside the issues. The statute says:
"Any person who opens up, conducts or maintains, either as principal or agent, any place for the unlawful *102 sale of intoxicating liquor, be and hereby is defined to be a `jointist'."
The instruction complained of gave the statutory definition of intoxicating liquor, but the contention seems to be that the witnesses used the word "moonshine," and that such word is not used in the statutory definition of intoxicating liquor. The argument is fully answered by the recent case of State v.Bogdon,
"I said I felt the effects of it. I was not intoxicated, but I know it was intoxicating liquor."
[2] The only other assignment is, that the court erred in not giving a requested instruction to the effect that, while the unlawful possession or sale of intoxicating liquor is primafacie evidence that it was possessed for the purpose of unlawful sale or disposition, the mere fact of such unlawful possession in any place or establishment does not raise any presumption of law that such place or establishment was a place opened up, conducted or maintained for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. Appellant relies on State v. Lesh,
"The offense charged is not the sale of intoxicating liquor, but is the conducting and maintaining of a place for the sale thereof. If a place is conducted for the purpose of the sale of intoxicating liquor, then the person so conducting or maintaining it is a jointist, whether a sale has been proven or not. Proof of sales, if any, is admissible and material in so far as it may throw light upon or enable the jury to determine for what purpose a place is kept."
Appellant, however, makes no complaint of this instruction, which appears to have sufficiently covered the situation in protection of his rights. There was no error in refusing the requested instruction.
Affirmed.
TOLMAN, C.J., MAIN, HOLCOMB, and FULLERTON, JJ., concur. *104