The question on this appeal is whether defendant is operating a “children’s boarding home” requiring a lítense under the provisions of Code chapter 237. The trial court denied the State injunctive relief primarily on the ground defendant was not. furnishing “lodging” as required by sеction 237.2. It provides:
“Any person who receives for care and treatment or has in his custody at any one time one or mоre children under the age of sixteen years unattended by parent or guardian, for the purpose of providing them with food, care, and lodging, except childrеn related to him by blood or marriage, and except children received by him with the intent of adopting them into his own family, shall be deemed to maintain a children’s boarding home. This definition shall not include any person who is caring for children for a period of less than thirty days.” (Emphasis added).
In 1909 Miss Jennie Coulter opened a day nursery in Burlington. It was incorporated in 1934 under the name of The Jenniе Coulter Day Nursery. It has always been operated as a charity, not a *581 business, by the Norman Circle of Kings Daughters and Sons. The membеrs give generously of their time and efforts. Its current matron has been so employed for 19 years. Approximately 80 percent of its operating budget is received from the Burlington Community Chest. No funds are received from any governmental unit. The State Depаrtment of Social Services knew of its operation for at least 20 years before initiating action to close the nursery in 1970.
Working mothers leave children, up to age seven, for care at the nursery. It is open from 7:00 a. m. to 5:30 p. m., Monday through Friday. No оvernight care has ever been offered or provided. During the day the children are given snacks and a hot lunch. Playtime activities, television and adjacent outdoor play area are furnished. At trial time a daily charge of 25 cents for the first child аnd 10 cents for a second child was made. Other than suggested minor changes the State made no complaint regarding the faсilities or the care given.
The State assigns three propositions for reversal; (1) the trial court erred in finding “lodging” as used in section 237.2 does not include child care in day care facilities, (2) the trial court ignored the purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting the statute and (3) the trial court erred in not properly considering the interpretive rules promulgated by the Iowa Department of Social Services.
I. Both parties cite our holding in State v. Hay,
In addition to the various descriptions and definitions of “lodging” and “lodger” set out in Hay, we note the follоwing:
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “lodger” as “one that lives or dwells in a place: one that passes the night in a place * * * ” and “lodging” as “a place to live * * * a place in which to settle or come to rest * *• * sleeping accommodations * * *.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, defines “lodgings” as “Habitation in another’s house; apartments in another’s house, furnished or unfurnished, occupied for habitation; the occupier being a ‘lodger.’ ”
See also 25A Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed.
In Selvetti v. Building Inspector of Revere,
Jackson v. Engert, Mo.App.1970,
Frоm these definitions it seems clear some permanency is required. However, the meaning of “lodging” may vary according to the purpose for which that word is used. 43 C.J.S. Innkeepers § 3.
Code section 4.1(2) provides: “Words and phrases shall be construed acсording to the context and the approved usage of the language; * *
II. Although conceding we determined in State v. Hay, suprа, that “and” as used in “food, care and lodging” is used in the conjunctive, the State argues the trial court ignored the purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting that statute.
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The intent of the legislature in enacting a statute is to be gathered from the statutе itself. It is our duty to give it the interpretation its language calls for and not to speculate as to probable legislative intent apart from the wording used. We do not inquire what the legislature meant. We ask only what the statute means. Kruck v. Needles,
In determining the meaning of a statute all provisions thereof and the Act of which it is а part must be considered. We should endeavor to construe our statutes so that no part will be rendered superfluous. Further the legislature will be presumed to have inserted every part in a statute for a purpose and to have intended that evеry part shall be carried into effect. In support of each of the foregoing principles see Goergen v. Statе Tax Commission, Iowa,
Like the trial court, we do not agree. with the State’s apparent position that the intent and purpоse o£ section 237.2 is to require a license if food and care is provided. To so interpret the statute “lodging” would have no meaning and that word rendered superfluous.
III. The State’s third assigned proposition is without merit. With respect to the weight given long-standing аdministrative interpretations of a statute we said in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas,
“* * * [I]t must be remembered that the plain рrovisions of the statute cannot be altered by an administrative rule or regulation, no matter how long it has existed or been exercised by administrative authority. Clarion Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission,252 Iowa 500 , 507,107 N.W.2d 553 , 558, and citations. To permit a сommission or board to change the law by giving to the statute or Act an interpretation or construction of which its words are not susceptible would be a departure from the meaning expressed by the words of the statute. Hindman v. Reaser,246 Iowa 1375 ,72 N.W.2d 559 . * *
See also Nishnabotna Valley Rural Elec. Coop. v. Iowa P. & L. Co., Iowa,
This case is readily factually distinguishable from State v. Hay, supra,
We agree with the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.