State v. JenkinsState v. Jenkins
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- Before:
- Peters
The only issue in this appeal is whether a trial court has discretion to suspend a part of the sentence of a person convicted of kidnapping in the first degree without the use of a firearm. The defendant, Mark Jenkins, was convicted, after a trial to a jury, of burglary in the second degree, a violation of
For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that the state proved, at trial, that the defendant and Gregory Howard in the early hours of July 14, 1983, broke into the kitchen of an apartment at Brookside Avenue in New Haven. When the fifteen year old victim entered the kitchen to investigate the disturbance, the two men choked him, threatened him, and dragged him outside. The victim was dragged in the direction of a nearby park. Once the victim was no longer being choked, he began to scream and the men fled the scene. *673The victim ran to the home of a neighbor to report the crime. A medical examination disclosed that the victim had sustained neck injuries that were consistent with his having been choked. The defendant does not contest that this evidentiary showing was sufficient to sustain his conviction of the crimes with which he was charged.3
At the sentencing proceedings, the defendant urged the trial court to consider suspending part of the ten year sentence, which is the minimum sentence for conviction under
The trial court, although agreeing with the defendant that there was some ambiguity in the relationship between the relevant statutes, determined that it was constrained to follow §§ 53a-28 and 53a-29 and to impose a mandatory sentence. The court expressly stated to the defendant that “[pjerhaps your recommended sentence might be the better avenue to take but I don’t feel the law permits me to do so.” The record is therefore clear that the trial court, despite the *674defendant‘s argument to the contrary, ruled that it was constrained not to consider a partially suspended sentence.
Our review of the propriety of the sentencing proceedings at trial must start with a close reading of the applicable statutes. The defendant stands convicted of the crime of kidnapping in the first degree, a crime which, under
Unfortunately, the unassailable logic of this statutory pattern must be reconciled with the enactment, in 1975, of
The legislative history of the enactment of
The question before us, then, is how this court should deal with legislative error that mistakenly assigns a lesser penalty to a greater crime. Read literally, the statutes impose on this defendant, convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, a mandatory minimum sentence that exceeds by nine years the mandatory minimum sentence that would be faced by someone convicted of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm. Such a discrepancy necessarily implicates the equal protection clauses of our federal and state constitutions.9
To avoid a constitutional confrontation, each of the parties urges us to construe the statutes to effectuate legislative intent. They urge us to consider a variety of suggestions for interpretations that might serve to reconcile the 1975 statute with the pre-existing sentencing pattern. None of these arguments, in the form advanced by the litigants, is ultimately persuasive.
The defendant argues that we should assign primary importance to the legislative intent, in Public Acts 1975, No. 75-380, of providing more severe penalties for *678crimes involving the use of firearms than for those that do not involve such use. Accordingly, the defendant maintains that we should construe the statutes in their entirety to permit unlimited judicial discretion to suspend sentences in crimes not involving the use of firearms. The defendant would have us find ambiguity in
The state offers three different constructions to implement the intent of the public act to enhance penalties for firearm-related crimes. Its first suggestion is that the new statute creates a statutory safety net to provide a minimum mandatory prison term of one year in the event that a future legislature dismantles the existing statutory framework requiring mandatory minimum sentences for class A felonies. The state itself recognizes that this interpretation “is not precisely what the legislature intended” in enacting
The state’s argument of nullification, because it serves as a reminder of the doctrine of repeal by implication, provides a sound basis for sustaining the defendant’s argument that his sentence needs further review. The legislature, cognizant of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection, must be deemed to have sought to attain a rational and sensible result that avoids placing a statute in constitutional jeopardy. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63-64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981). It is not rational and sensible to impose a lesser term of mandatory imprisonment on one convicted of *680kidnapping with the use of a firearm than on one convicted for a similar crime not involving a firearm. To avoid the constitutional quagmire that otherwise would confront us, we hold that the legislation codified as
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The defendant and Gregory Howard were charged with commission of the same crimes, and were tried jointly. Like the defendant, Howard was convicted of the crimes charged, and sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment of ten years. Howard has not appealed the judgment against him.
“(b) Except as provided in sections 53a-45, 53a-46a, 53a-54b and 53a-92, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by sections 18-65a or 18-73; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine and a period of probation, or a period of conditional discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by section 18-65 or 18-73; or (8) a sentence of unconditional discharge.
“(c) A sentence to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
“(b) The court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an offense, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; and (2) probation supervision is not appropriate.”
“(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.”
The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part:
“(CITIZENSHIP defined, privileges OF CITIZENS.)
“Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution provides:
“(EQUAL PROTECTION. NO SEGREGATION OR DISCRIMINATION.)
“Sec. 20. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”