*1 JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, STATE OF NEW JENKINS, JOHN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Arguеd February November 1977 Decided Brock, Defender, Ms. A. Kathryn Assistant Public Deputy Ness, C. Van Stanley the cause for argued appellant (Mr. Public Defender, attorney). Parrillo,
Mr. Anthony General, ar Attorney Deputy *2 the cause gued Hyland, fоr William P. respondent (Mr. of Attorney General New Jersey, attorney). The is affirmed for judgment substantially
Per Curiam. the reasons of the Di expressed the opinion Appellate vision. JJ., and The Court Sohbeibee, dissenting.
Olieeoed nar certification, 73 N. granted J. 39 limited to the (1976), row of J. A. issue whether N. 2A:151-5 in S. should be to include the That terpreted crime of manslaughter. for
provides an enhancеd sentence to be on one imposed convicted certain enumerated crimes while committed armed. Absent—and extensive conspicuously so—from that of those list crimes is In mаnslaughter. holding defendant, armed, who was convicted of while manslaughter may be sentenced to an additional for term fea ture, the Court not discards the only effectively established intеrpretive statutes principle strictly should be Meinken, construed, State v. 10 N. J. (1952); Giroux, Edwards, Neeld v. N. J. 224, State v. (1957); N. Carbone, J. 298 (1958); State v. J.N. Sutherland, see Statutory Construc generally tion, 59.03 6-8 .(Sands 1974), 4th ed. but also misper intent, eeives the legislative heed pays scant significant and, statutory history, way, a along contributes generous of revisionism dollop to the law. chronicles of the common The factual setting uncomplicated. case is The homi- cide occurred 23, 1974, about on March Eu- midnight when Lucas and Jenkins, nice John who had been living together, and over a somehow quarreled begаn “tussling” gun The discharged, fatally court, Eunice. trial wounding having a dismissed first the conclusion charge degree case, of the State’s on charged jury second mur- degree der and and voluntary involuntаry jury the defendant of murder in the second acquitted while armed. guilty a returned verdict for manslaughter 6 to years sentenced Defendant to run con- armed, the sentences for to 2 to years affirmed. The Appellate currently. statute. wording on the focus
At outset we follows: A. reads as 2A:151-5 S. Any person attempts rob- who commits or to commit murder, may- larceny, burglary, breaking entering, rape bery, arson, extortion, kidnapping, sodomy treason, hem, abduction, having fugitive justice, his when armed with a who * * * any shall, punishment possession firearm addition to the punished crime, imprison- рrovided first conviction * * years than one nor more than 10 ment for less *. *3 in reference any The vain for may enactment be examined omission, this manslaughter. Notwithstanding whatsoever to Quinones, 140 Division, the v. State Appellate relying J. that the 1976), Legis- N. Div. reasoned Super. (App. context in this lature intended that the word “murder” that in common law sense and concluded should be used its The at сommon law murder encompassed manslaughter. having in case majority reasoning, that approved Quinones, affirmed for day, substantially also decided this Quinones, v. reasons in the below. State the stated opinions N. J. 391 (1978). we note that the Initially rudimentary rather principle alluded, construction to which we have statutory heretofore that leads construed, statutes should be nаmely, strictly ato result from that reached the directly opposite by Court. murder, refers to plain, unambiguous statutory language In contrary the absence of some legis lative valid we duе history reason, other should give to v. Legislature’s deference the choice of words. Hoffman Hock, Sutherland, N. 397, Statutory J. 2A Construction, 46.01 4th (Sands 1974). ed. § statute, we to look beyond
Were inclined the words the hesitant to which we do such a are construing straight- forward, enactment, worded criminal clearly neverthe- we less would still be to led reverse. When initially enacted 1927 the did not includе murder. Additional penalties only were for the com- imposed attempt to mit or the commission of an bur- robbery, larceny, glary breaking and L. 1927, 321, c. 2. Two entering. § subsequent amendments to be expanded list of weapons included in the L. 1959, 1; of “armed.” c. meaning 148, L. § c. 1963, 160, 1. In 1966 to the list crimes was enlarged § “* * * add arson, rape, murder, mayhem, abduction, extor- * * tion, or treason L. kidnapping, sodomy с. 4. At that time it was that manslaughter well-settled a crime separate and distinct from murder. In v. State Brown, J. 405 (1956), N. decided some ten years prior amendment, to the Court declared: [Manslaughter degrеe is an offense distinct from and not of mur White, (Sup. der. See State v. 41 Iowa Ct. Murder distinguished the second from ele former ment essential but not the latter. .
[22 N. J. 411.] Therefore, when acted, it Legislature рresumably knew was an offense manslaughter- separate apart Miele, Barringer 144 (1951). Cf.
Reasoning Legislature intended that word “murder” should used in its common sense, law the Ap pellate prоceeded accord it a it meaning thought *4 was in will vogue (mistakenly, as be more than 400 seen) But years earlier. in the the nothing statutory history gives hint the lawmakers were slightest resorting to some archaic of the word rather the one meaning currently than it. A commonly court’s consideration of a given should in context time the of when it enacted. be the was Bd., Matawan Borough Seе Monmouth Tax 51 N. J. Cty. v. Morristown, 299 291, 65 J. State P.B.A. v. N. J. 160, (1974).
n “murder” that the word Legislature Even if the intended sense, the Appellate be used in common law its mur- law of common crime erred also the assuming that common еarly It true that der included from mur- manslaughter law of did England distinguish & Pollack all death. der, being by homicides punishable Maitland, 1899). Law 485 But History ed. English (2d of whereby benefit of subject clergy became to the homicides Adams, Con- capital punishment. offenders might spared To stitutional rev. History England (Schuyler of made benefit clergy this ecclesiastical power curb wilful murder malice “any prepеnsed,” available “malice 1, 3 it came to be known Henry c. or as (1531), murder, not in man- but element aforethought,” present commentaries, crim- Blackstone, in his described slaughter. offenses, into two being separate inal homicide as divided Blackstone, 190. Commentaries* manslaughter another as unlawful killing defined manslaughter He voluntarily upon either implied, without or express involuntarily or the commission passion sudden hand, Murder, Id* other unlawful act. on the some aforethought, as unlawful with malice killing was defined which distinguishes criterion now grand “the ** as Id.* 198. least Accordingly, other killing murder аnd century, as the sixteenth early developments crimes. These occurred separate were treated hence part the Revolution and formed before long Mairs, N. L. v. common law of this State. State received Loudon, N. J. Eq. Loudon v. Ct. (Sup. 1795); Vince, In re 2 N. J. & A. 1933); 251-252 (E. Brown, Court supra, acknowledged In State this (1949). law common between developed distinction had manslaughter: murder аnd malicious, general
At as a all homicide is common law rule justified per- murder, by command amounts unless where law; of accident self- excused the account mission manslaughter, prеservation, either alleviated into *5 involuntary consequence act, (volun strictly lawful, of some not or tary) sufficiently provoca occasioned some sudden and violent Manslаughter killing tion. the unlawful of another without express implied, may voluntarily, either or be either upon heat, involuntarily, a or sudden but in the commission of some presumed unlawful And act. at common law all homicide is be to contrary upon “appeareth malicious until 4 Black evidence.” Com., 224, 229, stone’s sections [22 N. 410-411.] J. at Thus, we have to sought demonstrate, the assumption the court now of the below—and here —with majority respect to early common law is historically unsound.
As additional for its support analysis, court below that urged the legislative purpose the statute was to deter the use of weapons the commission of during crimes of vio- lence, so that have manslaughter must been included. It reasoned inclusion an assault and not manslaughter would be inconceivable. miss the These contentions mark. well Legislature may have to intended exclude man- slaughter, since least involuntary unlike manslaughter, not does intent. require specifiс The logic includ- ing some offenses and not may others not be readily ap- instance, Eor parent. in the 1927 act Legislature imposed armed, added for an punishment assault committed whilе and not for yet rape murder. That difference may wise, seem logical or but our proper function requires we effect to recognize give that difference. Had the to Legislаture intended include have manslaughter, it would matter been simple have inserted that crime spe- have used a cifically term such generic as “homicide.” our to rewrite It is not function thе statute to satisfy our notions of what would wise appropriate. in view of the substantive
Consequently, differences be- tween murder we manslaughter, would respect the Legis- to include the lаture’s decision one crime not the other purview within the statute.1 We vote to modify proposed passed by Assembly, A-642, 1 In code No 22, 1976, punishment consequence vember additional as a *6 of two to three tbe additional sentence vacating 'judgment commission armed years Hughes and Justices Sul For Justice affirmance —Chief and Handler —4. livan, Pashman and Schreiber —2. For modification—Justices Clifford CORP., IN MATTER FAIRFIELD GENERAL OF THE A JERSEY CORPORATION. NEW McLAUGHLIN, FOR FAIRFIELD RECEIVER GEN JOHN J. CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, ERAL PRESLEY, EXECUTOR THE VERNON E. UNDER LAST PRESLEY, AND TESTAMENT OF DE WILL ELVIS CEASED, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. February Argued October 1977 —Decided (Section :12-l(b) only (3)), burglary applied to assault 2C robbery (Section 2C:18-2(b) 2C:19-l(b)). (2)), (Section In- Charge Jury terestingly, consisting defines the Model — Charges only Jury N. J. Model and second first (Noy. 19, Crim., Charge 2.223