76 So. 241 | La. | 1917
The defendant, appellant, was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor without a license, was condemned to serve nine months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of $500, and, in default of payment of the fine, to serve an additional term of six months in prison.
He complains of the ruling of the trial judge granting the district attorney a continuance on account of the absence of two witnesses for the state, without requiring the district attorney to make an affidavit or disclose what he intended to prove by the absent witnesses. The witnesses referred ' to were the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, who were temporarily absent from the parish. Although a denial of a motion for a continuance or postponement of a criminal trial might be a denial of justice to the party asking it, the granting of a continuance is not likely to do injustice to the party opposing it. At any rate it does not appear that the continuance or delay in this instance was disadvantageous to the defendant, or that he was better prepared to defend the case when it was continued than he was when it was tried.
Before pleading to the bill of information, the defendant asked for a bill of particulars disclosing: (1) The name of the person to whom intoxicating liquor was supposed to have been sold; (2) whether that person was a “spotter” • or detective; and (3) whether he was a stranger in the parish, and, if not a stranger, how long he had resided in the parish. The district attorney refused to disclose any of that information, and to the judge’s refusal to require him to disclose it the defendant’s attorney reserved a bill of exception.
It is well settled that the defendant, in a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor without a license, is not entitled to be informed, in advance of the trial, of the name or identity of the person supposed to have bought the liquor.
On the trial of the case the district attorney produced as a witness for the state a negro who testified that he resided in th& state of Mississippi, and had been hired by the prosecution as a “spotter” or detective to catch persons supposed to be selling intoxicating liquor. Thereupon the defendant’s counsel stated that he was taken by surprise, and filed a motion asking for a continuance of the trial to allow him a reasonable time to investigate the character or reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. The continuance was denied, and the defendant’s attorney reserved another bill of exception, in which it is recited that the hired negro “spotter” from Mississippi was the only witness who 'testified directly to a sale of liquor by the defendant, from which we assume that the sleuth is the man supposed to have bought the intoxicating liquor.
The learned counsel for the defendant cites
“The reason for withholding the name of the purchaser of intoxicating liquors is to prevent the defendant from tampering with the witness. These witnesses are of such a class as are easily influenced, and are themselves participants in the crimes about which they are called upon to testify, and it is good policy to remove them, as much as possible, from those evil influences.”
Whether it would not be equally good policy not to offer in evidence at all against the defendant in a criminal prosecution the testimony of a “spotter” who was hired to procure evidence against the accused — a witness whom the prosecuting officer himself is afraid or unwilling to trust — is a question which we are not called upon to decide. The objection to such evidence is to its lack of value or effect; and that is a matter for the trial judge to consider.
The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that he should have been given an opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the trial judge that the testimony of this witness was not worthy of belief appears to us as a travesty on the impeachment of the credibility of a witness.
In the absence of a showing to the contrary, we must assume that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence before the trial judge to warrant this conviction, without any regard for the testimony of the negro “spotter,”
The defendant was not entitled, as a matter -of right, to be informed, before the trial, of the names or identity of the witnesses to be called by the state.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.