STATE оf Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John Patrick LINZE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 43960
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2016 Term.
Filed: November 10, 2016
389 P.3d 150
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for respondent. Russell J. Spencer argued.
W. JONES, Justice
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
John Patrick Linze Jr. (“Appellant” or “Mr. Linze“) appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. He contends that the district court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained by police during a traffic stop. Specifically, Mr. Linze argues that: (1) the traffic stop was impermissibly extended in order to allow time for the drug detection dog to arrive; (2) the traffic stop was impermissibly extended in order to allow the drug detection dog to conduct a sweep; and (3) the alert of the drug detection dоg was insufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle because the dog was unreliable. Mr. Linze‘s initial appeal before the Idaho Court of Appeals resulted in his conviction being vacated. That court held that the time during which the drug detection dog conducted its sweep of the vehicle was an impermissible extension of the original traffic stop. This case comes before this Court on a petition for review filed by the State of Idaho.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 25, 2013, at approximately 10:19 a.m., Officer J. Bridges of the Caldwell Police Department (“Officer Bridges“) initiated a traffic stop in Caldwell, Idaho. The reason given for the stop was that the vehicle had a cracked front windshield in violation of
Deputy Bryce Moore (“Deputy Moore“) arrived at the scene with his drug detection dog (“Hash“) at approximately 10:38 a.m., ten minutes after hе was called and nineteen
Following Hash‘s alert, both officers searched the interior of the vehicle. Deputy Moore visually located a glass pipe with white crystal residue in the passenger door panel armrest. After retrieving the pipe, Officer Bridges informed Mr. and Mrs. Linze of their Miranda rights. Mr. Linze admitted to ownership of the pipe and admitted that he used it to consume methamphetamine.
Before the district court, Mr. Linze moved to suppress all physical evidence, testimony, lab reports, photos, documents, and incriminating statements resulting from the search of Mrs. Linze‘s vehicle. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on April 28, 2014.
At the hearing, Officer Bridges tеstified that he did not delay the traffic stop while waiting for the K-9 Unit to arrive. He testified that the stop took twenty minutes because: “I was thorough. On warrant checks I ran both through the computer. And my handwriting is very sloppy, so I take my time when I write my tickets.... If I would have finished early, I would have callеd off the canine.” Officer Bridges further testified that while Deputy Moore conducted the dog sweep, he stepped out of his car and provided “cover.” “It‘s for his safety,” Officer Bridges explained. “He‘s not paying attention to his surroundings when he‘s doing his canine sweep, so I just makе sure that I watch and nobody comes and tries to do us harm.”
Following the hearing, the district court denied Mr. Linze‘s motion to suppress. It held as follows: (1) “Officer Bridges had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle had a cracked front windshield and was being driven contrаry to traffic laws“; (2) “the length of the investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended from the time of the initial stop to the time Corporal Moore‘s canine gave a positive alert on the vehicle“; and (3) “the canine alert gave officers probable cause tо search the interior of the vehicle.”
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals overturned the district court‘s denial of the motion to suppress. The State petitioned this Court for review.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
- Did the district court err in determining that Officer Bridges’ actions did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop such that Mr. Linze‘s Fourth Amendment rights were violated?
- Did the district court err in determining that Officer Bridges and Deputy Moore had probable cause to search Mrs. Linze‘s vehicle?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). “This Court will accept thе trial court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “However, this Court may freely review the trial court‘s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id.
State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 330, 372 P.3d 382, 385 (2016).
V. ANALYSIS
A. The traffic stop was impermissibly extended in violation of Mr. Linze‘s Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
Here, we have a case in which a police officer had probable cause because Mrs. Linze was driving with a crackеd windshield, which constitutes a traffic violation. It follows that the initial seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The pertinent question before this Court is whether or not the seizure remained reasonable under the Fourth Amendment once Officer Bridges abandoned the purposе of the seizure in order to aid in a search for contraband. We hold that it did not.
This Court‘s holding is guided by the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Rodriguez. — U.S. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 1613, 191 L.Ed.2d at 497-98. In Rodriguez, a Nebraska K-9 officer pulled a vehicle over after observing it veer onto the shoulder of the highway. Id. After calling for a second officer, the K-9 officer finished running a records check and wrote a warning ticket to the driver of the vehicle. Id. The officer gave the driver the warning ticket, but did not allow him to leave. Id. Instead, the officer instructed the driver to wait for the second officer to arrive. Id. After roughly six minutes, the second officer arrived, at which time the two officers conducted a drug dog sweep. Id. The dog alerted, and methamphetamine was located in the vehicle. Id.
The United States Supreme Court framed the question before it as “whether police routinely may extеnd an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.” Id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d at 498-99. However, the United States Supreme Court did not restrict its analysis to cases in which the underlying purpose of the traffic stop was completed prior to a drug dog sweep. Id. Instead, the United States Supreme Court reached a much broader holding: “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution‘s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Id. This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis. Id. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16, 191 L.Ed.2d at 499-501 (rejecting the application of a de minimis exception previously adopted by the Eighth Circuit).
The parties before this Court have suggested two competing interpretations of the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in Rodriguez. The State suggests that Rodriguez allows a seizing officer to deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop up until the time at which the stop should have been reasonably completed. In other words, for еach traffic stop there is an objective amount of time within which that stop should reasonably be completed and any unrelated action taken by an officer within that amount of time does not violate the seized parties’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Conversely, Mr. Linze reasons thаt a deviation from the original purpose of a traffic stop will inevitably lengthen the time needed to complete the original purpose of the seizure, and, accordingly, will result in a stop that “exceed[s] the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made.” Under Mr. Linze‘s suggested interpretation, the timing of an officer‘s departure from the original purpose of the seizure is irrelevant, it only matters that the officer departed from that purpose.
Further enforcing the merits of Mr. Linze‘s interpretation of Rodriguez is the fact that the State‘s proposed interpretation cannot be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court‘s analysis. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected an argumеnt advanced by the Government that “by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.” — U.S. at —, 135 S.Ct. at 1616, 191 L.Ed.2d at 500-01. The gist of this argument was that because there is a set “reasonable” amount of time for each stop, any officer who completes his or her duties under that amount of time can pursue unrelated investigations. In rejecting this argument, the United States Supreme Court noted that “an officer always has to be reasonably diligent.” Id. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f an officer can complete traffic based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop‘s mission.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court concluded that “the critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket ... but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs‘—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop‘” Id. The United States Supreme Court‘s intention in Rodriguez is thus made clear. The rule isn‘t concerned with when the officer deviates from the original purpose of the traffic stop, it is concеrned with the fact that the officer deviates from the original purpose of the stop at all.1 The State‘s interpretation of Rodriguez violates the United States Supreme Court‘s underlying conclusion that “an officer always has to be reasonably diligent.” Id.
In sum, we hold that by delaying the traffic stop for two and a half minutes whilе performing a back-up function for a drug dog sweep, Officer Bridges violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Mr. and Mrs. Linze.2
B. This Court need not address whether Officer Bridges and Deputy Moore had probable cause to search Mrs. Linze‘s vehicle.
Because we have concluded that Mr. Linzе‘s Fourth Amendment rights were violated during the drug dog sniff, we need not address whether or not that sniff properly established probable cause.
VI. CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court‘s judgment and order of probation, and reverse the order denying Mr. Linze‘s motion to suppress.
W. JONES, Justice