101 Wash. App. 716 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2000
The juvenile court adjudicated J.M. guilty of felony harassment in violation of RCW 9A.46.020(l)(a)(i) and he appeals, contending that reversal is required because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.M. knew or reasonably should have known that his threat to kill his school principal would be communicated to the principal, and also failed to prove that J.M. knowingly engaged in words or conduct that placed the school principal in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. We conclude that the only mens rea intended by the Legislature is as stated in the plain language of section (l)(a)(i) of the harassment statute: The perpetrator must knowingly communicate a threat to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person. The State need not prove, in addition, that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the person threatened would learn of the threat, but only that the person threatened did learn of it and, based on words or conduct of the perpetrator, was placed in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. The State also need not prove the perpetrator’s state of mind with respect to the words or conduct that placed the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication.
FACTS
On April 28, 1999, approximately one week after the highly-publicized school shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, two Denny Middle School students, 14-year-old S.B. and 13-year-old J.T., were walking home from school. Thirteen-year-old J.M., who had recently been suspended from Denny Middle School, joined S.B. and J.T. and began to complain about the punishment he received at school. According to J.T., J.M. was angry at Wayne Hashiguchi, the principal of Denny Middle School; John Boyd, a Denny Middle School administrator; and Kevin Sharper, a Denny Middle School security person. The three students began talking about the Columbine shootings and J.M. said, “[T]hat’s like something I would do
At first, S.B. did not take J.M.’s statements seriously. But “[a]s he thought about it that night he started to think that it was possible [J.M.] would do something like that.” Clerk’s Papers at 43. The next day at school, S.B. told a friend what J.M. had said and asked that friend if he thought J.M. “would carry through on his threat.” Id. A Denny Middle School teacher overheard this conversation and reported it to a school counselor. The counselor brought S.B. to Hashiguchi, and S.B. told Hashiguchi what J.M. had said the previous day. Hashiguchi — who was aware of J.M.’s disciplinary problems at school and had observed J.M. “cry and be emotional, angry and loud” — was “shocked, surprised and concerned” and “afraid for his personal safety [.]” Id. at 44.
Hashiguchi reported the incident to the Seattle Police Department, and the State charged J.M. with felony harassment. At J.M.’s adjudicatory hearing at the close of the State’s case, J.M. moved for dismissal, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence that J.M. knew his threat would be communicated to the school principal. The juvenile court disagreed that it was necessary for the State to prove such knowledge, and denied the motion. Subsequently, the court found that J.M. made threats that were communicated to Hashiguchi, that J.M. made these threats knowingly, and that Hashiguchi’s fear for his safety was reasonable, in light of the recent shootings at Columbine High School, J.M.’s disciplinary record, and Hashiguchi’s personal experience with J.M.’s emotional reaction to disciplinary measures that had previously been imposed. The court adjudicated J.M. guilty of felony harassment. J.M. appeals.
I. The Elements of Harassment
J.M. contends that the harassment statute, RCW 9A.46-.020, requires the State to prove that he knew or reasonably should have known that the threat he communicated to two school chums to kill the school principal would be further communicated to the school principal, and that he also knowingly engaged in words or conduct that placed the principal in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. Insofar as here pertinent, the harassment statute reads as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if:
(a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens:
(i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; [and]
(b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
RCW 9A.46.020(1). “Threat” means, inter alia, “to communicate directly or indirectly the intent.. . [t]o cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person[.]” RCW 9A.04.110(25)(a). Harassment in violation of RCW 9A.46.020(l)(a)(i) by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person is a class C felony. RCW 9A.46.020(2).
J.M. contends that the adverb “knowingly” found in section (l)(a) of RCW 9A.46.020 modifies not only “threatens to cause bodily injury” under subsection (a)(i) but also modifies “by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out” under subsection (b). J.M reasons that threats, particularly threats to kill or otherwise inflict bodily injury, are seldom communicated in any other manner than knowingly or intentionally; therefore, the Legislature must have intended to criminalize something more than merely consciously uttering a threat — and the “something more” can
In response, the State maintains that in accord with the plain meaning of the statute, the adverb “knowingly” modifies only the verb that it immediately precedes, so that insofar as the perpetrator’s mens rea is concerned, the State need prove only that the accused knowingly threatened to cause bodily injury. By the State’s proposed interpretation, the focus under subsection (b) of the statute is the reasonableness of the fear of the person threatened that the threat will be carried out, which reasonableness must be measured objectively in light of words or conduct of the perpetrator that the perpetrator may but need not have known or intended would place the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
The State reasons further that the Legislature must have recognized that words or conduct of a perpetrator not previously thought to be particularly significant could reasonably be viewed as highly significant when placed in context with a threat made by that perpetrator. Applying the State’s reasoning to the facts of this case, it would follow that a rational trier of fact could find that the school principal was placed in reasonable fear that J.M. would carry out his threat to kill him based on the following words
As the State points out, the statutory definition of “threat” does not contain a mental element — it merely reads (insofar as here pertinent): “ ‘Threat’ means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent: (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person!.]” RCW 9A.04.110(25)(a). The State reasons that the adverb “knowingly” modifies the verb “threaten” in order to protect free speech, so that within the context of RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a) and subsection (i), a “knowing threat” means a “true threat” as that term has been used by the appellate courts, as distinguished from an idle threat. A “true threat” is a statement made in a context or under such circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm or to take the life of another person. State v. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. 367, 373-74, 957 P.2d 797 (1998) (holding that the definition of “threat” contained in RCW 9A.04.110(25)(d) and (j) encompasses both protected and unprotected speech but the definition of “threat” is not unconstitutionally overbroad in the context of RCW 9A.72.160, the Intimidating a Judge statute, because the statute proscribes only threats of substantial harm based on the discharge of a judge’s official duties), review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1029 (1998); see also State v. Williams, 98 Wn. App. 765, 769-71, 991 P.2d 107 (2000) (holding that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv)
The State’s reasoning is supported in part by the Legislature’s finding that protection from harassment can be accomplished without infringing on constitutionally protected speech or activity — which indicates that the Legislature was aware the statute encompasses some protected speech and wanted to avoid overstepping constitutional bounds. See RCW 9A.46.010. The State’s reasoning is further supported by our Supreme Court’s seminal discussion of the mental state of knowledge contained in State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 516-17, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). Under RCW 9A.08.010(l)(b), a person acts knowingly if he or she is aware of a fact, facts or circumstances or results described by a statute defining an offense — i.e., has subjective knowledge of such facts — and a trier of fact may (but is not required to) infer actual knowledge if a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe such facts exist: “The comparison to the ordinary person has been imported into many legal definitions of knowledge to make it clear to the jury what level of circumstantial evidence is sufficient for it to conclude that the defendant had actual knowledge. But the comparison creates only an inference. The jury must still find subjective knowledge.” Shipp, 93 Wn.2d at 517 (citation omitted).
Here, J.M. does not deny that he knowingly communicated a “true threat.” J.M. implicitly concedes that, in the context of the massive news coverage of the Columbine High School shootings and his own reference to those shootings when communicating the threat, a reasonable person would foresee that his statement would be interpreted as a serious threat of intention to take the life of the school principal. J.M. does not contend that he personally
Having the arguments of both sides in mind, we turn to the disposition of this case. “In interpreting statutory provisions, ‘[t]he fundamental objective ... is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature.’ ” State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 11, 904 P.2d 754 (1995) (footnote omitted) (alteration in original). “If the meaning of a statute is clear or can reasonably be discerned from the entire act or from statutory history, there is no resort to rules of statutory construction.” In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 250 n.4, 955 P.2d 798 (1998).
“In 1985 the Legislature enacted the antiharassment act as ‘part of a multifaceted remedial scheme ... to protect citizens from harmful harassing behavior.’ ” Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d at 12 (footnote omitted); see also RCW 9A.46.010 (containing legislative findings that “the prevention of serious, personal harassment is an important government objective” and that protection of citizens from harassment “can be accomplished without infringing on constitutionally protected speech or activity”).
The most natural grammatical reading of the harassment statute suggests that the adverb “knowingly” modifies only the verb phrase that it immediately precedes, here, “threatens to cause bodily injury.” Cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68, 115 S. Ct. 464, 130 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1994) (acknowledging that the “most natural grammatical reading. .. suggests that the term ‘knowingly’ modifies only the surrounding verbs[.]”) Nonetheless, strict grammatical construction may be disregarded if, e.g., there is supporting legislative intent. Id. at 68-69, 73-78 (holding that “knowingly” modified not only the verbs it immediately preceded, but also modified the phrase, “use of a minor” in federal child pornography statute); but cf. State
The legislative intent as expressed in the harassment statute as a whole does not support J.M.’s contention that we should disregard the most natural grammatical construction. A person who has been threatened indirectly may be placed in fear that is just as reasonable (based on words or conduct of the perpetrator) as if the threat had been made directly. The threatened person does have to find out that the threat was made, one way or another, or else there can be no reasonable fear on the part of that person that the threat will be carried out. But whether or not the perpetrator intended the threatened person to find out about the threat is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the fear that the threat will be carried out once the person threatened does find out about the threat. Although it may seem intuitive that in order to harass someone the perpetrator must intend that the person threatened find out that he or she has been threatened, we have to look to the Legislature’s definition of the crime — and the Legislature has not placed an intent or knowledge element with respect to the finding out. See RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i)-(b). We decline to add such an element. Cf. State v. Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712, 717, 862 P.2d 117 (1993) (holding that a perpetrator who communicated to his attorney a threat to “blow away” a judge was guilty of violating the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, notwithstanding the perpetrator’s belief that the judge would never learn of his threat, because the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, RCW 9A.72.160(1), does not include a requirement “that a threat... be made with the intent or knowledge that it will reach the judge”).
Such legislative awareness is evidenced by another section of the act, RCW 9A.46.030, which provides that any harassment offense committed as set forth in 9A.46.020 may be deemed to have been committed where the conduct occurred, or at the place from which the threat or threats were made, or at the place where the threats were received. This section reflects a realistic understanding that a person may communicate a threat, directly or indirectly, at a given time and place, the person threatened may receive the threat at a different time and place, and words or conduct of the perpetrator that may have occurred at yet another time and place may put the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
Such was the case in State v. Ragin, 94 Wn. App. 407, 972 P.2d 519 (1999). There, the victim befriended the defendant and, over a period of time, the defendant told the victim that he, the defendant, had been convicted of armed robbery, had been involved in domestic violence, and was well known to the police. Id. at 409. Some months later, during an episode of extreme rage directed in part toward the church that both the defendant and the victim attended, the defendant told the victim that he, the defen
A defendant is guilty of felony harassment if he threatens to [kill] a person, and the person is placed in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. The fact finder applies an objective standard to determine whether the victim’s fear that the threat will be carried out is reasonable. This requires the jury to consider the defendant’s conduct in context and to sift out idle threats from threats that warrant the mobilization of penal sanctions. The State had to prove that it was reasonable for [the victim] to believe [the defendant] would kill [the victim] and his family. . . . [The victim’s] knowledge of [the defendant’s] prior violent acts was relevant to the reasonable fear element of felony harassment.
. .. The jury was entitled to know what [the victim] knew at the time [the defendant] threatened him to decide whether a reasonable person knowing what [the victim] knew would believe [the defendant] could carry out the threats. The State was therefore allowed to use the frightening stories [the defendant] revealed to [the victim] to prove its case. Although the prior bad acts evidence admitted in felony harassment cases generally involves the victim, the same rationale applies here. In both instances, the earlier acts are necessary to put the threats in context.
Ragin, 94 Wn. App. at 411-12 (quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
Similarly, when the defendant is charged under RCW 9A.46.020(l)(a)(i), the trier of fact must sift threats that warrant penal sanctions from idle threats, i.e., must determine whether the defendant “knowingly” made a threat to do bodily injury or to kill the person threatened or another person, i.e., whether the defendant knew subjectively that the statement would be interpreted, by whomever received it, as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of another individual. And in making
Thus, we conclude that the harassment statute does not require the State to prove that a perpetrator knew or intended that his or her indirect threat would be communicated to the person threatened. To violate the harassment statute, the perpetrator’s threat must be knowingly communicated directly or indirectly; by some means the person threatened must find out about the threat; and words or conduct of the perpetrator must place the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. But it is not necessary that the perpetrator know or intend that the person threatened will find out, and it is not necessary that the perpetrator know or intend that the person threatened be placed in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out based on words or conduct of the perpetrator. Indeed, the perpetrator is equally culpable under the harassment statute regardless of whether he or she had every reason to believe that the person to whom the threat was communicated would keep it confidential — such as might be the case with school chums who may be reluctant to squeal on other kids — so long as the necessary elements are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the meaning of the harassment statute can readily be discerned from the plain language of the statute and the entire legislative act, we will not address the parties’ statutory construction arguments. See In re Charles, 135 Wn.2d at 250 n.4.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.M. contends that reversal of his juvenile adjudication is required because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the elements of harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. He also contends that the juvenile court failed to
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court examines whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-21, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). If we find that the evidence is insufficient in this case, we must reverse the adjudication and dismiss the charge. See State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 103, 954 P.2d 900 (1998).
As discussed above, the elements of the harassment statute, RCW 9A.46.020, are satisfied when a perpetrator knowingly communicates a threat, directly or indirectly, and by some means the person threatened finds out about it and is placed in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out based on words or conduct of the perpetrator. In this case, the record reflects that J.M., an emotional student who had experienced disciplinary problems at school, and who was angry at the principal and other Denny Middle School authority figures, revealed a plan to shoot these men that was similar to the highly-publicized shootings at Columbine High School. This took place only a few days after the school shootings at Columbine. J.M. averred that he and an accomplice would enter the school, kill the principal and two others, and flee the state. According to two Denny Middle School students who heard the threat, J.M. seemed angry, excited, and agitated. One student believed that J.M. might carry out his plan, and asked a friend if he thought this to be possible. As a result of this conversation, which was overheard by a teacher, the principal of the school found out what J.M. had said. The principal knew that J.M. had been suspended and that he had become highly emotional in response to past school disciplinary measures. The principal was afraid that the threat would be carried out.
Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that J.M. knowingly communicated to two fellow students a threat to kill the principal,
We find no deficiency in the juvenile court’s written findings. After a juvenile’s adjudicatory hearing, the “court shall enter written findings and conclusions in a case that is appealed. The findings shall state the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision.” JuCR 7.11(d). “Ultimate facts” are defined as “ [I] ssuable facts; facts essential to the right of action or matter of defense.. .. Facts which are necessary to determine issues in case, as distinguished from evidentiary facts supporting them. The logical conclusions deduced from certain primary evidentiary facts. Final facts required to establish ... defendant’s defense.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1522 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted), quoted in Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d at 15 n.15. The juvenile court’s findings, which we have summarized in the statement of facts for this opinion, meet the requirements of JuCR 7.11(d) in every particular.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Baker and Ellington, JJ., concur.
Review granted at 143 Wn.2d 1008 (2001).